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Introduction
On the I s* of January 1999 eleven European Union (EU) members fixed their cur­
rencies to form the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In the run-up to the 
formation of the euro area candidate countries had to  fulfil a set of entry criteria 
laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht. These consisted of limitations on nominal 
exchange rate volatility, and on the levels of inflation, interest rate, public debt and 
fiscal deficit. After the successful formation of the common currency, the countries 
gave up individual monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB), which 
supposedly, at least for some, meant a gain in credibility and a substantial change 
in monetary policy in general. Finally, following the latest wave of EU enlargement, 
which took place on the 1st of May 2004, in the next years we can expect new mem­
bers to be aiming to join the euro. The five nominal criteria will most certainly 
be applied to future enlargements. Whilst before EU entry practically all candidate 
countries declared a willingness to join the euro ”as soon as possible” the question 
wlicther they are ready and suitable to do so, is important.
Moreover, many researchers, such as Gali and Perotti (2003) have expressed fear 
that the fiscal entry criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact, which did not account 
for cyclical conditions would cause a decrease in the level of public investment, as it 
is often claimed tha t capital spending is less visible, and thus easier to cut than 
current spending. If so, the restraints imposed by the Treaty and the Pact could 
lead to an under-provision of infrastructure investment. If this argument were to be 
supported by empirical evidence the preoccupation with the current inferior levels of 
public investment could prove to be even stronger in the New Member States. There, 
the current low levels of public infrastructure arc* regarded as a limitation to growth 
prospects while on the other hand in many, especially the larger New Member States 
fiscal deficits tend to be above or close to the of GDP maximum required to 
join the euro area. Thus joining the EMU will require fiscal consolidation, and there
11
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is a fear th a t, for the political reasons mentioned above. the cut will fall on public 
investment spending and thus have an adverse influence on growth prospects.
Next, there are many reasons to suspect that the introduction of the common 
currency in Europe constituted a major economic change. Tying together 11 and later 
12 currencies, replacing them with one common currency, and giving lip monetary 
policy to the European Central Bank gives strong reasons to suspect a structural 
change in monetary policy, and in the behavior of both the exchange rates against 
third currencies and prices. Related to this, a good understanding of the link between 
exchange rates and prices via tlie exchange rate pass-through, both in the current euro 
members and in the New Member States is an important factor for m onetary policy 
design and may be a relevant issue once the latter countries attem pt to  adopt the 
euro.
This thesis consists of four chapters concerning the empirical assessment of inter­
national macroeconomic issues related to the introduction of the European common 
currency.
The first chapter of the thesis analyzes the potential readiness of the New Member 
States to join the euro area. It looks at nominal and real convergence indicators, 
relative to the state of the same markers in the current EMU members in the 19t)0s. 
The nominal criteria are a selected set of variables similar to the Maastricht TVeaty 
requirements, while the real criteria arc4 derived from the  Optimum Currency Area 
theory. As most of these criteria are regarded as endogenous, a direct comparison is 
rather undesirable, and an out-of-time approach is taken, that is the Central Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) are compared with the current EMU members within 
a similar time of potential EMU entry.
The second chapter focuses on the effects of the political horizon, large fiscal 
cuts and the run-up to the euro area on public expenditure. Here the effect of elec­
tions, political cycles and political instability on [mldie spending in OECD members
12
is investigated. Additionally the chapter addresses the question whether the fiscal 
restrictions related to the introduction of the euro had any effect.
Chapter III analyzes the long run exchange rate pass-through, proposing a new 
working definition of the long run E R P T  which is less arbitrary than the ones present 
in the empirical literature, and is based on theoretical underpinnings. It then looks 
deeper into whether individual industries in EMU members can be found to  have 
full pass-through, whether this pass-through was affected by the introduction of the 
common currency, and if so, in which way had this effect worked.
Chapter IV is intended as a link between Chapters I and III. It deals with the 
estimation of short run ERPT into import prices in the Central and Eastern Euro­
pean States. Moreover, it extensively reviews exchange rate developments in these 
countries, finding that the choice of the exchange rate regime does not seem to  be a 
major determinant of the degree to  which nominal effective exchange ra te  fluctuations 
are passed on to the import price level.
All Chapters are empirical, and use up-to-date econometric tools. In more detail, 
the first Chapter ”CEE Accession Countries and the EMU - An Assessment of Relative 
Suitability and Readiness for Euro Area Membership” asks the question whether the 
New Member States look ready to  adopt the euro. Eastward enlargement of the 
euro area will result in transition economies sharing a currency with well-established 
market economies. There seem to  be vast economic and institutional differences 
between the New Member States and the EMU participants. Therefore, in this paper, 
I compare the suitability (in term s of the Optimum Currency Area theory) of the 
candidates relative to the current members at a  similar time before joining, as well 
as their readiness to comply with Maastricht criteria. Using fuzzy clustering and 
principal components, we assess patterns of convergence, possible inhomogeneities 
within the future 'enlarged* euro area and create readiness and suitability indexes. 
We find the CEECs more suitable in terms of OCA criteria and more ready than
13
some of the (southern) current members once were. Moreover, they are not found to  
follow distinct convergence paths. This analysis was carried out in 2002. and at that 
point the assumption tha t all CEECs may aim at an early entry date was plausible. 
Although, as we know, due to various, quite often exogenous developments, many 
New Member States have postponed, or have been forced to postpone joining th e  
euro, the main conclusions of the paper still appear to hold. Of the countries th a t 
have not decided to join in 2007 the CEEC-4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia) did so mainly because of the lack of political support for early membership, 
connected somewhat with the unwillingness to  reduce rather high fiscal deficits, thus 
in a sense because of the lack of the drive to fulfil the criteria rather than the technical 
infeasibility. As for the other 4 New Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, 
they seemed to aim at an early entry date; however in three cases these attem pts were 
invalidated by the inflation criterion. In the end Slovenia seems likely to he the only 
country to join the EMU in 2007 however the failure of the Baltic States to satisfy 
the inflation criterion seems rather the fault of the (currently) exceptionally low value 
of the benchmark, which was not the ease when the euro area was formed.
In the next chapter. ” How Easily is Public Investment Cut? A Dynamic Panel 
Approach" using a dynamic panel of 19 OECD countries over 1971-2001 I analyze 
the movement of public investment spending. Controlling for downward trends in 
many countries, I focus on short-term  movements and find investment a fairly rigid 
albeit pro-cyclical component of government spending. This means that on average 
public investment tends to fluctuate less than current expenditures, however I also 
find that in severe fiscal restraints it is public investment that is mostly affected. 
Momjver, the fiscal consolidations related to the adoption of the euro do not seem 
to differ in this respect. However, this cannot be treated as evidence that the fiscal 
rules accompanying the introduction of the euro had no effect at all. In a number of 
countries, strong consolidation of fiscal spending, which as we found usually affects
14
public investment spending very significantly, could be observed during the run-up 
to the EMU. T hat is, the urge to  fulfil the M aastricht Treaty criteria may have 
contributed to the reduction of public investment spending because of the need to 
reduce fiscal deficit in total. As according to the findings of the previous chapter 
one of the main obstacles for EMU membership of the CEECs will most probably 
be the fiscal deficit criterion, fiscal consolidation can be expected to occur once these 
countries make the attem pt to join the common currency. From this chapter, it 
results tha t one may therefore expect large cuts of public investment spending which 
may not be desirable in countries w ith low levels of infrastructure. Moreover, I find a 
strong link between the ’’policy horizon” of a government and public investment, in 
the sense that weaker, more myopic governments prefer to  lay even more weight of a 
fiscal consolidation on investment spending in order to preserve current spending.
The third chapter "Measuring Long Run Exchange Rate Pass-Through” is co­
authored with Olivier de Bandt from the Bank of France and Anindya Banerjee from 
the EUI. Here, we discuss the issue of estimating short- and long-run exchange rate 
pass-through (ERPT) into import prices in individual industries in the euro area 
countries and ask the question whether the introduction of the common currency 
had an effect on the degree of long run pass-through. We show how the measures 
of this rate proposed by recent papers may be flawed. The underlying theoretical 
considerations suggest the existence of a long-run relationship in the sense of Engle 
and Granger (1987) between import unit values, the exchange rate and a measure of 
foreign prices. This long-run relationship is typically ignored in the empirical analysis 
and an ad hoc alternative definition of the long run pass-through is proposed. We 
describe why the Engle and Granger (1987) long-run coefficient is im portant, how 
it may be restored to the empirical analysis by taking account of varying lag length 
and of structural breaks, and most importantly what difference is made to the policy 
debate surrounding exchange rate pass-through by differentiating between alternative 15
15
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measures of this variable. Our discussion is undertaken using; time series and panel 
d a ta  techniques for testing for cointegration in the possible presence of structu ral 
breaks. The main findings are tha t in the long run ER PT is close to  unity, especially 
in commodity sectors over all the countries. Moreover, in the other sectors we a re  
able to reject the hypothesis of zero pass-through in the long run more often then in  
previous papers. Next, even in the cases of the manufacturing sectors where pass­
through equal to one is rejected, the point estimates are generally higher than in  
previous studies and closer to one. Finally we find that if we allow for the E R P T  
to change on an estimated break date, in most cases this change occurs close to tin* 
introduction of the euro or in the vicinity to the im portant turn-around in the euro­
dollar developments. Wc find tha t long run EHPT generally increased, for which wo 
provide possible explanations.
The final chapter focuses on the estimation of the pass-through from the nominal 
effective exchange rate into import prices in Central Eastern European countries. 
Applying similar methodology as in the previous chapter I arrive at the conclusion 
th a t ER PT was not primarily driven by the choice of the exchange rate regime. In 
a number of countries characterized by very different- exchange rate1 arrangements I 
find full or close to full and immediate pass-through into import price's in general and 
especially into commodity prices. Moreover, I find that even in the short run a large 
degree of this effect seems to he passed on further to the consumer prices, which may 
potentially cause some overlooked vulnerability for the countries within the ERM II.
W ithin the chapters of this thesis 1 use a wide range of empirical tools. In C hapter 
I, following the work of Artis and Zhang (2002) I use fuzzy clustering which allows 
the search of partitions in a multi-dimensional data set. This is a some what non­
standard technique and the outcome is rather indicative than rigorous, and therefore 
it is augmented with the extraction of principal components and the formation of 
an index based on the strongest of them. The latter technique is sometimes referred
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to as classical multi-dimensional scaling. In the next C hapter, I use standard static 
and dynamic panel methods, starting from a pooled OLS estimator, a Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estim ator together with the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) 
Instrumental Variable estimator and the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estim ator. 
In a set of Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the performance of the different esti­
mators within panels of similar dimensions and setup and conclude that the LSDV 
and AB-GMM estimators seem the most appropriate for the purposes of the paper. 
Finally, in Chapter III and to  a more limited extent Chapter IV we apply an entire ar­
ray of residual based measures in order to test for cointegration - st arting from simple 
ADF tests with different lag selection criteria, then switching to Pedroni (1999) type 
panel cointegration tests with no cross-sectional dependence and the Banerjee and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (200G) test with a  common factor type dependence. Finally, these 
are extended by methods tha t allow for structural breaks, be it in single equations, 
as in Gregory and Hansen (199G), or in panels.
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Chapter I
CEE Accession Countries and the EMU 
an Assessment of Relative Suitability and 
Readiness for Euro Area Membership
Abstract
Eastw ard enlargem ent of th e  Eurozone will result in transition  econom ies 
sharing a cu rren cy  w ith w ell-established m arket econom ies. W e compart? th e  
su itab ility  (in term s of O ptim um  C urrency A rea th eory) o f  the cand id ates re l­
ative to  cu rren t m em bers at a  sim ilar tim e before jo in in g , as well as th e ir  
readiness to  com ply w ith  M aastrich t C riteria . U sing fuzzy c lu ster analysis 
and principal com p onents, we assess p atterns of convergence, possible inho­
m ogeneities w ithin the fu ture Eurozone and crea te  readiness and su itab ility  
indexes. W e find the C E E C s  m ore su itab le in term s o f  O C A  criteria  and m ore 
ready th an  som e of th e  cu rrent m em bers o n ce  wore. M oreover, th e y  are not 
found to  follow d istin ct convergence paths.*
J E L  C lassification N um bers: F 3 3 , FO, F l o ,  CG
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union. Nominal Convergence. Heal Convergence, 
Optimum CwTcncy Area, Central Eastern  Europe.
*A version of this paper has been published in the Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 20, 
September 2005, pp. 430-474. For a detailed, up-to-date overview of the developments on the issue 
of Central and Eastern European New Member States and the EMU, we refer the reader to Section 
4.4 in Chapter IV of this thesis.
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I . l  Introduction
O n th e 1>/ o f  M ay 2004 ten  E u rop ean  countries jo in  th e European U nion. T h e  en larg em en t 
agreem ent does not allow for any opt-out clause, as in th e  ease of th e  U.I\. and D e n m a rk , 
thu s those cou ntries will lx? bound to  eventually enter th e  Econom ic and M o n etary  U n io n . 
D u e to  th e  en try  requirem ents, th is  should not happen earlier than 2007. A s there se e m  
to  b e  sign ificant benefits of jo in in g  th e com m on E u rop ean  currency, it is o ften  a rg u ed  
th a t it would b e  desirable for th e  can d id ate cou ntries to  adopt th e euro u n ila tera lly  ( s e e  
for ex a m p le  \ u ti, 2002: C orice lli, 2 0 0 2 ; Bratkow ski and Kostow ski, 2 0 0 2 ). T h is  o p tio n , 
how ever, is strongly  discouraged by th e EU, and therefore does not seem  plausible f o r  
th e  tim e b ein g . T h is m eans, th a t th e  cand id ate cou n tries will have to  fulfil th e  e n tra n c e  
cr ite r ia  posed by the M aastrich t T reaty . This leads one to  ask  w hether th ese cou ntries a r o  
read y  to  fulfil the requirem ents? A re they, in general, su ita b le  for com m on cu rren cy  a re a  
m em b ersh ip ? W ill this bo done throu gh  steady convergence, or be a on e-tim e effort, fo r  
exam p le  by reducing th e fiscal d efic it excep tionally  for one year instead o f m ore th orou gh  
reform , y ield ing  perhaps p roblem s in com plying w ith  th e  S ta b ility  and G row th P act or a n y  
arran g em en t that may replace it in th e  future?
T h is  p ap e r aim s to find out in w hat respect th e  C en tra l European accession  co u n tries  
fit th e  p a tte rn s  distinguished am ong current m em bers o f th e  EM U . T h e  exercise searches 
for s im ilaritie s  am ong th e  convergence paths tow ards com m on cu rrency adop tion  o f th e  
cu rrent E u rozon e states and th a t o f  can d id ate cou ntries. In  order to  shed som e light o n  
th e p erfo rm an ce o f the accession  s ta te s , the analysis looks at how th ey  fit in th e c o re  
and n orth / sou th  periphery p a rtitio n  found in previous work (see for exam p le A rtis and  
Z hang. 2 0 0 1 ; A rtis and Zhang, 2 0 0 2 ) .
B elow , th e  M aastricht C riter ia  a re  used to  g ive an idea about readiness and  th e effort
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it will ta k e  to fulfil th e en try  requirem ents, while th e  O ptim u m  C urrency A rea (O C A ) 
ch aracteristics  serve to  ju d g e th e  su itab ility  of the accession countries relative to  cu rren t 
m em bers. H istorically, the 8  C entral E a ste rn  European (C E E C s )  enlargem ent s ta te s  are 
form er com m unist countries w ith cent rally-planned econom ies. S ix  o f th em  formed p arts 
o f other countries, and in fa ct o f  other cu rrency unions in th e  early  1990s. T h is suggests 
significant differences from th e  current m em bers.
If  th e  C E E C s can  be found to  ex h ib it strong, p ersisten t d issim ilarities in com p arison  
to  E M U  m em bers, th is m ay b e  an ind ication  th a t th ey  m ay b e significantly less su ita b le  
for E M U , or add to  th e  inhom ogeneity o f  th e Eurozone. In  th is case, en tran ce  will have a  
strong im p act on  th e  condu ct o f  m onetary  policy and effects. W h ile  finding they  convorgw l 
in a  sim ilar way as cu rrent m em bers did can  help predict th e  im p act o f a  com m on cu rren cy  
by looking at Eurozone sta tes and th eir trou bles in com plying w ith  th e S G P , th e ir p o te n tia l 
gains and losses from  jo in in g  th e  E M U . T h e  idea o f this sim ple experim ent is to  apply  
fuzzy clustering  to  look for p artition  am ong a  set o f  current E M U  m em bers and accession  
states, as possible en tran ts to  th e  euro area . T h e results are confronted w ith th a t o f  an o th er 
m u ltivariate analysis tool - principal com p onents, w hich serves for the creation  of ’read in ess1 
and ’su itab ility ’ indexes for th e  can d id ate countries and relatin g  them  to cu rrent E u rozon e 
states.
As b o th  th e M aastrich t C riteria  and O ptim um  C urrency A rea criteria  are o ften  argued 
to  be endogenous, com p aring cou ntries already in th e E M U  w ith cand id ates would b e  
p roblem atic and in effect, undesirable. Instead, th is  p ap er focuses on an  o u t-o f-tim e ’ 
analysis, that is, it looks a t d a ta  at a  ce r ta in  period o f tim e before accession, assu m ing th e  
earliest possible en try  d ate  for th e  C E E C s  i.e. 2007, and com  pares can d id ate cou n tries w ith  
m em bers, w ithin n  years before entry. T h a t  is, we perform  com p arative s ta tic s  looking  at 21
21
BHMBBggHMWBIIIWWIMBBBBBBMI— B— I
tIk? year 2007 — n for CEECs, 2001 — n for Greece and 1900 -  n for the* other EMU states.
T h is out o f tim e' analysis is ce rta in ly  not flawless, but has the advantage* o f  avoiding the* 
ex ante  vs. ex post problem . Am ong the draw backs, the most serious is definitely  t h e  
fact th a t changes o f all th e o th e r  ch aracteristics  - th e  so calk'd 'sta te -o f-th e-w orld ' a r e  
ignored. T h ese  include various asp e cts , som ew hat e x te rn a l to  our analysis, as th e fact o f  
E U  m em bership , E R M  p artic ip a tio n  and generally  su b stan tia lly  different m on etary  reg im es, 
levels o f  E u rop ean  integration , s ta te  o f the world econom y and integration and tech n o lo g y  
differences between the two decades. Amid these reservations, the m ethodology pursueM s t i l l  
seem s to  y ield  a reasonable trad e-off, although conclu sions must he drawn w ith  reserv atio n .
As a  result of operationalizing  O C A  theory, we ten d  to  find a con cen tric core/ p erip h ery  
s tru c tu re  o f the p otential com m on currency area , w ith  th e  C E E C s, blending in to  th is p a t ­
tern . T h e  transition  cou ntries converge well enough, so  th a t  w ithin 5 years o f  E M U  m em ­
bersh ip , th e y  becom e classified a s  well d istribu ted  in  th e  core/periphery p a tte rn , w h en ; 
closeness to  G erm any seem s to  govern su itab ility . In  te rm s o f nom inal convergence, so m e  
C E E C s , nam ely  th e  I ia lt ic  s ta te s  and the Czech R ep u b lic  exh ib it h igher readiness to  fu lfil 
th e M aastrich t criteria  th a n  m ost cu rrent m em bers did  w ithin 5 years o f  entry. In  fa c t ,  
althou gh  o ften  sta rtin g  from  a fa r  aw ay position, acco rd in g  to  the m ethodology used, n o n e  
o f the tran sitio n  cou n tries are, w ith in  5 years o f  p o ten tia l Eurozone m em bership , less read y  
to  qualify  then  th e  E M U  outliers w ere at a sim ilar p o in t.
1.2 The Optimum C urrency A rea
T lie  O C A  theory  was developed b y  M undell (19G1) and M cK innon  (1 0 0 3 ) and according to  
th e  prim ary view, an op tim al cu rre n cy  area is a fairly  hom ogenous region w ith synchronized 
business cycle's anel sym m etric resp onse to  sh ock s, flex ib le  prices and factor m obility. A
more recent overview  o f th e  theory ca n  be found in T av las (1 9 9 3 ). T h e  au th o r m entions 
th e following ch aracteristics  o f op tim al partic ip an ts o f a com m on  cu rrency  zone:
• Synchronization  o f business cy cles  and supply/dem and shocks - sim ilar cy cles, shocks 
and reactions reduce th e  need for sep arate m onetary  policies,
• S im ila r i ty  o f  in fla tio n  r a te s  -  O C A  th e o ry  a t t r i b u t e s  s im ila r  le v e ls  o f  in f la tio n  t o  
s im ila r  p re fe re n c e s  o n  in fla tio n , th u s  a  low c o s t  o f  jo in in g  a  c o m m o n  c u r r e n c y ,
• F a cto r m obility  - when high, is seen as a  su b stitu te  for exchange ra te  m ovem ents in 
prom oting extern al ad ju stm en t,
• P rice  anti wage flexibility  - less rigidity  am ong or betw een regions resu lts in a  less likely 
occu rren ce o f th e  sit uat ion when one region is troubled  by high unem ploym ent and the 
o th er by high inflat ion because o f th e  lack o f scope for real exchange ra te  ad ju stm en t. 
T h erefore, flexibility  serves as an  asy m m etric shock-absorbing m echanism ,
• G oods m arket in tegration  - co u n tries w ith a  sim ilar production stru c tu re  are less 
prone to  asym m etric shocks, and thus face lower c o s ts  o f fixing th e ir  cu rren cies to  
each  o ther, and pursuing a com m on m onetary  policy,
• O p e n n e s s  a n d  e c o n o m y  size -  s m a ll , o p e n  e c o n o m ie s  te n d  t o  p r e f e r  fixed  e x c h a n g e  
r a t e s ,  a s  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  m o v e m e n ts  h a w  b ig g e r  d is r u p tiv e  e lfe c ts  t h a n  in  re la tiv e ly  
c lo se d  e c o n o m ie s ,
• Trad e in teg ration  - jo in in g  a com m on cu rren cy  d isp oses o f the exch an g e ra te  risk 
associated  w ith tra ilin g , thus is m ore favorable for cou n tries which trad e intensively 
w ith  each o th er,
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• Dogrcx» of com m odity  d iversification - highly diversified econom ics a re  less v u ln e ra b le , 
w hen hit by sector-sp ecific  shocks.
• Sm all need for real exchange rate v o latility  - h istorica lly  low exch an ge ra te  v o la t i l i ty  
su ggests low cost o f fixing the currencies,
• F isc a l in tegration  - a high level of fiscal harm onization  between cou ntries, would a llo w  
for inter-regional tran sfers th at aim  at sm ooth in g  out the effects of diverse sh o ck s.
T h e  th e o ry  o f  the O ptim um  C u rren cy  A rea has been highly criticized  as th e  sheer fact o f  
jo in in g  a  com m on cu rrency  a re a  is associated  w ith a  m a jo r change in th e  econom y o f  a  
cou n try . T h e re  have l>een m any a ttem p ts  to  o p eration alize O CA  theory  (see  for e x a m p le  
Bayourni and Fichengreen , 199b and references th e re in ), but p ractically  all are  tro u b le d  
by the problem  of the end ogeneity  o f th e c r ite r ia  them selves. T h is was sharp ly  posed b y  
F rankel and R ose (1997) and Frankel and R ose (1 9 9 8 ). B y  looking at ex -an te  in d ica to rs , 
o n e cannot draw  definite conclu sions on the o p tim ality  o f a currency union. A c a n d id a te  
seem ing u nfit for a m onetary union when looking a t  h istorical O CA  ind icators may w ell 
tu rn  out an  optim al m em ber on ce in, as th e  sole fact o f  jo in in g  a  com m on cu rren cy  ch a n g es  
th e  n atu re  o f  the O C A  variab les. In fact, a m o n etary  union will most probably foster a n  
increase in tra d e  in tegration . B u sin ess cycle co rrela tio n  can  change as a consequence o f th is ,  
though th e  theory  is not con sisten t abou t the d irection  o f the change. M ore in teg ra tio n , 
throu gh In tra -In d u stry  T rad e m ay foster convergence and synchronization o f tlie  cycles, b u t 
on th e  o th e r  hand may lead to  sp ecia liza tio n  (see for exam p le K rugm an and V enables, 1 9 93 ) 
and th ereb y  m ore asym m etric shocks. A lthough the th eo retica l predictions a re  am bigu ou s, 
Frankel anti Rost; (1997) c la im  to  find stron g  su p p ort for th e  first scenario  in th e ir em p irica l 
work.
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As for th e  inflation rate  sim ilarity  cr iteria , it is im p ortant to  notice th at O C A  theory 
was m ainly  developed under th e  b e lie f o f the inflation-unem ploym ent tr a d e o ff  ( th e  Philips 
curve). T ak in g  th e  later recognized, vertical long-run Philip s curve, suggests th a t  the in­
flation in a co u n try  may not be a ctu a lly  the result o f in flation  preference, but perhaps of 
the cred ib ility  o f  th e  policy m akers. Supposedly, entering  a  m onetary  union should im prove 
credibility , thu s m ake easier th e  m ainten an ce of lower inflation .
E ven lab or m obility can  b e  su spected  o f being endogenous. B erto la  (1 9 8 9 ) as cited  in 
Tavlas (1993 ) proposes a  m odel in w hich fixing th e  exchange ra te  reduces the incom e risk 
betwi'en th e  regions, and thus fosters m ore interregional m obility. F iscal in teg ration  may 
in fact worsen th e  response to  co u n try  specific shocks, as th e  local policies m ay b e  b e tte r  
fine-tuned to  deal w ith them .
Su m m arizing, the suspected endogeneity  of th e  O C A  criteria  poses a th rea t to  the 
cred ib ility  of ex -an te  analysis, though in fact h istorical in d icators are som etim es th e  only 
tools available. T h is  is actu a lly  an argum ent in favor o f using sim ilarity  and convergence to  
m em ber cou ntries a t th e sim ilar stag e  prior to  en try  in order to  shod som e light on  possible 
outcom es for th e  cand id ates.
1.3 Accession Countries and the Eurozone
A fter th e  accession  to  th e E U , th e  C en tra l European cou n tries will be required , by the 
T reaty  o f  M aastrich t, to  jo in  th e E M U  ’as soon as they will be ready’ . O ne o f  th e  most 
stressed advantages would b e  th e cred ib ility  gain, since th e  full adoption o f th e  euro, de­
spite h isto rica l cases o f cu rren cy  u n io n s’ breakdow ns, seem s a very strong and tru stw orthy  
co m m itm en t. T h e  loss o f  th e  exch an g e ra te  as an ad ju stm en t m echanism  for absorbing  
asym m etric sh ock s does not seem  a  p rim ary  concern, as it is not certa in  w hether it serves
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th is  purpose? or contra rily  is a source? of d isturbances itse lf (th ere  is som e evid ence for t h i s  
front th e  current EU m em bers, see for in stan ce A rtis and E h rm an n , 2 0 0 0 ). Therefore?, i t  
ca n  b e  e x p ic te d  th at C E E C s  will not only be obliged to , but also aim  for en terin g  the? E M U  
as soon as possible (for an overview of argum ents in favor o f eu r o ta t io n , see? for exam  p i e  
N u ti, 2 0 0 2 ; Coricolli, 2 0 0 2 ; Bratkow ski and Itostow ski, 2 0 02 ). T h e  en try  con d ition s d i s ­
c u s s a l below  include E U  m em bership anel require a tw o year exam in ation  period. T h u s ,  
2 0 0 7  is probably  the earliest plausible d ate  for E u rozone accession, and will be? th e e le fa u lt. 
d a te  in th e  analysis condu ct eel.1
1.3.1 The Maastricht Treaty Criteria
The? M aastrich t TV<;aty o f 1002 definexl nom inal prerequisites o f the ex-onomy, m?ce?ssary fo r  
E M U  m em bership . A m ong the requirem ents to  be? fulfille'd by cand id ates are ;
*  for twe> years prior to  en try  elate:
-  the nom inal exch an g e ra te  rem aining w ithin th e ±159e E R M  II bonne Is, w ith ou t 
devaluation o f  the ce?ntral rate ,
• for one? year prior to  en try  elate:
-  the? inflation ra te  no more? than  1 .Wi points above the average o f  th e  three; E U  
m em bers w ith  lowe;st in flation ,
-  the; inte?re?st ra te  on long -term  governm ent bond s ne> m ore th an  '1% poin ts a b o v e  
the; average o f  th e th ree  low -inflation eemntrios.
-  Imelget eleficit not exceeding 3 (/i e)f G D P ,
U'his date* was the officially declared target date for Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia. Due mainly 
to inflation developments the two Baltic States were eventually forced to postpone this date. l or 
more details on this issue and an overview of the developments in the strategies to join the euro wt> 
refer the reader to Section 4.4 in Chapter IV of this thesis.
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-  government debt no higher than 00% of GDP,
At least two issues are worth noting: first of a ll, th e last two o f th e so  called ’M aastrich t 
C riteria  (M C )’ have been applied som ew hat less s tr ic tly  to  cu rren t E M U  m em bers, as they  
are acc om panied by a clause which allow s for higher values if  converging o r on an excep tion al 
basis. Second, th e  inflation and interest ra te  criteria  are assessed relative to  E U , not E M U  
m em bers, and thus may, in fact be judged  relative to  other ap p licant cou ntries, o r even th e 
opt-out cou ntries.
T h e  above criteria  have been w idely criticized (see for instance Ilu ite r , C o rse tti and 
R ou bin i, 1!)93; Bratkow ski and R ostow ski, 2002), m ainly for th e  arb itrarin ess o f th e  values 
and for accou nting  only for th e  nom inal side o f convergence and stab ility , while ignoring 
the real side. T h e y  do not account for any cyclical ad ju stm en ts, do not d isting u ish  betw een 
various types o f public spending, art; to  a large degree endogenous and tak e into exam in at ion 
a very short period . T h e  assessm ent o f th e  appropriateness o f  t he criteria  is beyond th e scope 
of th is paper, but as most probably  form ing the ob ligatory  benchm ark, th ey  w ill be used 
below for t he evaluat ion o f t he readiness o f  accession cou ntries for Eurozone m em bership.
As m entioned, the Accession C ou n tries upon jo in in g  th e  E U  will be bound to  en ter th e  
E M U , as soon as they fulfil th e  M aastrich t C riteria , as no op t-ou t clause has been allow ed.2 
In this paper, we take a  look at the perform ance o f the eight C E E  can d id ate  cou ntries, 
according to  th e  M aast richt requirem ents, and com pare th e ir  situation  to  th e  one o f current
E M I’ s ta tes  w ith in  a  sim ilar am ount o f years before en tering  the com m on currency.
2Admitted]}-, there1 is little pressure to do so, and as can be seen from the example of Sweden, 
which is the only 'old’ EU member without an opt-out clause and outside the EMU - the decision 
to join can in practice be postponed.
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1.4 The Data
T h e  E M U  candidate C E E C s have undergone tra n sitio n  from ren t rally-planned t o w a r d s  
m arket (economies. T h is  process is actu ally  still con tin u in g , but undoubt wily th e re  h a s  
been a  m a jo r structu ral break in the end of the 1980s and the beginning o f the 1 9 9 0 s  in  
th e ch aracteristics  of these econom ies. D ata  produced by  sta tistica l offices o f th e  c e n t r a l ly -  
planned (economies is not only itse lf  unreliable, but afterw ard s, in th e  first years o f t r a n s i t io n  
th e  cou n tries experienced a landslide, with falling G D P  and high levels o f  in flation , t o  b e  
followed by a sp ectacu lar rebound. Therefore the figures, if  at all available, can  be e x p e c t e d  
to  be im precise. Hence any d a ta  before, say, 1993 a re  p ractica lly  useless, and d a ta  for t h e  
early  y ears must be trea te d  w ith  ex trem e caution. T h is  problem  flaws th e  a ctu a l ch o ice  a n d  
co n stru c tio n  o f the variables for analysis, m aking th e m  far from ideal.
As m entioned, th e an aly sis tak es a specific ’out o f  tim e ' approach, th a t is c o m p a r in g  
co u n tries w ithin a ce rta in  period (years) before jo in in g  th e currency union. H ence f o r  
in stan ce , assum ing the C E E C s  a im  for entering th e  Eurozone? in 2007 , the an aly sis c o n d u c te d  
for a years prior to  m em bership  will com pare 2002  d a ta  for the accession cou ntries, 1 9 9 0  
d a ta  for G reece  and 1991 d a ta  for th e o th er E M U  s ta te s .
As th e re  is no obvious way to  d iscrim inate against «inch other the* c r ite r ia  used in t h i s  
an aly sis , tints all th e variables have been standardized by su b tractin g  th e  m ean and d iv id in g  
by the resp ective stand ard  d ev ia tio n .
1.4.1 Real Convergence Variables
A s seen before, O CA  lite ra tu re  su gg ests a num ber e>f feature's which m ake a co u n try  more? 
likely  to  be? su itab le  for com m on cu rren cy  m em bership. T h e  variables chosen for our a n a ly s is  
a re : business cycle correlation , real exchange ra te  vedatility, labor m arket fle?xibility, traele?
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in tegration  and inflation ra te . T h e  first two o f th e  above a re  measured w ith resp ect to  
G erm any, thus we are  in a sense assessing  th e su itab ility  o f  countries to  adopt a com m on 
cu rrency together w ith Germ any. T h e  reference co re  used la ter for th e  ca lcu la tio n  o f  the 
O CA  index will b e  Germ any.
T h e  business cy cle  variable is in fa c t m ore o f  a  m easure o f correlation  o f industrial
production flu ctuations, due to  th e fa c t th a t , as explained  above, shortness o f  th e  sam ple
lim its th e  estim ation  of business cy cles for th e  C E E C s . T h e  reference is G erm any, and the
correlation  is based on sm oothed (H P -filte r) m onthly  d a ta  over a period o f  8 years, th u s due
to the shortness o f the sam ple does not. vary over tim e  - a  sim plification necessary  to  avoid
the disruptive influence of early  1990s d a ta  for th e  C E E C s , and com p arability  w ith  E M U -
11. T h e  real exchange! rate v o la tility  against G erm any is cap tu red  by m onthly observations
over 2 year m oving windows. L ab o r m arket flexib ility  is proxied by a m easure o f  th e  ease
of new jo b  creat ion - an aggregate index created  upon variab les such as th e d u ration  and
com plexity  of new business reg istration  procedures, as well as th e cost o f  these procedures
and m inim um  cap ita l required re la tiv e  to  G N I. A nother suggested proxy was em ploym ent
protection  legislation, which was not used due to  th e  fact th a t it would b e  m easuring some
dem aní 1 side flexib ility  - am biguously re lated  to  th e  cap ab ility  o f  th e lab or m arket to  adjust
to  shocks. It seem s indeed u nclear w h eth er m ore s tr ic t  em ploym ent p ro tection  would lead
to less severe effects of negative shocks on  econom y, or co n trarily  slow down th e  speed o f
ad justm ent and lead to  m ore persistent shocks. T h e  degree o f  trad e in tegration  is m easured
as the share o f  trad e done w ith th e  cu rren t E M U  m em bers. T he A ccession  C ou ntries,
though not form ally  E U  m em bers e x h ib it relatively  high integration w ith th e  E u ro-113
com p arable w ith  th at o f current m em bers. A m ore precise description o f  th e d a ta  sources 
J By Euro-11 we denote the EMU excluding Luxembourg, for which data are unavailable.
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anti variables creation  can b e  fourni in A ppendix A. Am ong th e in ten tion s of th e r e a l- s id e  
an aly sis is th e  con stru ction  o f  a Su itab ility  Ind ex - a one dim ensional m easure c a p tu r in g  
the re la tiv e  su itab ility  o f a country, according to  O C A  theor>r, for th e  E u rozone.
1.4.2 Nominal Convergence Variables
T h e  ch o ice o f indicators in ord er to  measure th e  readiness o f count ries in te rm s o f M a a s tr ic h t  
c r ite r ia  is relatively straightforw ard. D ata  for in fla tion , m onthly exch an ge ra te  against t h e  
E C U  and euro, budget deficit and public debt are generally available. T h e  long t e r m  
interest ra te  on government, bonds poses a m inor availab ility  problem  in th e  ease o f  t h e  
ca n d id a te  cou ntries, and thus lias b m i proxied, for b o th  M em ber S ta te s  and A c ce ss io n  
C ou n tries, by the average* m arket lending ra te . In  ord er to  introduce reference points, tw o  
dum m ies have been added - D u m m y {0) with all the variables set to  zero and D u rn m y (M C )  
w ith all variables set to  m arginally  fulfilling th e  M C . T h e se  will form  a benchm ark  for t h o  
assessm en t, as tin1 set o f  count ries does not provide a appropriate reference. C on trary  t o  
th e  cast? o f  real convergence c r ite r ia  w here it serves th is  purpose, G erm any is not p erfo rm in g  
ex cep tio n a lly  in term s o f nom inal criteria  fulfillm ent, tliu s tin? Durtmiy(Q) serves for t h i s  
purpose, w hile D u m m y (M C )  servos as a  cu t-o ff value, h i other words, being classifuM f a r  
from  G erm any, in term s of th e  nom inal variables, would not necessarily  m ean p erform ing  
w orse th a n  G erm any. In  order to  cap tu re  cou n tries th a t score b e tte r  on tho M a a str ich t 
c r ite r ia  th a n  obliged, we adopted Durnmy(0) as the reference value, while D u in m y (M C )  is  
th e  fu rth est away in term s of a ll requirem ents, am ong th e  com binations still satisfying th e  
t reaty .
Tin* d e ta ils  concerning the crea tio n  of the variables a re  presented in A ppendix A. O ne o f  
th e  resu lts o f  o u r nom inal an aly sis  is th e  R ead iness In d ex  - intended to  he a one d im ensional
3 0
measure to score the readiness of countries to fulfil the Maastricht requirements.
1.5 The Methodology
F or each  of th e  two sets o f criteria , th e  analysis consists o f  two parts and th e resu lts  art? 
subsequently  com pared. In th e  first s tep , th e fuzzy clu sterin g  algorithm  is applied to  search 
for a  p attern  in  th e d ata . Second, principal com ponent an aly sis is used in an a tte m p t to  
sim plify th e m u ltivariate d a ta  set w ith  th e intention of crea tin g  a relative one-dim ensional 
m easure.
1.5.1 Fuzzy Clustering Algorithm
T h e  fuzzy clu sterin g  algorithm  used to  partition  th e  d a ta , can  be seen in m ore d eta il in 
K au ffm an  and Rousseeuw (1 990) or in Hoppner, K law onn, K ru se and H unkier (1 9 9 9 ). T h e  
exact m ethod em ployed is th e c-m e a n s  m ethod proposed by D u n n  (1974) and B ezd ek  (1 9 7 4 ). 
T h is follows th e  work o f A rtis and Zhang (2002) and B oreiko  (2003).
In ou r case, the d ata  set con sists o f  u countries, and p  variables. E ach  o b je c t  a** is 
characterized  by a vector o f  featu res (aq — { x u , .., x i;>} for i =  1..??), w here each variable 
is standardized w ith moan zero and u nit variance. T h e  d issim ilarity index d { i , j )  is the 
E u clid ian  d istan ce bctw<?en th e  two o b je c ts  x* and x_, in p-dim ensional space:
( 1)
T h e  o b je c tiv e  o f  th e  algorithm  is to  m inim ize th e following o b jectiv e  function  G:
(2)
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su b ject to  th e  following con stra in ts:
Vij >  0  for i =  l . .n ,  j  =  l . .m
5 3 fly =  1 for i =  1 . .«  (3 )
3
T h e  ou tcom e o f the algorithm  is a m atrix  £/nJm , w here elem ent tiij is th e  m em bership  
co efficien t, or tin; "degree o f belongingness” o f o b je c t i to  c lu ster j ,  w hile m  is th e  num ber 
o f c lu sters. E lem ents in each o f th e  n rows sum up to  1. F o r  each obj<?ct i , a re latively  high, 
d om in atin g  value of one of tin? m em bership coefficients Vij allows for assigning i to hard 
c lu ster j  w ith  high certain ty . As for d iagnostics, in order to  assess how well p artitio n ed  th e 
d a ta  are, th e  following D unn coefficient is proposed:
n m
Fm = 1 2 Y l uiv /n ( 1)
i= lv=l
and we will apply the norm alized version o f the coeffic ien t:
_  F m -  (1/m ) _  m F rn -  1 
1 — (1/m ) m  — 1
w hich a fter  inserting  equation  (-4) in to  (5) yields:
« i S k i X r - ,  «&/» - 1
m — 1
(S)
(B)
T h e  above tak es values from  0 - co m p lete  fuzziness, w hen m em bership  indices have the 
sam e value, to  1 - no fuzziness, when each  o b ject is assigned to  a ce rta in  c lu ster with the 
m em bership  coefficient o f 1. In  the la t te r  ease we can  sp eak  o f a ‘c lea r’ o r ‘hard ' p artition .
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The measure of the quality of classification in the hard cluster, the silhouette width of 
object i is calculated as follows:
*(’) = - b(i} f f u -,i (7)
- 1  <  s{i) < 1
where a (i) is the average dissimilarity of i from all objects in the same cluster (in our case 
the average Euclidian distance l/ (»c/(i) — and MO the minimum (across
all other clusters) of the average dissimilarity of i from all the objects in each single other 
cluster. When s(t) is close to one, this implies that a (i) is small with respitet to 6(i), that is, 
the object is well classified in the appropriate cluster. If s(i)  is close to zero, this implies that 
a(t) and h(i) are approximately equal, thus it is unclear which cluster should i belong to. 
Negative s(i) implies i is assigned to the wrong cluster. Silhouette width values for clusters 
and the whole data set indicate the quality of respectively cluster and total partition. In 
order to choose the optimal number of clusters m average silhouette maximizat ion has been 
applied.
1.5.2 Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis is a multivariate analysis tool, which aims at reducing the 
number of variables in the data. In fact, in a mult ¡-variable data set, it is often the case that 
groups of variables move together. Th is may be a sign of the redundancy of information 
as variables may be driven by common underlying forces, thus being only a realization 
of tilt! core structure of the data set. Extracting the principal components allows for a 
simplification of the data by replacing the variance of a group of variables with a single new
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one. Each principal component is a linear combination of the original variables, that, is th e  
data matrix X  with n observations and p  variables can be transform«) into the Z  m atrix, 
where:
Zi =  crii Ar] + 0 (2 ^ 2  T ■■■ V QipXp for i = 1 ..p (8)
Principal components have two distinctive features:
• the p  components are orthogonal to each other, thus there is no redundancy of infor­
mation,
• the first component explains the largest percentage of the variation in the original 
p-dimonsional data set (the second principal component explains the stcond largest 
percentage and so on).
Although there is not necessarily a pure dimensional gain (there arep principal components, 
from p  initial variables if not perfectly co-linear), often the first, few principal components 
account for most of the variation while the contribution of the rest is negligible. The prob­
lem of extracting principal components is basically that of obtaining the eigenvectors and 
eigenvalues o f the data correlation matrix, and arranging the eigenvalues in decreasing order. 
The highest eigenvalue will distinguish the first principal component and the corresponding 
eigenvector will contain the variable loadings - that is the (Vs.
The application of principal component analysis in creating aggregate indexes for multi- 
variable analysis follows the work of Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000) and is generally 
a method of classical multi-dimensional scaling. The redum l dimension framework allows 
for creating a more straightforward index of closeness', data patterns presentation, partition 
and interpretation. In the first stop, Bartlett's 2 test is list'd for finding tlit1 dimensionality of 
the data set, which is then used as guidance for selecting the number of principal components
:W
used for creating the index. Second, the principal components themselves are extracted and 
the old data set is transformed with respect to them. The following requirements are used 
to find the exact number of components preserved for further analysis:
• cumulatively, they explain at least 60% of the sample variance,
• each of the components is associated with an eigenvalue greater than 1,
• individual contribution of each principal component in explaining overall variance is 
at least 15%.
Next, upon the previously selected most significant components, the weighted Euclidian 
distance from the reference values is taken:
where m  is the selected number of principal components, Wj is the percent of variance 
explained by component j ,  Zij is the value of new variable Zj for country i (see equation 
(8)). The reference values R  are: in the case of Real Convergence - Germany, and in the 
case of Nominal Convergence - D um m y(0). As the purpose of the component extraction is 
the formation of the indexes we will not be troubled by the interpretation of t he components 
themselves, which often proves to be problematic.
Tiie main weakness of the principal components approach is the sensitivity to basic data 
modifications. Revisions, updates or inclusions of other countries affect the variance of the 
data set, and thus the principal components themselves.
m
{%ij ZRj)2Wj
IN D (i) = m (9)
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1.6 Results and Discussion
C lu sterin g  appears to  be an in terestin g  m ethod o f analyzing E M U  convergence. A p p rop ri­
ately , allow ing for a fuzzy p artitio n  perm its us to  m ake use o f a m uch b ro ad er sp e c tru m  
o f in form ation . T h e  m ain advantage! over hard clu sterin g  is th a t observ ation s, in our c a s e  
cou n tries, are  not stric tly  a llo cated  to  single clu sters, but given a coefficient o f  b elon gin gn ess 
to  each clu ster . T h is allows the d eterm ination , not on ly  of sim ilarities betw een  co u n tries  
inside th e  clu sters, but also  the degree' of in ter-clu ster cou ntry  correspond ence, as well a s  
o f s im ilaritie s  between clusters. T h e  application o f principal com p onents in trod u ces m o re  
rigor to  th e  results and allows th e  form ation o f su itab ility  and readiness indexes, w h ich  
though rough, give a c learer idea on how candidates perform  relative to  each o th e r  in te rm s  
of O C A  m em bership and M aastrich t C riteria com p lian ce.
1.6.1 OCA Criteria
T h e  resu lts o f  fuzzy clu ster an aly sis applied to th e  O C A  criteria  are d isp layed in T ab le  1. 
D ue to  th e  fact th at two out of five variables are tim e  invariant proxies, on ly  tw o p eriod s 
of e x a m in a tio n  have been taken : 11 and .j years before p o ten tia l accession . In  both  th e  
o p tim al nu m ber o f clu sters is 5, and  th e  d ata ex h ib its  q u ite  a high degrtte o f fuzziness -  th e  
D u n n 's  norm alized coefficient is in eq u al to  0 .31 . T h is  stren g th en s th e argu m ent for using  
th e fuzzy version of th e clusttiring  alg orith m . M oreover, in bo th  cases th e  p a rtitio n  ap p ears 
q u ite  sound - none of th e  co u n tries  is m iselassified, and  th e lowest o b je c t silh o u ette  is 
0 .4 0 . W e con sid er G erm any as th e  d efault com m on cu rren cy  m em ber in th e  w hole o f H eal 
C onvergence analysis. T h u s, w ith in  11 years before p oten tia l adoption o f th e  euro, 'th e  
co re ’ , th a t is th e  countries most suitable? to  jo in , lies betw een clu ster I and II . G erm an y 's , 
and hence ‘th e  cores' coefficients a re  4!)(/i and 20% respectively. T h e co u n try  w ith  alm ost
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OCA Criteria 11 years before EMU OCA Criteria 5 years before EMU
Country I
Clusters 
II III IV V
Count ry 
Silh. I
Clusters 
II III IV V
Count ry 
Silh.
Austria .7 7 .07 .08 .00 .02 .84 .42 .25 .25 .05 .03 .50
Belgium .7 6 .07 .09 .05 .02 .81 .4 4 .20 .23 .05 .03 .46
Finland .11 .43 .11 .27 .07 .89 .11 .13 .08 .6 0 .07 .82
France .6 6 .1G .09 .07 .02 .76 .7 0 .19 .06 .04 .01 .73
Germany .4 9 .20 .14 .11 .00 .72 .4 7 .27 .15 .07 .04 .07
Greece .00 .00 .00 .00 1 .0 1.0 .00 .00 .00 .00 1 .0 1.0
Ireland .12 .52 .11 .21 .04 .89 .16 .17 .09 .5 3 .04 .70
Italy .8 6 .05 .05 .02 .01 .83 .16 .41 .29 .11 .03 .58
Net herb .4 9 .23 .12 .10 .0G .52 .5 7 .21 .11 .08 .03 .74
Portugal .4 3 .12 .28 .08 .08 .54 .12 .22 .58 .04 .05 .73
Spain .6 6 .09 .17 .05 .03 .73 .07 .19 .70 .02 .02 .43
CzechR. .63 .08 .21 .05 .03 .03 .26 .4 2 .24 .05 .02 .48
Estonia .10 .24 .20 .42 .04 .52 .4 7 .25 .12 .13 .01 .01
Hungary .12 .10 .55 .17 .00 .67 .03 .00 .89 .01 .01 .72
Latvia .05 .25 .12 .56 .03 .57 .09 .11 .05 .72 .02 .55
Lithuania .07 .15 .15 .57 .07 .68 .05 .05 .03 .84 .02 .82
Poland .10 .07 .68 .12 .03 .01 .19 .4 0 .22 .15 .04 .72
Slovakia .17 .17 .42 .19 .05 .40 .15 .5 5 .21 .04 .02 .48
Slovenia .65 .07 .20 .05 .04 .65 .13 .17 .59 .04 .00 .70
CL.Silh. .70 .89 .58 .59 1.0 .70 .02 .50 .06 .72 1.0 .05
Dunn .3124 .3138
Table 1: Optimum Currency Area - fuzzy clustering results. Column "Country Silh." gives 
country silhouette value. How "CL. Silh." gives cluster silhouette value and ’’Dunn” gives 
Dunn's fuzziness coefficient. Bold numbers indicate hard cluster assignment.
identical distribution among clusters is the Netherlands, and thus is the primary candidate 
for joining Germany in a common currency, exhibiting low inflation and real exchange 
rate volatility, high trade integration and labor market flexibility, together with an average 
business cycle correlation. Next is France, with a high business cycle correlation and less 
flexible labor market. Austria and Belgium are found to  be very similar to each other, 
and moreover very close to the core. Italy is also close to  the two, except for a higher 
inflation level. Further away, yet still in cluster I there are: Portugal and Spain joined by 
the Czech Hepublic and Slovenia. Eleven years before accession these exhibit a large degree 
of similarity. Cluster II with Finland and Ireland, though with coefficients of 43% and 52%,
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H ard C lu ster B u sin ess
C y cle
Real 
Ex.R ate;
L ab o r
M arket
Trad e
In teg rat.
In flation
IT , A F S .B E L .F R . 
S P .S L .V C Z ,G E R . 
X L .P T
M e d -IIi Low -M od M ed-Low M ed -IIi L ow -M ed
FLN .IR L Low Mod Hi Low Low-M ix 1
P L ,H L \ S L K Hi Ili Low M od-Low Hi
L IT .L A T ,E S T L o w -IIi Mod Hi Low Hi
G R Low Low Low Hi Hi
T a b le  2 : O C A  11 years before E M U  - hard clu ster ch aracteristics .
is charaeterizt'd  by low tra d e  in teg ratio n  and business cy cle  correlation , high labor m arket, 
flexib ility  and medium real ex ch an g e  rate? volatility. B o th , but especially F in lan d , show a  
high d egree o f resem blance to  th e  th ree  B a ltic  S ta te s , classified  in a hard sep a ra te  c lu s te r  
( IV ) m ainly  due to  higher in fla tio n  and real exchange ra te  volatility. G reece rem ains in  a  
separate; c lu ster, which su ggests th a t according to  O C A  criteria , in 1990, 11 years b e fo re  
acced ing to  tilt; E M U , G reece w as riot part o f  th e  G erm any-based  optim al cu rren cy  a r e a . 
C lu ster I I I  Is oomposixl o f  H ungary, Boland and Slovakia - characterized  by high b u sin ess 
cy cle  co rre la tio n , exchange ra te  v o la tility  and inflation , and low lab or m arket flex ib ility . 
I f  we con sid er the fact th a t all C E E C s  excluding L ith u an ia  (15% ) and L atv ia  (12% ) h a v e  
coefficien ts o f belongingness to  th is  c lu ster higher th an  2 0 % , we can  interpret th is as t h e  
C en tra l E u rop ean  periphery. It is w orth noting that th is  c lu ster exh ib its  a  high degree o f  
sim ilarity  to  P ortu gal (2 8 % ) and S p a in  (17% ).
T ab le  2 shows th e  d u s te r  ch a ra c te r is tic s , w hich to g e th e r  with th e  results in T ab ic  1, 
allow us to  roughly sketch a p rim ary  view o f th e  p attern :
• t h e  c o r e  - G erm any, N eth erlan d s, F ran ce, A u stria and Belgium , followed by I ta ly  
and fu rth er by Spain , S lovenia, Czech R ep u b lic and Portugal.
• t h e  n o r t h e r n  p e r ip h e r y  - F in lan d  and Ireland , w itli som e sim ilarity  to  the B a lt ic
TS
Hard Cluster Business
Cycle
Real
Ex.Rate
Labor
Market
Trade
Integrai.
Inflation
F R ,N L ,E ST ,G E R ,
AUS
Med-IIi Low-Med Med-Low Med-Hi Low-Med
SLK ,C Z ,IT ,P L Hi-Med Hi-Med Low-Med Med Low-Med
IIU ,SP,PT,SLN Med-IIi Med Low Hi Hi
LIT ,LA T,FIN ,IR L Low Low Hi-Med Low Low-Med
G R Low Med Low Med Hi
Table 3: OCA 5 years before EMU - hard cluster characteristics.
States.
• th e  ’tra n s it io n  p e rip h e ry ’- mainly Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, but close to all 
r“ other C EEC s.
The picture changes significantly when we move G years forward. The t ransition economics, 
further away from the early 1990s’ chaotic period, tend to have stabilized their economies, 
successfully decreased inflation and increased trade integration with current EM U mem­
bers. Hence, the notion of the transition countries and current EMU states forming diverse 
clusters, fades away. The level of inhomogeneity is not as intense, and patterns composed 
of a mix of both CEECs and EU countries emerge. The core again lies betwi'en clus­
ters I (Germany’s coefficient- 47%) and II (Germany 27%). Germany, France, Netherlands, 
Austria and Belgium show persisting strong resemblance. They are joined in cluster I by 
Estonia, which lowered its inflation substantially over this time, while accompanied by a 
strong decrease in real exchange rate volatility - thus became the primary CEEC candidate 
for the euro in terms of OCA criteria. Though in a separate cluster (II) the Czf!ch Republic 
and to a slightly lesser extent Poland anil Slovakia, are also very close to the core - their 
fuzzy coefficients exhibit a strong similarity to Germany. Cluster III can be interpreted as 
a signal of existence of the southern periphery - relatively strong belongingness of Spain,
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P ortu g al. H ungary and Slovenia also  joined by fairly sim ilar Ita ly  (2 i)/T eom pared  to 
in f lu s te r  II)  - all with average real exchange volatility, high trad e in tegration  and in fla tio n , 
and low lab o r market flexibility. C lu ster IV  indicates th e  strengthening o f th e  ties  betw een  
th e B a lt ic  S ta te s  and the northern  periphery, with the; excep tion  o f E sto n ia  w hich as in d i- 
cntcxl move* I closer to  Germ any, due to  still higher inflation and business cy cle  co rre la tio n , 
but still ex h ib its  a cooflicient of 139t in the northern periphery due to  low trade1 in teg ra tio n  
and  a relatively  flexible; lab or m ark et. G reece tends to  form  a sep arate clu ster, m ainly due; 
to  negative; business cycle? co rrela tio n , low labor m arket flexibility, and very high in fla tio n . 
T h u s th e  p a tte rn  o f in hom ogeneities changexl over th e fl year period, and can he; sum m arize*] 
as follows:
• t h e  c o r e  - G erm any, A u stria , Belgium , F ran ce and th e N etherlands joined by E s to n ia ;
• t h e  s o u t h e r n  p e r ip h e r y  -  Hungary, Sp ain , Slovenia and Portugal w ith  significant
closeneiss of Ita ly ;
• t h e  e a s t e r n  p e r ip h e r y  - Slovakia, Czech R ep u blic and Poland, su rp risingly  close; 
to  the; ewe; and showing sim ilarity  w ith Ita ly  but also  E sto n ia  and S lov en ia ;
• t h e  n o r t h e r n  p e r ip h e r y  -  L ith u an ia , L a tv ia . F in lan d  and Ireland , w ith  some» p e r­
sistin g  resem blance to  E s to n ia ;
• t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  o u t l i e r  -  G reexe , showing som e weak sim ilarities w ith th e  sou th ern  
periphery;
C lu ster an alysis yields the em erg in g  con cen tric core periphery p attern  for real conver­
gence, and th e  diffusion o f the C E E C s  betw een th e  in tra -E C  peripheries, ye't th e se  resu lts 
lack som e rigor. T h ey  co n stitu te  a s ta r tin g  point and p rincipal com ponents are; used to  see'k 
co n firm ation  of relative convergence and per forma nee accord ing  to  the O C A  cr ite r ia .
10
OCA 2 first
co m jxm en ts
tim e h  y. 5 y.
I s'  var. 4 3 .4 6 49 .72
explained
2nd var. 2 7 .5 5 2 4 .8 4
ex p la in « !
B a r t le t t ’s test p — value
n = 2 .01 .02
n = 3 .02 .0 7
T a b le  4 : O CA  A nalysis - two first principal com ponents: p ercen tag e o f variance explained 
by each com ponent and dim ensionality  test.
T h e  results o f the P C s analysis displayed in T a b le  4 (m ore d etails in th e  A ppendix B ) , 
are suflicient to  allow focusing on th e  first two com p onents, as in both  cases th ey  explain  
over 70%  of th e  variance w hilst m eeting  other previously s ta te d  requirem ents. B a r t le t t ’s 
test yields the non -re jection  o f the d im ension o f th e  d a ta  set equal 2 a t 9 9 %  confidence level 
in the case of 11 years prior en try  and a t  95%  level a t 5 years prior to  en try , thu s to g eth er 
with th e  above inform ation , allows th e  preservation solely o f  th e  first tw o com p onents for 
further analysis, w ithout an im p ortan t loss o f inform ation.
T h e  OCA S u ita b ility  In d ex  is used to  ju d ge re lativ e convergence. It is a  tran sform ation  
into o i k ; dim ension, hence results in th e  loss o f som e inform at ion com pared to  the P C  graphs 
(Figu res 2 and 4 ) , and obviously com p ared  to  clu ster analysis, but fac ilita tes  in terp reta tion . 
T h e  cou ntry  perform ance has been presented in F ig u re  1 ( 1 1  years) and F ig u re  3  (5  y ears). 
T h e first apparent observation is th a t  the O C A  criteria  ordering  is ce rta in ly  negatively  
correlated  with geographical d istance from  the co re  o f th e  com m on cu rren cy  (G erm an y ). 
Eleven years before entry, th e  C E E C s still co n stitu te  som ew hat o f a  sep arate  en tity  - their 
su itab ility  is certa in ly  lower th an  o f m ost EU  m em bers, thou gh som e sort o f 'grav ity ' forces 
are visible. F ive years before m em bership, the diversity  o f th e  form er east-b lo ck  plays a
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O C A  11 O C A  5 O C A  11 O C A  5
A u stria 0.G2 0 .5 7 Spain 1.01 1 .07
B elgium 0.65 0 .41 C zech It . 1.25 0 .4 3
Fin land 2.G2 3 .2 0 E sto n ia 2.6G 0 .8 5
F rance 0 .04 0.3G H ungary 2.93 1 .09
G erm any 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 L atv ia 2.78 1 .95
Grcxx-e 2.51 2 .9 6 L ith u an ia 4.2G 2 .9 8
Ireland 2.2G 2 .2 9 Poland 2.23 0 .9 4
Ita ly 0 .7 8 0 .9 5 Slovakia 1.98 0 .5 8
N etherlands 0 .4 8 0 .4 9 Slovenia 1.27 1.G8
Port ugal 1.49 1 .50
T a b le  5 : S u ita b ility  Index - co lu m ns ’'O C A  11” and ” O C A  5” denote values a t ,  resp ectiv e ly , 
I I -  and 5-years prior to en try  d a te .
m uch sm aller role, and th e  suggested ’g rav ity ’ p a ttern  stren g th en s. T h e  strik in g  result is  
th e  apparent rings formed by E M U  candidates -  G erm an y 's  neighbors, excluding P o la n d  
seem  most ap p rop riate  w ith O C A  in d ex  values below  0.(5, then  followed by th e second g ro u p  
- Italy , P oland , Sp ain , Hungary, and  th e  furthest away geographically  - E sto n ia , all b e lo w  
1.2. T h e  th ird  group, co n stitu tes  a  som ew hat m ore peripheral set con tain ing  P ortu gal a n d  
Slovenia - below  1.8. F in ally , the tw o last groups from  th e  ring of least su itab le  a cco rd in g  
to  th e  O CA  cr ite r ia  - L a tv ia , Ire lan d , L ithuania and F in lan d  from th e  north  to g eth er w ith  
G reece from th e  south. T h is , som ew h at grav itational p attern  suggests that close tr a d e  
and econom ical ties  govern our c r ite r ia . In fact, th e  amount, of trade done esp ecially  w ith  
G erm any, com bined with high b u sin ess cycle correlation  and low real exch an ge v o la tility  
exh ib ited  by th e  cou ntries w ith  c lo se  ties  to  G erm any, overw helm  any fading influences o f  
th e tran sitio n  for th e  C E E C s . F u rth e r  aw ay geographically , these seem to  m a tte r  less and  
thu s th e  co u n tries  w ithin larger d is ta n c e  form  th e  peripheries.
T h e  co m p ara tiv e  s ta tics  ap p roach  y ields:
• a group o f  s t a b le  o p t im u m  c u r r e n c y  a r e a  m e m b e r s ,  consisting  o f G erm any, 
F ran ce, B elg iu m , the N eth erlan d s, and A u stria ;
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F ig u re  l: F M U  candidates 11 years prior to  (p o ten tia l) en try  d ate - O C A  S u ita b ility  
Index. Lower num ber (lighter eolor) in d icates 'c loser’ in term s o f O CA criteria . Illack  -  not 
classified.
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F ig u re  2: O CA  11 years before? en try  -  c lu sters and PC’s com p ared . O b je c ts  in sam e hard 
cluster have identical icons (G erm any  inverted).
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Figure 3: 12MU candidates 3 years prior to (p o ten tia l) en try  d a te  - O C A  S u ita b ility  In ­
dex. Lower num ber (lighter co lor) ind icates clo ser’ in te rm s o f OCA crite ria . B la ck  - not 
classified.
• a group o f  c o n v e r g in g  s t a t e s ,  changing fairly  rap id ly : Czech R ep u b lic , S lovakia , 
E sto n ia , Roland, H ungary, s till rather far L a tv ia  and som ewhat further L ith u an ia ;
• a  group o f r e la t iv e ly  c lo s e  b u t  s t a b le  c o u n t r i e s  - th e  southern periphery  - Ita ly , 
Sp ain , P ortu g al jo ined  by S lovenia;
• a group o f o u t l ie r s ,  w hich are , according t o  th e  c r ite r ia  used, least op tim al for tin? 
euro: Ire lan d , and diverging G ree ce  and F in lan d .
T h e fact th at principal com ponent an aly sis  allows us th e  redu ction  of th e  d a ta  set to  tw o 
dim ensions, preserving  over 70/i o f  th e  variance, p erm its  a  m ore inform ative illu stra tion  o f 
O CA  cr ite r ia  p erform ance. T h o u g h  p erh ap s a b it rough, th e  graphs of th e  first tw o of new 
variables obtained  through P C s , allow  for a com parison  o f  our index creation  m ethodology 
and c lu ste r  an aly sis . In F igu re 2 (11 y ears) and F ig u re  4 (5  y ears) the different, hard  clu sters 
are d istinguished  by different lab els . In  F ig u re 2 a  c lea r  d is tin c tio n  between th e ‘core* m ade 
up m ostly  o f  cu rren t EM U  m em bers exclu ding G rt'ece and th e  far n orth  - F in la n d  and 
Ireland . T h e  last two cou n tries form  a clu ster which is d istinguishably  far from  oth er
11
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F ig u re  4 : O CA  5 years before en try  - d u sters  and P C s  com part'd . O b je c ts  in sam e hard 
cluster have id entical icons (G erm an y  inverted ).
clusters, but closest to the Baltic States. The eastern block countries tend to fit in the 
medium values of the first component and generally the cluster findings are well confirmed.
The two dimensional plot of the principal components analysis results 5 years prior to 
EMU membership, is visible in Figure 4. The northern periphery is apparent and similarly 
the southern periphery - Portugal, Spain, Slovenia and Hungary are plotted fairly close to 
Italy, and less to the outlying Greece. Hard clusters I and II form the respectively the strict 
and wider core of the EMU. This somewhat confirms the notion that best fit for foregoing 
own currency are, according to OCA theory, small, open economies. The CEEC economies 
are relatively small compared to EU members and the level of openness is on average similar. 
Additionally, the apparent concentric core periphery pattern, suggests some sort of a gravity 
model seems to be a next step extension to capture appropriateness for the OCA.
1.6.2 Maastricht Criteria
A fter co n stru ctin g  th e O C A  S u itab ility  Index, we turn to  assessing nom inal con v ergen ce . 
T h e  s Iuct fact, th a t countries are found su itab le to  jo in  th e  E M U  according to  th e  se lw te d  
T eal' O ptim u m  C urrency A rea variables, does not necessarily  mean that th ey  w ill not h av e 
trou b le  in com p lying  with th e  M aastrich t ‘nom inal' requirem ents and th u s d oes n ot im p ly  
actu a l E M U  readiness. In th is part, we perform  a  sim ilar analysis to  th e  above, but. w ith  
respect to  th e  M aastricht criteria .
T ab le  0 d isp lays th e clu ster analysis results, for 1 1 ,8  and  5 years before p o ten tia l E M U  
accession. As co n trary  to  th e  O CA  exercise , all five o f th e  variables used can  lx? m easured 
yearly, three periods are reported  - th is  co n tribu tes to  th e  analysis o f  th e co n v erg en ce 
p attern s. In th e  three periods exam ined  th e degree? o f  fuzziness if fairly high - betw een 0.3-1 
and 0 .4 0 . T h e  op tim al num ber of d u s te rs  is ra th er high - 7 and 8, but th is  m ay b e in part 
a ttrib u ted  to  th e  fact o f inclusion of th e  two ‘a r tif ic ia l’ dum m ies that tend  to  c lu s te r  aw ay 
from o th er o b je c ts . However excep t for 5 cases, th e  average silhouettes a re  above 0 .0 0  and 
none o f  the o b je c ts  is m isclassifierl. In th e  period o f 11 y ears before E M U  m em bersh ip , wc? 
find G erm any, F ran ce and A u stria to g e th e r  with Spain  and Portu gal. The; C zech  R ep u b lic  
and Slovakia jo in  th is clu ster, m ainly b<?cause o f fairly  sim ilar inflation, nom inal exchange? 
rate  v o latility  and interest rates. T h is  association  is w eakened by lower debt levels of th e  
two tra n sitio n  econom ies. C lu ster II co n ta in s cou ntries w ith  high budget d eficit and  public 
debt and relatively  low inflation - Ire lan d , N etherlands, Helgium  and to a lesser e x te n t - w ith  
« co e ffic ie n t o f 3 0%  - Ita ly  (m ain ly  d u e to  higher in fla tio n ). In fact Italy  is also p artitio n ed  
close to  G reece (n o te  Ita ly 's  coefficient o f  21% in clu ster V I I ) ,  which thou gh in a sep ara te  
d u ste r , has s im ilarly  a very high d eficit and high public d e b t, fairly low exch an g e ra te  
v o latility  but m uch higher inflation and interest ra te . F in lan d  clusters som ew hat b e tw m i
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Hard C lu ster Budget
Deficit
P u blic
D ebt
N om inal 
Ex.H a to
Interest
H ate
In flation
S L K .A U S .K R .S P
G E R ,C Z ,P T
All M ed-Low M ed -L ow M id -L o w M id -L o w
IR L .N L .B E L .IT Hi Hi Low -M od Low -M id L ow -M ed
D (0 ), P IN Low Low L o w -M id Low L ow -M ed
S L X , L A T , E S T Low Low Low Hi Hi
G R Hi Hi Low Hi Hi
L IT ,P L ,H U M e d i l i All Hi Ili Hi
D (M C ) Med Med Hi Med Low
T ablt* 7: M C  11 years before E M U  - hard d u ste r  ch a ra cte ris tics .
the con* clu ster I (20% ), c lu ster IV  w ith E sto n ia . L atv ia  and Slovenia (22% ) and c lu ster 
III w ith the D u m m y i0) (2 7 % ) in d icatin g  in fact that it is closest to  th e  zero values and, 
at least at th is  point, would have no problem  com plying w ith  th e  M aastricht requ irem ents. 
As em phasized before, the analy sis o f  11 years before E u rozon e entry, is troubled  by th e 
som ew hat ch ao tic  period o f rapid tran sitio n  for th e  C E E C s . T h erefore, it is not surprising 
that th e  C E E C s  ex h ib it quite; a high d egree o f  co rresp ond ence, d istingu ishable from  th e E U  
m em bers, lie n e e , c lu sters IV  and V I, are  not only fairly sim ilar to  each o ther, but co n ta in  
basically  all C E E C s  excluding Slovakia . T h e  la tte r  show s som e sim ilarity  w ith  c lu ster 
IV (1 4 % ), as d o es th e  Czech R ep u b lic  (3 1 % ). C lu ster V I co n sists  o f P oland , L ith u an ia  
(b oth  71% ) and  H ungary(5 7 % ) - and  is d istingu ishable from  IV  because o f m uch higher 
deficit and d e b t. T h e  dum m ies do not. co n trib u te  m uch to  th e  in terp reta tion , but one must 
bear in mind th a t  th ey  also serve a  p u rp ose o f  cap tu ring  convergence.
M oving ah ead  3 years, we see a  stren g th en in g  o f th e cu rren t E M U  m em bers core in 
clu ster I. G erm any, Franco, N eth erlan d s and A u stria  becom e increasingly  sim ilar, all w ith 
coefficients ab o v e 0 .0 5 . T h e y  a re  jo in e d  by Ireland (17% ), w hich scores also average on all 
th e variables, ex ce p t for public d eb t, w hich although reduced from  the previous period , still
■18
MHard C lu ster B ud get
D eficit
P u b lic
D ebt
Nom inal
E x .R a te
Interest
R a te
Inflation
A U S ,G E R ,N L ,F U
S L N ,S P
M ed M ed -H i L ow -M ed M ed-Low M ed -L ow
I T ,B E L Hi Hi Low Med M ed-Hi
L IT ,L A T ,E S T H i-M ed Low Low M ed-Low L ow -M ed
D (M C ).P L ,C Z ,F L N M ed L ow -M ed Hi All All
I IU ,S L K ,P T M ed -H i M ed -H i M ed-H i Ili Hi
D (0 ) Low Low Low Low Low
G R Hi Hi Med Hi Hi
T a b le  8 : M C  8 years before E M U  - hard  cluster ch a ra cte ristics .
rem ains high. Sp ain  and P ortu gal shift away, tow ards c lu ster II and V I, bw au se o f high 
inflation, interest ra te  and budget d efic it. T h e  C zech R ep u b lic, Poland and F in lan d  jo in  
the D m n m y {M C )  m ainly due to  close to  3%, of G D P  d eficits and relatively high exchange 
ra te  volatility. Tin* Czech R ep u blic show s also close resem blance (21% ) to  clu ster I I ,  that 
is E ston ia , L a tv ia  and L ith u an ia , w hich achieved significant nom inal stab ilization  by fixing 
exchange rates, reducing in flation , m aintain in g  very low governm ent debt but also relatively  
high d eficits. B elg ium  and Ita ly  in c lu s te r  II still exh ib it very high public debt and d eficit, 
again w ith  som e (2 1 % ) resem blance o f  th e  la tte r  to  G reece, a lso  with a very high d ebt and 
deficit, bu t clustered  sep arate ly  due to  high inflation and interest rates. (Muster V I co n ta in s 
countries with still persistent high in fla tio n  and interest ra tes , and relatively  high values 
o f all o th e r variables - th ese econom ies are  not converging, a t  least not as quickly  and  are 
still characterized  by a significant am o u n t o f instability. T h e y  include Hungary, Slovakia 
(which actu a lly  diverged, m ainly  due to  a ju m p  in in flation  and interest ra te ), and  to  a 
lesser degree Poland  (23% ) and S lo v en ia(17%,). T h e y  show som e correspondence w ith  the 
high inflation and interest ra te  Ib e ria n  countries.
W ith in  5 years o f  m em bership , th e  C E E C s  m anaged to  achieve further s tab iliza tio n  of
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Hard C lu ster Budget
D eficit
P ublic
Debt
Nominal 
E x .K a te
Interest
R ate
In fla tion
X L .A U S .E IL G E R
B K L .IR L
All H i-M ed Low -M w l Low -M ed Low -M od
E L W C Z .L A T .L IT All Low L ow -IIi Low -M od Low
S L K ,E S T Low Low M ed-Low Low -M ed Ili-M e d
P T ,S P ,H U ,IT Ili Ili-M e d H i-M ed H i-M ed Ili-M o d
S L X Lou’ Low Low Hi Hi
D (M C ),P L Med Med Ili Ili-M e d Ili-M e d
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G R Hi Hi Med Hi Hi
T u b lr  9 : M C â years before? E M U  - bard cluster ch a ra cte ristics .
th e ir (x-onomios. T h e  EU  m em bers generally ran high d eficits, tints the: core is jo in ed  by  
B elg iu m  (though only m arginally  - liO'/t, because o f  public debt, levels am ong th e  highest, in  
the E U ) and by Ireland w hich m anaged to  further reduce its  debt burden. Ita ly , P o r tu g a l, 
Sp ain  and H ungary stren g th en  th e ir resem blance, thus th e  idea o f a sou thern  p erip h ery  
seem s ju stifia b le . Poland sta y s  dost? to  the D u m m y(M C ), i.e. the cut-ofF values, but fa ils  
to  converge fu rther. F in lan d , C zw h  R epu blic, L atv ia  and L ith u an ia  seem to rem ain  am ong 
the prim e can d id ates in term s o f readiness and th e  three C E E C s  in d u s te r  I I I  show high  
sim ilarity  w ith c lu ster II , th a t is E sto n ia  and Slovakia, m ainly  due to low pu blic debt and  
sim ilar interest ra tes .
T h u s, overall applying c lu s te r  an a ly sis  to M aastricht C rite r ia , yields the; follow ing p a t­
tern :
• t h e  c o r e  -  G erm any, F ran ce , A u str ia  and N eth erlan d s, w ith Ireland w ithin reach but 
still not coping w ith the* public d ebt criteria  and to  lesser extent B elg iu m  g en erally  
sta b le  w ith the; non-fiscal c r ite r ia , but with extrem ely  excessive d ebt;
• s o u t h e r n  p e r ip h e r y  - not en tire ly  hom ogenous - P o rtu g a l. Spain , Ita ly  jo im xl by
SO
M C 2 first
com ponents
tim e 11 y. 5 y.
1st var. 48 .57  49 .53
explained
2tld var. 34.11 22 .73
explained
B a r t le t t ’s test p — valu e
n = 2 .00  .05
n —3 .08 .08
T a b le  10: M C  A nalysis -  two first p rincipal com ponents: percent ago o f variance exp lained  
by each com p onent and dim ensionality te s t .
H ungary w ith  som e resem blance to  Greece - generally  not converging to  m eet thi; 
en try  prerequisites. Poland a lthou g h  approaching th e  M aastrich t C riteria  m arginal 
values is still outside, and in m any ways resem bles th is  periphery;
• t h e  n o r t h / e a s t  p e r ip h e r y  o f leading qualifiers: F in lan d  with th e  B a lt ic  S ta te s  
to g eth er w ith  Czech R ep u blic and Slovakia o f w hich all bu t th e last stead ily  qu alify  
accord ing to  th e  M aastrich t c r ite r ia  (in this sense being m ore ’ready to  e n te r ’ th an  
th e actu al co re ). Slovakia althou gh  w ithin reach of m eeting  the requirem ents, seem s 
not to  follow a  steady convergence path , but rath er to  be fairly u nstable;
• S lo v e n ia  s ta r t ing off closer th an  m ost C E E C s, but not im proving esp ecially  in term s 
o f inflation;
T h e P C s analysis results displayed in Table 10 (m ore d eta ils  in A ppendix 13), a re  suf­
ficient to  allow focusing on th e  first tw o com ponents, as in b o th  cases th ey  cu m u latively  
explained over 70%  o f the variance in o u r sample and m eeting  o th er previously s ta ted  re­
quirem ents. B a r t le t t ’s test suggests 2 dim ensions o f  th e  d a ta  a t  95%  confidence level in 
both cases.
T h e  rules o f con stru ction  o f  th e R ead in ess Index a re  e x a c tly  th e sam e as in th e  ca se  o f
Rfflnmnt!smffn«wju«wii<)vuqouuap)onuuiJUiiuijwuuuiMJPi
51
M C  11 M C  5 M C  11 M C  5
A u stria 1 .48* 1 .92* C zech  Rep. 1 .88* 1 .5 0 *
Belgium 2.40 2 .4 2 E sto n ia 2.76 0 .9 5 *
F in land 1 .27* 2.0G* H ungary 4.32 2 .7 0
Fran ce 1 .14* 1.G8* L a tv ia 3.36 1 .7 8 *
G erm any 1 .12* 1 .7 8 * L ith u an ia 3.98 1.0G*
G reece 4.11 4 .0 5 P oland 3.64 2 .4 8
Ireland l.GG* 1.G8* Slovakia 1.G5* 1 .3 9 *
Ita ly 3 .06 3 .3 8 Slovenia 2.5G 2 .4 6
N etherlands 1 .8 1 * 1 .9 3 * Dum m y(O) 0 .00* 0 .0 0 *
P ortu gal 2.51 2.8G D u m m y (M C ) 2.21 2.21
Spain 1.9G* 2 .4 9
T a b le  11: M aastrich t C riteria  R eadiness Index - rescaled for equal D u m m y (M C ) values a t  
both  d ates. C olum ns "M C  11" and " M C  5" d enote values a t, respectively, 11- and 5-years 
prior to  en try  d ate . *  indicates values lower than  cu t-o ff point D um m y(M C )
the O C A  S u itab ility  Index, thus also  the w eaknesses are sim ilar. D u m m y(0) a c ts  as th e  
reference - id entically  to  G erm any in th e  previous an alysis . A dditionally, th e  D u m m y (M C )  
serves as a c u t-o ff  value, but ra th er one way. M ore precisely, due to  th e  fa ct o f  m in c in g  
the dim ensions to  1, we can  only b e  certain  th a t  a  value o f  th e index above th e  one o f  
D urnm y(M C ) m eans problem s w ith  com plying w ith  th e  cr ite r ia . In  th e  o p p o site  ca se , 
when th e  value is sm aller, th is  does n o t necessarily m ean m eetin g  the requ irem en ts, so lely  
that a  cou ntry  is close to  fu lfilling th em  - usually th e  closer, th e sm aller th e  ind ex, but 
it need not be so in every ca se . M oreover, th e  M C  5 y ears index is re-scaled , for th e  
D u m m y (M C )  values to  be eq u al - in order to  fa c ilita te  com p arison .
C om p arin g  th e  indexes over th e  G years yields th e  follow ing p attern :
• d iv e r g in g  - A u stria , F in la n d , F ran ce  and G erm an y  generally  qu alify ing  and Ita ly , 
P ortu gal and Spain not. qu alify in g .
• c o n v e r g in g  - all C E E C s  w ith th e  excep tion  o f  Slovenia, o f which only H u ngary  and 
Poland do not qualify.
s t a b le  - o f w hich Ireland  and N eth erlan d s clo se  to  fu lfillm ent, Slovenia, B elg iu m  and
MM
G rocxe not fulfilling, albeit for different reasons.
The significant stabilization  o f th e  C K E C s resulted in su b sta n tia l convergence tow ards 
fulfilling th e  requirem ents. W ith in  5 y ears before the E M U  accession  most o f these cou n tries 
seem well cap able o f  m eeting th e  en try  conditions, the leader being  E ston ia . G enerally  the 
B a ltic  S ta tes , Czech Republic and less s tab ly  Slovakia persist in nom inal convergence and 
would st'eni to  have less trouble to  qu alify  than  most EU  m em bers did. As for th e  o th ers, 
the main o bstacles art! rem aining budget deficits and m arginally  high public debt levels in 
Poland and H ungary (though still below  the G0(/t of G D P  requirem ent), as well as high 
i nil at ion in Slovenia. O verall, however, th e  C K E C s do not stiem  to  perform  worst! th a n  any 
o f tilt! southern KU sta tes . T h is , su ggests that all should he ca p a b le  of qualifying, though 
for the Hires? laggards it may require a  large effort - w hether it will be fiscal co n tractio n  
in Poland and H ungary or an effort to  bring down price in flation  in Slovenia. T h e  fact 
that as far as 5 years before entry, th e  C K E C s seem more ready, may a lso  be a  sort o f 
signalling. Being  relatively  young, developing econom ies they  art! generally regarded as less 
crexliblo and s ta b le . In light o f th e  tw o facts : (1 ) th e  still u n certa in  result o f the ongoing 
debate w hether th e enlargem ent co u n tries  should bo allowed to  en ter the EM U  as quickly  
as possible and w hether it is op tim al from  th e current m em bers point o f  view, and  (2) 
assum ing significant gains assunuKl to  com e from adopting th e  com m on cu rrency for the 
( 'E E C ’s, and tho will to  m aterialize th e m  as fast as possible, th e  tran sition  economic!« rnav 
lx! more determ ined to  show (signal) th a t they are in fact ready for the Eurozone.
As can  bo soon in Figures a and 7 , th e re  are clear differences, between th e  convergence 
o f countries accord ing  to  R eadiness and  Su itab ility  Indexes. T h e  ‘nom inal' structure! is 
not concentric, though does exh ib it a strengthening  southern  periphery. T h e northern  
countries, found peripheral in term s o f  O C A  criteria , look most ready in term s of M aastrich t
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Low er num ber (lighter color) in d icates 'closer’ in term s o f  fulfilling M a a strich t c r ite r ia . 
B lack  - not classified .
requirem ents. T o  put it briefly, p erh ap s not part o f th e Opt im um  C urrency A rea, as defined 
by theory, nevertheless they should need less effort to  fulfil th e  criteria  and qualify . As fo r 
the ’co re ' cou n tries, m ost are w ith in  reach of qualifying, thou gh  despite m anaging to  red u ce 
governm ent d eb t, m any rem ain  in ex cess o f the M aastrich t requirement..
T h e  B a lt ic  S ta te s  converge to  th e  northern periphery, eventually ou tp erform ing  it in  
term s o f M aastrich t cr iteria . T h e  C zech  R epu blic and Slovakia , are, in term s o f our in d e x , 
ready 11 y ears before accession , and confirm  th is p erform ance 5 years before*. O ver th e  6  
years Poland and Slovenia, b u t esp ec ia lly  H ungary jo in  th e  southern periphery in term s o f  
the variab les used. However, s ta r tin g  from  a m ore u n su itab le  position H ungary and P olan d  
stead ily  converge tow ards fulfilling th e  cr ite r ia , w hereas th e  southern  EU  m em bers show n o  
such sign w ith in  5 y ears of E M U  m em bersh ip .
T h e  plot accord in g  to  th e  tw o first principal com p on en ts, 5 years prior to  accession  is 
presented in F ig u re  8, and should  b e  confronted  w ith F ig u re  fi. C onfirm ing th e  previous 
findings, even th e  core EU  co u n tries  perform  som ew hat p oorer in term s o f  nom inal cr ite r ia  
th an  som e o f th e  C E E C s . S p a in , H u ngary  and P ortu gal show  high sim ilarity, and to g eth er
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w ith Ita ly  and to  a  lesser extent. G reece , seem  to co n stitu te  th e  'nom inal’ southern  p erip h ery  
- very sim ilar to  th e  'real' one. S lovenia is also fairly  peripheral nom inally, but show s less 
resem blance to  th e  others. T h e  previously  found ’re a l’ core and  northern periphery  co u n tries  
seem well ca p a b le  o f fulfilling th e  c r ite r ia , esp ecially  if  we con sid er that, de fa cto  th e  d ebt 
cr ite r ia  was trea p 'd  lightly. Poland  is not qualifying, bu t show ing significant con v erg en ce , 
and sharing som e o f the featu res o f  th e  southern periphery. Sum m ing up, in n om inal 
convergence an a ly sis  we find:
• t h e  c o r e  - consisting o f G erm any, France, A u stria , B elg iu m  and N etherland s, jo in ed  
by Czech R ep u blic and Slovakia , tog eth er w ith  t h e  n o r t h e r n  p e r ip h e r y  - Ire lan d , 
B a lt ic  S ta te s  and F in lan d  w hich a ctu a lly  seem  to  have less problem  to  m eet th e  M C ;
• t h e  s o u t h e r n  p e r ip h e r y  - co n sis tin g  o f Ita ly , S p ain , P ortu g al. H ungary to  a  lesser 
extent G ree ce  and Slovenia, but also  to  som e ex ten t Poland which is c lo se  to  M C  
cu t-o ff values;
I t  is a lso  w orth notin g  th at th e  findings confirm  both  nom inal and real s im ilarities  betw een
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Czech R epublic and Slovakia, and also  betw een the B a lt ic  S ta te s  - which should not be 
surprising, as those econom ies not only  show  resem blance in m any fields, but also, not so 
long ago formed p a rts  o f  oth er cou n tries and currency unions.
1.6.3 Results Compared
T h e com parison w ith  previous work is not straight forward - th ere have* not been m any 
noticeable? a ttem p ts  to  judge su itab ility  and readiness of C E K C s for the E M C  relative to  
current m em bers. N evertheless, th e  resu lts o f  th is sc?em fairly in line with previous a tte m p ts  
o f operationalizing nom inal and real convergence for these groups o f cou ntries sep arately . 
A rtis and Zhang (2 0 0 2 ) find a sim ilar p a tte rn  throughout th e current EM U  m em bers, and 
the core-periphery term inology w ithin  the? E M U  candidates has been actu ally  adopted from 
this paper. In term s of O CA  cr ite r ia , applied within a  shorter period before the E M U , th ey  
discover a sim ilar p a tte rn  o f a core* com posed o f  G erm any (by d efau lt), Franco, N etherlands, 
Belgium  and A u stria , and a southern  periphery  - P ortu gal, Sp ain , Italy  and also G reece . 
The? northern periphery found is F in lan d  and Ireland tog eth er w ith D enm ark, Sweden and 
th e U .K . which an? not part o f interest in th is  paper. Including solely EU  cou ntries allow s 
th e authors to list? b e tte r  d a ta , e s p m a lly  business cycles co rrela tio n  and labor m arket 
flexibility m easures, but tlx? sim ilarity  o f  th e ir  results yield support- to  the above findings. 
In term s o f  the M aastrich t cr ite ria , th e ir  result is slightly  d ifferent. O verall, however th e 
most appropriate period to  re la te  to  o u r resu lts is th e  an aly sis conducted by A rtis and 
Zhang (2002) for 1990-97 , as th e  o th ers  (1 9 9 5 -9 7  and 1997) d o  not even overlap our sam p le 
years. T h is  over-tim e average an aly sis is a slightly different approach , but generally  they  
find G erm any, F ran ce . A ustria, B elg iu m , th e  N etherlands and  Ireland in th e  core, Sp ain  
Portugal and Ita ly  to g eth er w ith  F in lan d  in th e  periphery and  G reece as an  outlier. I he
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fact that above results are similar but stronger than the ones in our paper can be attributed 
to the fact that our data set is bigger, much more variant and diverse, and in fact of poorer 
quality. A cluster analysis of CEECs in search for nominal and real convergence is conducted 
by Iioreiko (2003). Though, an over tim e average, the results for periods 1998-2001 and 2001 
can be compared to the above analysis. Firstly, in terms of real convergence the author 
finds Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia as the best performers, sometimes 
joined by Slovakia. The analysis above confirms the Czech Republic and Slovakia as most 
suitable according to the OCA, followed by Estonia and Hungary, but fails to find Slovenia 
in the optimal group, as it exhibits excessive inflation and low labor market flexibility (a 
variable not used by Boreiko, 2003). As for the Maastricht criteria, Boreiko (2003) finds 
the Baltic States and Slovenia as the best performing. Our analysis confirms the B altic 
States as undoubted leaders, but are joined by Czech Republic and Slovakia instead. It. 
must be noted that we base upon more recent data, which recognizes its closeness, but 
fails to find Slovenia a leader, mainly due to persistent higher inflation and interest rates. 
These two criteria cause Slovenia not to converge, but. overall it is placed very close, and in 
fact closer than many current EMU members, to fulfilling the entry requirements. Despite 
finding Slovakia a good performer in the last period (i.e. 2002) we do notice its unstable 
path towards the nominal criteria, therefore do not claim its readiness strongly. As for 
the Czech Republic, it shows persistent convergence, however still maintains an excessive 
budget deficit. As scoring high on the other criteria, this single violation, seems to  m atter 
less in our PC  analysis, though consistently with Boreiko (2003) it is ranked lower then 
the B altic States. Overall, the results are fairly similar, hut it noted that the differences in 
exact results may arise to different methodology, time horizon and data set.
As for the verification of the indexes created in this paper, we refer to Bayou mi and
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Eichengreen (1997), who use exchange rate deviation predictions based upon the estimated 
historical relation between this variable and standard deviation in real output difference, 
sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agricultural, mineral, and manufacturing 
trade in total merchandise trade, the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic G DP 
and the mean of the GDP, all relative to  Germany, in order to  develop an OCA index and 
rank countries. Therefore, using the following bilateral nominal exchange rate equation:
S D (a j)  = a  + lhSD (vi -  y j ) + fo D IS S IM ij  +  foT R A D E ij + fa S IZ E ij, (10)
on extrapolated independent variables, the authors associate low need for exchange rate 
deviations with high suitability in terms of OCA criteria. Table 12 displays the comparison 
between our OCA Suitability Index am! an OCA index from Iiayouini and Eichengreen 
(1997). Although the correlation coefficients do not seem outstandingly high, they can be 
seen as supportive: firstly the groups of countries found most and least suitable are very 
similar, and secondly the fact of the actual values correlated with a coefficient above 0.40, 
despite a use of a very different approach, and not even exactly the same years, is actually 
encouraging. Overall, the results are consistent with previous findings, but contribute 
towards a more rigorous and informative assessment of both real and nominal performance 
of CEECs when approaching EMU membership.
1.7 Conclusions
The comparative statics exercise performed above was intended to find out how Central 
European EU candidate countries fit into the partitions believed to exist among EMU 
members. It aimed to explain the convergence paths towards Eurozone accession and assess
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OCA Index 
(1998)
BfcE OCA 
Index(1997)
OCA Index 
(1991)
BfcE  OCA 
Index (1995)
Correlation 
(only EM U) .48 .42
Most suitable Netherlands
Austria
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Austria
Netherlands
Belgium
Austria
Least suitable Finland
Greece
Finland
Spain
Finland
Greece
Finland
Spain
Table 12: OCA Index comparison - with Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997).
the relative suitability and readiness o f these states for adopting the euro. The purpose is 
to yield insight on possible future inhomogeneities and policy pressures in the future union, 
potential gains and losses from joining and problems associated with fulfilling the entrance 
criteria as well as complying with the SGP or any other stability agreement that may 
replace it. Certainly, limitations to the interpretation of the results exist. Among them, the 
sheer fact that countries not seeming suitable for a common currency, may actually profit 
most from joining it. Secondly, the data period available for analysis is short, especially 
for measuring business cycle correlation - not much can be done about this. Thirdly, if 
we believe the story of the endogeneity of OCA theory, than despite the fact that the 
methodology used seems to reduce this problem significantly, we may be more reserved 
to trust, the variables used. Nevertheless, the exercise seems interesting and worth the 
trade-off.
Summarizing, in this paper we find that the CEECs exhibit quite strong convergence 
towards both fulfilling the nominal requirements as well as to  being suitable for the Eu­
ropean currency area. The transition economies seem to blend in well with the existing 
core-periphery partition of the EMU members. When assessing suitability according to
fiO
OCA criteria the Central European states fit nicely in the concentric, geographical pattern 
that can be observed within 5 years before entry. The leaders in real convergence art? the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia, which become increasingly like the core. In nominal 
convergence, the Baltic States converge rapidly, to eventually outperform most EU mem­
bers, similarly to Czech Republic, which starts of from a more stable economy and Slovakia. 
However in case of the latter, the convergence is unstable during the period. Hungary is 
found strongly present in the southern periphery in both real and nominal terms, though its 
convergence path suggests it may move towards the core, at least in terms of MO readiness. 
Slovenia starts off from a relatively privileged position in terms of both sets of the crite­
ria, but shows little convergence, similarly to the southern periphery. Poland is converging 
in terms of OCA criteria, but less in Maastricht criteria and shows some similarity with 
the southern periphery, especially concerning the fiscal policy stance. Latvia and Lithuania, 
leading in nominal convergence, in terms of real variables drift strongly towards neighboring 
Finland and the northern periphery in general. It must be emphasized that at the start of 
the analysis most C EEC s are certainly less prepared and suitable than current EMU mem­
bers were. However, within the G years examined, they become more suitable and ready 
then southern European countries were upon 5 years before Eurozone entry. In some oases, 
especially nominal criteria, they manage to  outperform current members. Thus, according 
to the analysis conducted above, the prime candidates suitable for the EMU, that should 
not haw problems being ready to satisfy the Maastricht requirements can be expected to be 
Estonia and Czech Republic, and less confidently Slovakia. These states converge towards 
the strict core. Hungary, Slovenia and Poland will require more efTort in order to comply 
with entry conditions, but if successful, the first two, Slovenia especially, should be joining 
the southern periphery, while Poland should form part of the core. The remaining B altic
G1
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S ta te s  - L ithuania and Latvia jo in  Fin land  and Ireland in th e  northern  periphery b u t should 
not have significant problems in qualifying for the E M U .
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■Appendix A: Data Sources and Descriptions
N om inal Convergence - M C:
1. Budget deficit as 9? o f G D P  (A nnual) - EM U -10 (ex . G reece) 1990-1001 - IF S  ( IM F ) , - 
1988-1990  E IU  C ou ntry  R eports - G reece 1990-1996 - E conom ist In telligence Unit C ou ntry  
R ep o rts  - C E E C s  1996-2002 - D B  R esearch ;
2. G overnm ent D ebt as % o f G D P  (A n n u al) - E M U -10  (ex . G reece ) 1988-1991 - I F S  (IM F )
- G reece 1990-1996  - Econom ist In telligence Unit C ou ntry  R ep o rts  - C E E C s  1996 -2 0 0 2  - 
D B  R esearch ;
3. N om inal E xch an g e R ate V olatility  a . against E C U  till 1999 , against euro 1999 -2002  b. 
m onth ly  d ata : - all figures from IF S  c. 2  year m oving in tervals, ending on th e  year reported  
d. ln (N E R t)- ln (N E R t-l)  e. S T D D E V (.) * 1 0 0 ;
■1. In terest R a te  (Annual) a. end o f y ear m arket lending ra te  - E M U -10 (ex. A u stria ), 
C E E C  (ex. 2002 ) - W D I (\VB) - A u stria , C E E C (2 0 0 2 )  - N atio n al S ta tis tics  Offices 
6. In flation  - C P I annual % change, I F S  Dummy(O) - all variab les set equal to  0. 
I)u n im y (M C ) - all variables set to  m arginally  fulfilling M aastrich t Treaty C riteria  require­
m ents, i.e .: F isca l Deficit =  -3%  o f G D P , e tc .
R eal C onvergence -  O C A :
1. Business C ycles C orrelation: In d u stry  P ro d u ctio n  Index, M onthly  - D a ta S tre a m  a . 8 
years, pair wist* against G erm any: - E M U -10 1986-1991  - G reece  1988-1996 - C E E C s  1991- 
2002  b. rebased at initial year =  100 c . sm oothed using I I P  filter lam bda =  1 4 400  d. 
correlation  reported  e. T IM E  IN V A R IA N T
2. Real Exchange* Rate Volatility a. against Germany,
b. E li  =  N E R (lo c a l/ D M )* P P I( lo c a I)/ P P I(G E R ), c . sources: -  P P I  - E M U -1 1 - IF S , C E E C s
- D ata S trea m  - N om inal Exchange! R a te  -  I F S  d. 2y ear m oving intervals, {'tiding on th e  year 
reported, e. ln (E R t ) - ln (E R t- l )  f. S T D D E V ( .) * 1 0 0
3. L abor M arket F lex ib ility  a. figures -W H  D oing B u siness 2 004  R eport b. T IM E  IN V A R I­
A N T c. aggregated index: - d u ration  an d  no. o f procedures required to setup  business - 
cost and m inim um  cap ita l required to  se tu p  business (9 K JD P ) - qu intile ranking 1-5 ( l-m o st 
flexible) d. d ata  for E ston ia  m issing - proxied  by average L ith u an ia  k, L atv ia
1. Trade In teg ra tio n  w ith EM U  a. (Im p ort from  E M U  cif +  E x p o rt to  E M U  fob)/ (Im port 
to ta l c if  T  Export, to ta l fob) b . W orld rlY ade A nalyzer - figures for 2002 not availab le pre­
vious year used.
».Inflation - see nominal convergence.
All variables s ta n d a rd iz e ! to have m o a n = 0  and v a r ia n c e '-1.
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Chapter II
How Easily is Public Investment Cut? 
A Dynamic Panel Approach
Abstract
Using a dynamic panel of 19 OECD countries over 1971-2004 we analyze 
the movement of public investment spending. Controlling for downward trends 
in many countries, we focus on short-term movements and find investment a 
fairly rigid, albeit pro-cyclical, component of government spending as it fluc­
tuates less than current expenditures. However, in severe fiscal restraint it is 
public investment that is mostly affected. We show that governments with a 
myopic policy horizon did not generally lower public investment, but were more 
inclined to cut it during fiscal consolidations. Moreover, fiscal consolidations 
related to the adoption of the euro did not differ in this respect.
JEL Classification Numbers: H50, H62, C23.
Keywords: Public Investment, Fiscal Adjustment, Political Horizon, EMU, 
Dynamic Panel Estimation.
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II. 1 Introduction
The last half century has seen a  notable fall in real government investment expenditures 
in most industrialized countries. Though government spending was generally increasing in 
real terms, public investment levels as a share of Gross Domestic Product fell sharply in 
many of the most developed countries. W hile undoubtedly this long-term trend decline is 
partly a matter of changes in demand for public investment it is interesting to ask how 
much movement in public investment is due to short-term fiscal and political factors.
The objective of this paper is to  assess how strongly public spending cuts aiTect govern­
ment investment and whether governments with a short horizon, politically weak or facing 
elections are more prone to cut investment instead of current expenditure, thus breaching 
the 'golden rule' of investment. Furthermore we ask whether public- investment exhibits 
the features of a Keynesian counter-cyclical tool and whether fiscal requirements associated 
with the introduction of the euro had an effect on investment in countries involved.
In order to verify the hypotheses, we use several different definitions of fiscal adjustments 
and of political horizons, as well as different specifications including a selection of cyclical, 
fiscal and political variables on a set of 19 OECD countries in the years 1971-2001. We apply 
a set of estimation techniques to a dynamic panel with a lagged dependent variable (LDV) 
in order to verify a series of hypotheses. In order to be more confident in interpreting the 
results we perform a short set of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations assessing the performance 
of the estimation techniques in a  panel setup dimensionally similar to the one available. As 
the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSD V) and Arellano and Bond (1991) General Method 
of Moments (AB-GMM) estimators seem to behave well, we use them for the purpose of 
verifying the hypotheses.
We find that, in the short term, public investment tends to  fluctuate far less than total
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government spending; however it is highly prone to cuts during a  major fiscal adjustment. 
Moreover, we find that during a budgetary consolidation, a myopic government is signif­
icantly more willing to pursue investment cuts than a government with a longer policy 
horizon. On the other hand, we fail to find any noticeable effect of upcoming elections as 
such on public investment nor any change of public investment behavior due to monetary 
integration in the EU and the related fiscal constraints such as the Maastricht Treaty entry 
criteria or the Stability and Growth Pact. The latter part of the analysis may be flawed by 
the shortness of the sample, but generally though we do find that a significant number of 
fiscal consolidations took place in the EU  countries in the second half of the 1990s, these 
did not seem to differ, at least in the effect on public investment, from other fiscal consoli­
dations in our sample. Finally we find that public investment, though following a negative 
trend in many of the OECD countries, was strongly pro-cyclical in the short-term.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II.2  review's the literature 
on the determinants of government investment, discussing previous approaches and results. 
Section II.3 presents the estimation setup and data used in the exercise, wdiile the following 
Section II.4 presents the results, their robustness to changes in specification and focuses on 
their interpretation and discussion. Finally, Section I I .5 concludes, while Appendix C con­
tains results of a Monte Carlo simulation exercise wThich provides insight on the appropriate 
estimation method.
II.2 Explaining Public Investment Changes
11.2.1 Public investment in OECD countries
Public Investment in most industrialized countries has seen a decline since the 1960s and 
1970s both as a share of GDP and of total government expenditure. In the first case,
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presented in Figure 1, the decrease is clearly visible for EMU countries excluding Ireland, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal; for the EU countries outside the EMU; for Norway, Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the US. Public investment levels measured as gross fixed capital 
formation of the general government where usually between 4-6% of GDP in the lDGOs and 
1970s while reaching levels around 1-3% with a notable exception of the 1980s’ EU accession 
countries, Ireland and Japan.
Notably, the fall in government investment is even more profound if we look at the share 
in total government spending. In Figure 2 we see that government investment spending as 
share of total government disbursements fell gradually reaching less than half the levels of 
the 1960s in all of the countries apart Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This fall is in fact visible 
in the gross values of investment, while with the available data we cannot say much about 
the net values. There is no reason to think that the depreciation rate of public capital 
should have remained the same through-out the past 40 years, but there is not much work 
done in this area. Attempts to estimate the real net public capital stock by Kamps (2004) 
do not show such a severe a drop in the stock, thus perhaps backing some theories of the 
falling marginal infrastructure demand.
As for the effect of public investment on growth, empirical estimates seem to vary quite 
widely. A detailed summary of the literature, found in De Haan and Romp (2005), points 
to the fact that although the empirical results differ in magnitude, significance and even 
direction, generally public capital stock seems to have a positive effect on growth. The link 
does appear fragile, depending on the estimation method, data and period used, the exact 
type of investment (transport, education, health etc.) and the fact that many of the studies 
can not properly account for the net effect of public investment spending, which arises from 
the fact that, as with any other type of public spending it takes resources away from other
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Figure 1: Government Investment as % of GDP.
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activities. Overall, the impact of public investment on growth seems to be much lower than 
the initial estimates of Aschauer (1989), which assessed the productivity of public capital as 
significantly higher than that of private capital. Nevertheless, practically all studies agree 
that some levels of public capital are a necessary prerequisite for growth.
In our paper we abstract from evaluating issues such as the causes and consequences 
of the long-term drop in public capital expenditure, the growth effects, changes in demand 
for public infrastructure, the possibility that, certain types of investment, have reached some 
saturation point, the potential problem of undersupply of public capital and the indirect 
effect o f privatization of certain sectors. The trend decline, if found in some countries, may 
be a demand phenomenon or a  consequence of changes in the depreciation rate, and if so 
should not have any adverse effects on the level of public capital and moreover on economic 
growth. On the other hand, if important projects are foregone because of incidental cuts in 
public expenditure caused by polit ical or other disturbances, the negative effect on develop­
ment and growth may be noticeable. Hence we focus on the reaction of public investment 
spending to fiscal adjustments and electoral cycles, yet in order to isolate the effects, take 
into account the forces determining public investment levels and the different trends in such 
spending.
II.2.2 Hypotheses
In this paper we attempt to test two main hypotheses:
• (H I) First of all, we ask the question whether public investment tends to be the least 
rigid component- of government spending i.e. does it fluctuate more than other cates 
gories of government, spending, being more likely to be subject to cuts and increase’s 
than current spending?
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We define rigidity, as short-term persistence with respect to total public spending move­
ments - that is, for example, during a total spending change of a more rigid component 
would usually change by less than x% while a less rigid component would change by more 
than x%. We are especially interested how strongly do large fiscal consolidation efforts fall 
upon public investment. That is, whether the above relationship changes when government 
finances undergo a serious cut - signalling some kind of asymmetry upon the incidence of 
consolidation.
*  (H2) Second, we ask whether governments with a  shorter policy horizon tend to  be 
more inclined to  cut investment when cutting public expenditures than governments 
that are more likely to stay in power longer.
This hypothesis originates from the idea that if elections are more frequent and the political 
situation less stable, governments may be trying to ’’ buy” votes by preserving current 
spending, which is arguably more visible to  the voters, and thus letting public investment 
bear the burden of fiscal cuts.
The two questions come from the fact that very little empirical research has been done to 
assess the effect of fiscal adjustments and the political horizon on government investment. 
On one hand, Oxley and Martin (1991) argue the existence of a "political reality that it 
is easier  to cut-back o r  postpone investm ent spending than it is to cut current spending" 
backed by Roubini and Sachs (1989), who claim that "in period o f  restrictive fisca l policies  
and fiscal consolidation  capital expenditures were the first to be reduced (often  drastically) 
given that they  were the least rigid com ponent o f  expenditures”. Intuitive explanations for 
the first view argue that public investment is less visible than current spending to the 
voter, at least in the short term, thus a myopic government, when cutting spending should 
be inclined to cut public investment. The governments’ chance of reelection would be more
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adversely affected if current spending was cut. Therefore, we implicitly assume there exists 
a trade-off between the ’short-term’ policy, as part of which current expenditure is preserved 
versus investment spending, aiming to please voters and thus at an election success, and 
’long- term’ policy goals like fiscal consolidation or infrastructure and thus growth prospects. 
The existence of a temptation to forgo the second in favor of the first because of political 
weakness and instability is based on the notion that effects of current spending cuts are 
more instantaneous and direct for individuals, while investment cuts have an effect more 
prolonged in time, more dispersed and thus individuals do not have a certainty it will affect 
them. For the sake of clarity, take a simple example - a government can promise to  raise 
teachers wages in the following year, or can promise to  build a  school. If the government 
should decide to go back on its promise, postpone its realization or perhaps spread out its 
realizat ion in a longer period of time, we can imagine different reactions to such a decision 
in t he two different scenarios. Intuitively, in the first scenario (teachers wages) the effect will 
be felt immediately and clearly by a very specific group, while in the second case (building 
a school) the effect would not. be as instant, not so clear and the affected group not as 
certain. Therefore in the first case we can expect much fiercer opposition as incentives to 
lobby are much higher. On the other hand Aubin, Berdot, Goyeau and Lafay (1988) claim 
that ”investm ent expenditure is usually m ore evident than consum ption expen d itu ie" and 
that it is more acceptable for the wide public. If we believe this than the previous story 
should not hold.
The second view is often labelled the ’’golden rule of investment” . Discussed for instance 
in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), it originates from the idea that potential benefits from 
public investment projects will be reaped in the more or less distant future, thus running 
a deficit and borrowing for investment is justified as sort of an inter-temporal deal - the
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future beneficiaries will also share the costs.
In addition to our principal line of investigation we try to verify two other questions:
• (H3) Is public investment used as a counter cyclical tool, i.e. can we ex post claim that 
public investment fluctuations followed a counter or rather a  pro cyclical pattern?
• (H4) Has the formation of the EM U had a significant effect on public investment in 
its member countries.
We do the latter by asking whether the burden of budget limits such as the Maastricht 
TYeaty requirements and the SG P afTected public investment levels. If we do find evidence 
for the Pacts’ influence on investment, this may be supportive of the literature on SG P 
reforms, and amendments to account for public investment, as in Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2004). This effect may be of special importance in light of the future EMU enlargement, 
where the CEECs, because of their currently inferior levels of infrastructure may require 
higher levels of gross investment - as did the southern countries that joined the EU in the 
1980s or as did the old members in the 1970s.
II .2.3 Empirical work on public investment
There are two main strands of empirical literature related to our analysis. The first type, 
literature on the determinants o f public investment, ranges from time-series estimations 
summarized in more detail in Lybeck (1988) or Sturm (1998) to panel data estimates as in 
De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) and Turrini (2004). A selection of important contribu­
tions have been presented in Table 1. We divide the variables used for explaining public 
investment into four main categories.
Firstly, there are the lagged values of the dependent variable. They are used to capture
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som e persistence d ynam ics that m ay be present in public investm ent figures, arising  from 
feature's such as th e  continuity  o f  certa in  p ro jec ts  or policies.
T h e  swornl ca teg o ry  can be labelled as Econom ic Structural Variables and includes real 
G D P  or its growth ra te , G D P  per ca p ita , th e  output gap, unem ploym ent and inflation. 
T h ese variables a re  used to  account for cy clica l factors and te st th e  cou n ter-cy clica lity  of 
public investm ent, th a t is w hether it is used as a stab iliza tion  to o l. G D P  in levels is used to 
test for W agners’ Law  o f  increasing share o f  governm ent spending in G D P . H enrekson (1988) 
suggests th at governm ent investm ent spending in Sweden m ay have been co u n ter-cyclica l 
but ad m its that it seem s doubtfu l th a t governm ent grow th th eories used in his estim ation  
are ap p licable to  exp lain in g  pu blic investm ent. A ubin e t  al. (11)88) find evidence in favor 
of th e  K eynesian  stab iliza t ion role o f  French governm ent investm ent using unem ploym ent 
rates. Do Ila a n  el a l. (1 9 9 6 ) using th e  G D P  grow th ra te  find evid ence th a t public investm ent 
is cou n ter-cy clica l, to  an ex ten t h igher th an  o th e r  governm ent o u tla y s . On th e o th e r  hand 
Turrin i (2001 ) uses tin 1 output gap to  find weak evidence o f  p ro-cy clica lity , a lb eit increasing 
slightly  a fter  the second phase o f th e  E M U . O th er variables in th is  categ ory  are th e ra tio  of 
m ean to  m edian incom e, as a m easure o f inequality , th e real in terest ra te  proxying for the 
a ltern a tiv e  co sts  o f investm ent and found to  have a  sign ificant neg ative effect by A ubin e t al. 
(1 0 8 8 ). De Ila a n  et al. (1996) ask th e  question w hether private investment, is a su b stitu te  
or a com plem ent o f  public investm ent and suggest th ere  is ev id ence o f com plem entarity . 
A m ong o th er variab les we have governm ent investm ent in flation , u rban ization , trad e and 
cu rrent account variab les and incom e d istrib u tio n .
F iscal Variables co n ta in  various m easures o f d eficit; governm ent receipts and spending; 
and public d ebt levels. T h e y  are included to  ta k e  account of th e  general situ ation  in the 
pu blic finances and to  test m ore specific hyp otheses such as th a t in periods o f restraint
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public investment is more likely to be cut than other government spending. Most of these 
variables are found significant if included; worth mentioning are the strongly negative effect 
of public debt on investment found by Turrini (2004), negative effects of lagged current 
expenditure and positive of tax revenues in the same work and the strong negative effect of 
the fiscal stringency dummy in De Ilaan et al. ( 199fi).
Socio-Political Variables like the degree of unionization, coalition strength, political 
scene orientation, electoral cycle, public sector employment, political stability etc. are 
included to test whether political pressure, degree of centralization, government power and 
orientation, election vicinity etc. impede public investment levels. Henrekson (1988) finds 
a  negative significant effect of weakness of coalition on public investment for Sweden. In 
the French case, Aubin et al. (1988) discover that central governments tended to raise 
investment before national elections, while local governments tended to cut investment and 
increase consumption before local-level elections. De Haan et al. (1996) do not find support 
for the importance of any of the political variables in yearly data, but manage to find 
a significant negative effect of the frequency of government changes on both government 
investment as share of G DP and as share of government outlays on three-year averages.
Finally, we have variables that may be hard to attribute to the other categories, but 
are included in order to test specific hypotheses. These are for instance EMU dummies and 
interaction variables, as in Turrini (2004), which serve for test ing whether public investment 
was affected by the fiscal stringency imposed during preparation for the EMU and the budget 
limit of the SGP.
The second type of empirical analysis relevant to our work is the literature on the com­
position and characteristics of fiscal adjustments. It tends to focus on how much of the fiscal 
cut is borne by the reduction of public investment. Balassone and Franco (2000) in a com-
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P ap er C ou n tries P u b lic E x p lan ato ry E stim atio n
and P eriod Investm ent Variables Met hod
Henrekson Sw eden G overnm ent D em and: U rbanization, ML
(1988) 1950-1984 Investm ent R eal G D P , D ependency
deflated by R ate , Incom e D istr ,
G D P  p rice U nionization , D eficit ;
d eflator Supply: Public Sector, 
U nem ploym ent, Coali­
tion, T a x  C en tra liza tio n
Aubin F ran ce , G eneral, Population growth , O LS
et al. 1 9 01 -83 C en tra l and AU ncm p, A  R eal In-
(1988) L o ca l G ov. terest, L ocal Tax to
G F C F  a t Spending growth, E lec-
C u r. P rices  
grow th
ra tes
tion D um m ies
D e Ila a n 19-22 G overnm ent E con om ic: LDV, unbalanced
et al. O E C D Investm ent A  GDP, Governm ent panel W L S ,
(199G) co u n tries , as % o f Inv. In flation  less GDP F E
revised 1 9 8 0 -1 9 9 2 G D P , as Inf., Civil Servants
in S tu rm % o f  G ov. growth, F iscal Strin-
(1998) O u tlay s gency, A  Structural 
Deficit, Private. Inv, 
Tax C entralization; 
S o cio -P o litica l: G ov­
ernm ent Pow er, C olor, 
P o litica l S tab ility , 
E lection  y ea r
De H aan 19-22 G overnm ent E co n om ic: L D V , Gov- unbalanced
et a l. O E C D Invest m ent em inent Inv. In flation panel W L S ,
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3-y ear % o f  G ov. growth, P olitica l Stabil-
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potential ture, output gap, output
ou tp u t gap interacted with 
EMU dumm y, lagged  
debt gross o f  interest 
exp., lag o f  prim ary  
CAD, all over trend  
real G D P
Ita lics  d en o te  variables significant, in at least one specification
T a b le  1: D ete rm in an ts  o f public investm ent - L itera tu re  sum m ary.
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parative statics exercise for EU countries in the 1980s and 1990s1 find positive correlation 
between fiscal consolidation and reduction of public investment, both as a share of G D P 
and as a share of primary outlays. The construction of the exercise allows only for rough 
interpretation as it cannot establish causality, control for or disentangle the various underly­
ing effects or provide a measure of significance* Similarly Jonakin and Stephens (1999) in a 
comparative statics exercise for 5 Central American economies in the period 1975-1993 find 
public investment strongly affected by fiscal adjustment. Alesina and Perotti (1990) ana­
lyze the composition and longer-term deficit reduction effect of fiscal adjustments in OECD 
countries to find that fiscal consolidation done through public investment is usually reversed 
in the near future, while current spending cuts have a more persistent effect. Their finding 
indicates that consolidation through public investment, apart from being ineffective, results 
in additional volatility in public finances. Gali and Perotti (2003) ask whether the signing 
of the Maastricht Treaty had a significant impact on public investment levels in EM U-to-be 
members. They use comparative statics and fiscal policy rule estimation to discover that a 
trend decline in public investment commenced long before, in the 1980s and took place in 
other OECD member states. They find some evidence of public investment being mildly 
pro-cyclical, but do not find a significant change of this characteristic after Maastricht. 
Sanz and Velasquez (2003) take a dynamic panel approach and use Arellano and Pond 
(1991) GMM estimates for 20 OECD countries for 1970-1997 to test the effect of govern­
ment contraction on various components of public spending. They arrive at the result that 
a number of spending categories which can be (roughly) associated with public investment , 
namely housing and economic end public services are affected more-than-proportionally by
a decrease in government size, while transport and communication is affected proportion-
lwith the exception of Greece, Portugal and Spain; Luxembourg is excluded due to data unavail­
ability
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ally. T h e se  resu lts  are not fully ad ap tab le  for our purposes, as it does not target public 
investm ent exp en d itu res directly. For a  sam ple o f O E C D  cou n tries Lane (2 0 0 3 ) e stim a tes  
individual regressions over 1900-1998 , to  find th a t governm ent investm ent spending w as th e  
most p ro-cyclical o f  th e com p onents o f governm ent spending, but th is ch a ra cte ris tic  varied 
am ong cou n tries as in th e U K  it was a c tu a lly  th e  most co u n ter-cy clica l com p onent.
Sum m arizing, th e re  is not an overw helm ing am ount of em p irica l research on p u blic 
investm ent and th e  resu lts do not seem  very robust. T h e  co n tra d ic to r)’ ev idence on th e  
question o f th e  p ro -cy clica lity  o f in vestm ent spending and  the fact th a t little  su p p ort can  
be found for the p o litica l d eterm in an ts o f  public investm ent seem  to  be ju s t som e o f th e  
interesting areas for fu rth er research.
II.3 Data and model setup
II.3.1 The econometric model
T h e model th at we will estim ate  is g enerally  a follow-up on  the se tu p  proposed by D e I la a n  
et al. (1 9 9 0 ) - a panel w ith a lagged d ep end ant variab le  and co u n try  specific in tercep ts  
augm ented by cou ntry-specific tren d s in ord er to  account, for th e  long term  decline in p u b lic  
investm ent:
P ublm 'u  =  Y ^ P k *  P v b lm 'it-k  +  ^  a *  * F isV ar? t +  [3s *  P olV ar*t
k s »
+ ^  r" * CycVar%  T ^  ^  * O tfiV arft + <&*( + /q T e lf (1)
.« .s
where P u b ln v  is th e  dependent variable; F ia V a r  is the set o f ’fisca l’ variables, th at inclu d e 
total governm ent d isbu rsem ents, dum m ies for fiscal cu ts and  in teractio n  variables; P olV u r  is 
the set o f ‘p o litic a l’ variables including election  frequency, election  dum m ies and in teractio n
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variables; C y cV ar  is the set of ’cyclical' variables, capturing the effect of the business cycle; 
O th V ar  is the set of all other variables, for example monetary integration dummies, private 
investment and the real interest rate; & is the country specific time trend coefficient; is 
the country specific intercept.
II .3.2 Variables
A more detailed description of the data sources and construction of the variables is in 
Appendix A. In our exercise we use the ratio of gross fixed capital formation of the general 
government, to GDP as the indicator of public investment. This is the most common measure 
of public investment in the literature. One of the convenient features of this measure is that 
it excludes military and defence spending. It does however, among others, include fixed 
capital formation in education, health, transport and communication, community housing, 
social security, electricity and gas supply and general public services. We are reluctant to 
use estimates of the depreciation rate in order to obtain figures for net investment for a 
number of reasons. First of all, the figures are not available for most of the countries and 
years in our setup. Second and more important, these are only estimates, thus depend on 
very strong assumptions and would add an unnecessary source of error to our investigation. 
Moreover, in our analysis of the determinants of short-term fluct uations it is gross spending 
that is more interesting, as it is the actual tool of the government decision.
As for the basic setup it follows directly from De Ilaan et al. (199G) and other empirical 
work surveyed above, but is adapted for the purpose of testing our hypotheses and alter­
native specifications are explored. We can group the explanatory variables in four main 
categories. For each of the variables we include a small description of why we find it ju sti­
fied to include in the regression. We name all the variables we used, though the individual 81
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specifications of the model consist of various subsets of variables. The first is the lagged 
values o f the dependent variable.
We estimate the model with a  selection o f Fiscal Variables such as Net Lending, Prim ary  
Balance, Current Disbursements, Total Disbursements and Total Receipts. However, for t h e  
purpose of verifying (H i) we focus on Total Disbursements and Consolidation dummies, 
the former are cyclically unadjusted and measured relative to real GDP, while the la t te r  
are constructed from other fiscal variables. 1 If  public investment spending is a rigid  
component of total spending, than we should expect, it to fluctuate less than total spending 
-  the coefficient on Total Disbursements, call it oltd-> should be lower than the share o f  
public investment in total spending, call it share, in which case an x % of GDP cut in to ta l  
spending, controlling for other factors, would be accompanied by a cxtd* z  % of GDP cut in  
investment spending. This would be lower than share*x % o f G D P - the amount we would 
expect if the cut was to affect investment spending proportionately. As for the coefficient o n  
the Consolidation dummies, call it a c n ,  it serves for the verification of whet her t he previous 
effect changes during a m ajor fiscal consolidation. In this case, we compare a a jD  * x +  olcd 
% of GDP actual cut in public investment with a share * x  % of GDP if the cut was t o  
affect investment in the same way it did total spending. Contrary to work such as Turrin i 
(2004) we do not include public debt in our set of variables, though one might think th a t  
a large burden of debt causes a  decline in public investment to  be more likely. However, 
we are not interested in the causes of cu ts in government spending or the primary balance,
and the effect o f debt should be picked up by the other fiscal variables - either through
*The working definitions of fiscal consolidation are. based on th e  idea by Alesina and P ero tti 
(1996). They propose labelling a period in which the cyclically ad justed primary fiscal deficit fa lls  
by at least 1 .5% of G D P within a year, or by a t least 1%  o f G D P in  two consecutive years a fisca l 
consolidation. We base ourselves on this prim ary definition, using additional definitions and a w ider 
range of variables for this purpose, such as to tal disbursements, prim ary balance and net lending. 
For more details check Appendix A.
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the channel of total disbursements, current disbursements and primary balance, or through 
fiscal consolidation which, it cannot be excluded, may be induced by the debt burden.
Political Dummies are included to test hypothesis (112), that is whether elections cause 
the government to sacrifice public investment for current spending. A confirmation of this 
statement can be found if the coefficient on Election dummies is negative. A negative co­
efficient on Election frequency means that a less stable political situation reduces public 
investment, while a negative coefficient on Election Frequency interacted with fiscal consol­
idation dummy is evidence that governments in a less stable situation prefer to consolidate 
through public investment.
For the third hypothesis (113), cyclical variables like the Unemployment rate, the Output 
gap, GDP growth rate and Inflation are used. Testing implicitly for the stance of public 
investment policies with respect to the business cycle, in case of a  counter-cyclical policy 
we can expect the coefficients on the Output Gap, Inflation and GDP growth rate to be 
negative, and the one on Unemployment to  be positive.
As for the verification of (114) a negative coefficient on any of the EMU dummies or their 
interaction with fiscal other variables would allow us to  argue that monetary integration 
in Europe had an additional negative impact on public investment. This would mean that 
the potential consolidations required by the fiscal criteria in order to qualify for the EM U, 
or in order to adhere to the SGP were different than other consolidations, affecting public 
investment to a larger extent. Moreover, interaction variables allow us to assess the degree 
to  which the above mentioned relationships changed because of the introduction of the euro.
Other variables include controls such as the Real interest rate as a proxy for the cost of 
investment and Private Investment as % of GDP, included to test whether there is a degree 
of substitutability between the two.
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A n o th e r im p o rtan t issue arising w hen governm ent investm ent is exam ined is w h ether 
to use values o f ex p lan ato ry  variables from  the sam e tim e periods l o r the lagged l - l  values 
to  exp lain  the d ependent variable at tim e  t. T h ere  seem s to b e  no straightforw ard answ er 
and th e  em pirical lite ra tu re  is not consistent on this m atter. W e decided to  tak e th e  values 
from th e  sam e period  as the dependent variable, as th e  division on government investm ent 
exp en d itu res in th e  budget is m ade tog eth er with o th e r  bu dgetary  decisions for a  given 
year. M oreover, w e can  som ew hat d isreard  th e qu estions of d em and for public invest m ent­
or its desired  level in  different cou ntries as t he id entification  of th o se  would be cu m bersom e. 
T h e  inclu sion  o f th e  cou ntry  specific trend s roughly tak es care o f  th is  m a tter and allow s us 
to focus on our m ain  research qu estions.
F in ally , in o rd er to  confirm  th e  sta tio n ary  natu re o f our variables, of w hich m ost are 
expressed in p ercen tag e of G D P, we refer the reader to  T able 4 in A ppendix B . O v era ll, 
panel unit root te s ts  ra th er consistently  re ject the null hypothesis o f  non-st-ationarity in th e  
specification  with individual in tercep ts. T h is  allows us to  estim ate  equation  ( 1 ) in levels.
II.3.3 Estimation techniques
For each sp ecifica tio n  we use th e follow ing techniques to  o btain  coefficient estim ates :
• O L S -P o o led  regression w ith co u n try  specific tim e dum m ies but com m on in tercep t 
(O L S ) ,
• L S D V  - fixed effects  panel e s tim a to r  (L S D V ),
• th e  A nderson and Hsiao (1 9 8 1 ) first d ifference in stru m en ta l variable (A II-1V ) w ith  
second order lag s o f th e dependent variab le  in levels as in st rument s,
• A rellan o  and B o n d  (1991) G M M  e s tim a to r  (A R -G M M ).
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Taking the 19 OECD countries sample, over the years 1971-2004, results in an unbalanced 
panel of Af=19, 71= 34 .2
If, as we believe, the fixed effect specification is correct the OLS estimator can be 
expected to be inconsistent even as N  and T  -*  oo due to the omitted variable bias,3 
however may be insightful. In this case both the LSDV and AB-GMM estimator should 
be consistent and unbiased. The AII-IV estimator can be expected to be similar to  the 
previous two but is known for its lower efficiency owed to  the fact of not exploiting available 
information and instrument weakness. We do not expect the finite sample ’Nickell bias’4 
affecting the LSDV estimator to be of a problematic order as it is a noticeable problem 
only in panels with a large N and small, fixed T  while in our case T=34>N> Thus in the 
finite sample with a similar cross section and time dimension the AB-GMM should have no 
advantage. Obviously in a macro panel of similar N and T, both relatively small, we should 
be careful with the asymptotic properties, thus in Appendix C we propose a MC exercise in 
order to give us some insight on the behavior of the different estimators in similar sample 
settings. The various estimation methods are used as an illustration of some the problems 
arising when working with a macro-panel with a narrow cross-section and relatively long 
time-series.
2Due to the unavailability of cyclically adjusted data for the creation of fiscal cut dummies New 
Zealand and Iceland were excluded. Final number of observations is 575.
3In the case of the jiooled OLS estim ation the country specific effects would be assumed to  lie 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
4Check Nickell (1981) or Arellano and Bond (1991) for more details. In short, the ’Nickell b ias’ in 
dynamic panels with LDV is a finite sample bias resulting from the presence of the country specific 
effect both in the LD V  and in the regression equation. It can be of large and significant magnitude 
for a small, fixed T, but disappears as T—> oo.
II. 4 Results
We dccuhxl to  ta k e  th e  approach of e stim a tin g  d ifferent sp ecification s w ith varying defini­
tions o f  fiscal stringency, different p olitica l variables and se p a ra te  E M U  second and third 
phase dum m ies in order to  check  the ro bu stn ess o f  our resu lts. For th e  purpose o f  inter­
preting th e  coefficien ts, we report an exam p le sp ecifica tio n .5 T h e  app lication  o f  all four 
estim ation  m ethods yields fairly  sim ilar results, displayed ap p rop riately  in T a b le  2 below. 
T h e chosen exam ple specification uses to ta l d isbu rsem ents c u ts  as in defin ition  4 and the 
fiscal dum m y and E M U  dummy definition 3 .6
As for tech n icalities , the A B -G M M  estim a to r  applied in th e  standard  version cannot 
reject Sarg an 's  over-identifying restrictio n s te st null, thu s th e  application  o f  th e  technique 
seems valid. D ue to  th e  country  set used in our analysis w e decided to  apply  th e  hct- 
erosced asticity  co n sisten t version o f the A B -G M M  estim ato r, for w hich th e d istrib u tio n  of 
the S arg an ’s s ta tis t ic s  is unknow n. T h e  A rellan o-B on d  te st hyp othesis o f lack o f second 
order au to co rre la tio n  cannot bo re jected  a t  h% nor 1 0 %  sign ificance level, w hich m eans 
our estim ates should be co n sisten t. G eneral robu stness checks w ith  a  sh orter tim e-series 
dim ension can  b e  seen as su pportive for o u r resu lts. As for tiie  ch o ice  o f fixed versus random  
effects, th e  Ilau sin an  test re jects  th e  null o f th e d ifference betw een th e  estim ates not being 
sy stem atic , w hat ju s tif ie s  th e use o f  fixed effects.
W e find th e  estim ated  coefficients on  th e  variables o f in terest co n sisten t throughout 
different sp ecifica tio n s o f th e m odel, th ou gh  varying n o ticeab ly  in significance, som etim es
in m agnitude and rare ly  in sign as different estim atio n  m ethods are  applied.
° Appendix B provides results for an entire range of specifications. Generali)*, the results seem 
very robust to the changes in measurements of our control variables, as well as different definitions 
of fiscal consol it fat ions.
,3Cheek Appendix A for details of all the definitions. The idea is based on Alesina and IVrotti 
(199(1) and De Haan et al. (1996).
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Variables O L S LSDV AH-IV AB-GMM
G G G F C F (- l ) .9G1*** .8G 5*** .957*** .874***
(.03) (.03) (.13) (.03)
G G G F C F (-2 ) -.149*** - .1 5 6 *** -.180*** -.154***
(.03) (.03) (.04) (.03)
O U T G A P 0 2 1 * * * .0 3 2 *** .038*** .032***
(.0 0 ) (.0 0 ) (.0 1 ) (.0 0 )
T O T D IS - . 0 0 0 0 1 3 * * * 051*** .0 1 0 **
(.0 0 ) (.0 0 ) (.0 1 ) (.0 0 )
C O N S T ) - I l l * * * 124*** -.087** -.127***
( .0 2 ) ( .0 2 ) (.03) (.0 2 )
P R IV IN V - . 0 0 2 -.006 - . 0 1 2 -.008
( .0 0 ) (.0 0 ) (.0 1 ) (.0 0 )
III - . 0 0 2 - . 0 0 1 .005 . 0 0 0
(.0 0 ) (.0 0 ) (.0 0 ) (.0 0 )
EM U -.045 .032 -.015 .029
(.04) (.04) ( .1 0 ) (.04)
E L E C -.018 -.019 - . 0 2 2 -.01G
(.0 2 ) (.0 2 ) (.0 2 ) (.0 2 )
E L E C .F R E Q - .5 2 4 * * * - .4 5 9 *** - .2 3 6 * -.454***
x  C O N S T ) ( . 1 2 ) ( . 1 2 ) (.13) ( .1 2 )
Trends (-):
A U **,B D **,
B G * * ,C N * ,
D K *** lIT *,
J P * * ,O E * * ,
U K ***,
<-):
A U ***,B D ***,
B G *** ,D K *** ,
p jsj** ]p ** *
J P * * * ,O E * * * ,
P T * * ,S W * * * ,
U K *** ,
(+ ) :
I R * * * ,
(-):
A U ***,B D ***,
B G *** ,D K *** ,
F N * ,I T * * * ,
J P * * * ,O E * * * ,
P T * * ,S \ V * * * ,
U K ***,
obs 575 575 559 559
Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
* ,* * ,* * *  denote 10%, 5% and !%■ significance.
Table 2: Estimation results, example specification (1) from Table 6 in Appendix B.
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*II.4.1 Discussion
In th is  section  we review the insight o f  our estim ation  results on  th e hypotheses o f  in terest. 
We use th e  exam p le  specification o f T ab le  2 , but exploit the fa c t th a t the overall resu lts  are 
fairly  c o n s is te n t.
As for th e  gen eral in terp retation , th e  lagged dependent v ariab le seems to  influence the 
current level o f governm ent investm ent strongly, which confirm s th e necessity  to  include it 
in order to  account for the m u lti-year n atu re o f public investm ent. W e decided to  include 
th e  second order lag, as it is highly significant, hut will refrain  from searching for a m ore 
in tu itiv e in terp re ta tio n  of the dynam ics.
M oreover, th e  cou n try  specific trend coefficients a re  generally  o f high sign ificance, thus 
overall th e  inclusion  o f cou ntry  trends in our analysis is ju stified  and the coefficients on 
o th e r variables c a n  be in terp reted  som ew hat as d eviations from  the trend. In  m ost sp ec­
ification s significant negative trend s are found for 1 1 - 1 2  of th e  countries, while in som e 
sp ecification s th e  tren d  coefficient for Ireland is significantly  positive. As em phasized, these 
trend s are  included to  proxy for th e  phenom ena o f generally  fa llin g  public in vestm ent. T h ey  
m ay ca p tu re  issues like dem and for public investm ent, cost changes, or som e sort o f satu- 
ration/deereasing  re tu rn s issues. In  this paper we focus on th e short term  flu ctu atio n s, but 
inclu de th e  trend s to  cap tu re th e  above-m entioned effects.
Now wo tu rn  to  th e  verification o f  our hypotheses. F ir s t ,  as for ( I I I )  the m ost in teresting  
results con cern  T otal D isbursem ents as CA o f  G D P .' T h e  coefficient on th is variab le ranges
from  .01 to  .02  in a ll spfreifications, generally  significant at level. In order to  in terp ret 7
7In tlie specifications presented in Appendix B Total Disbursements is the primar}" variable of 
choice as it is of interest for testing hypotheses (III) and (H2). We have explored other specifications 
and the results for variables of interest are robust. For example, inclusion of one of the following: 
Total-Receipts, Primary Balance, Net Lend my does not significantly affect the conclusions on testing 
the hypothesis, though admittedly including larger subsets of fiscal (as well as cyclical) variables, 
causes some problems with multieolinearity.
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this, we must bear in mind the fact that the share of government investment in total dis­
bursements ranges from .02 to .24 with a  mean of .07. This means that if public spending 
cuts were to proportionally affect all types of spending, including public investment spend­
ing, we would expect that a 1 percentage point (of GDP) change in total disbursements, 
would be accompanied, on average, by a .07 percentage point of G DP change in disburse­
ments on investment. As our estimate is between .01 and .02, significantly lower than .07 
this means that a 1% of GDP cut in total disbursements was accompanied with only a  .01 
to  .02 % of GDP cut in public investment. Thus public investment was significantly less 
affected than other types of spending. In fact, this is an argument against the hypothesis 
that government investment is the least rigid component of public spending - as it is on 
average significantly less affected than other categories, in other words, it is rigid according 
to our definition. But this is not the whole story - the coefficient on the fiscal consolidation  
dumm y  is significantly negative in most specifications (see Tables 3 and 6) and ranges from 
-.03 to -.27 (though a majority of values fall between -.09 and -.1G). As the average cut in 
total spending during fiscal consolidation ranged from -1.2 to -2.3 % of GDP (definitions 1- 
4) and -.1 6  to -1 .1  % of GDP (definitions 5-10), when it comes to fiscal consolidations public 
investment becomes much more affected than usual. Column (5) o f the table presents the 
estimated average cuts of public investment during fiscal consolidations, which are usually 
similar or higher, in some cases even significantly higher, than what we would expect if it 
was to be cut in proportion with other types of spending - the latter values are given in 
column (4). Thus overall, the behavior o f investment spending during fiscal consolidations
does not allow us to further claim that public investment is a highly rigid component.8
^Notably the effect calculated in Table 3 still disregards the effect of the interaction between the 
election frequency and fiscal consolidation. Adding up the effects, we would obtain an even higher 
public investment effect o f fiscal consolidation, which can partly be seen by comparing the coefficients 
on fiscal consolidation dummies from Table 6 : specifications ( l ) - ( 8), where the interaction variable
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H ence on(' of th e  most im portant resu lts o f our analysis: thou gh  public investm ent spend­
ing iluct nates less than other types o f governm ent spending, a  severe  fiscal cu t falls strongly  
on this ty p e of spending .9
Dei.
No.
( 1 )
d otal
D isbursem ents
C hange*
( 2 )'
F isca l
D um m y
coefficien t
(3 )
E xp ected
P rop ortional
C han g e*
(■O'
A ctu al
estim ated
C h an g e*
(5 )'
S td . E rr. 
o f co i. (5 )
( 0 )_____
1 -2 .2 8 -.14 -.159 -.1 6 9 ( .0 1 )
2 -1 .84 - . 1 0 - .1 2 8 -.1 8 3 ( . 1 0 )
3 -1 .1 9 -.0 9 4 -.083 - .1 0 9 ( .0 1 )
4 - 1.2 0 - .1 2 4 -.088 - .1 4 0 ( .0 3 )
5 -1 .03 -.1 3 4 -.072 - .1 4 7 (.0 3 )
0 - 1.00 - . 1 0 0 - .073 - .1 1 9 (.0 5 )
7 - 0 .10 - .023 -.031 - .0 2 8 ( .0 3 )
8 -0 .0 9 -.1 0 5 -.048 -.1 1 3 (.0 3 )
9 -0 .5 8 - .1 0 7 -.0 4 0 -.1 1 4 (.0 5 )
10 - 0 .10 - .0 8 8 - . 0 1 1 - .0 9 0 ( .0 3 )
*  C hanges in % o f C D F  '
T a b le  3: Public- investm ent c u ts  (luring fiscal con so lid ation s -  colum n ( 1 ) -  d efin ition  of 
consolidation (see A ppendix A ); colum n (2 ) - average cut in to ta l d isbursem ents during 
consolidation ; co lu m n (3 ) - estim ated  coefficient on th e  fiscal consolidation  dum m y; colum n 
(4 )- ex p ia te d  cu t if  public investm ent moved p ro p o rtio n ate ly  w ith total d isbu rsem en ts; 
colum n ( 5 ) - th e  a c tu a l estim ated  effect throu gh th e  to ta l d isbursem ents coefficient and 
fiscal dum m y; colum n ( 0 ) - stand ard  erro r o f  (5 ). B a sed  on sp ecification  ( 1 ) from  T a b le  6 .
As for hypothesis (H 2), we d o  not find th e  election  y ear nor th e  (’lection y ear in teracted  
with the fiscal consolidation  dum m y to  have any influence on o u r dependent, variab le . T h is  
seems to  confirm  th e  previous findings o f D e H aan et a l. (1 0 % )  - that political variables do 
not have influence on governm ent investm ent. However by inclu ding an election  frequency 
variable we find th a t governm ents w ith a  shorter horizon w ere tending to  expand public
investm ent spending (th e  positive coefficient on Election  Frequency  is equivalent w ith  th e
is included in the specification with (10)-(11) where it is excluded.
■The exclusion of lagged dependent variables, as for example in specifications (9) and (12) in 
Table 6 causes some rise in the coefficient on total disbursements, but it is still significantly lower 
than the share of public investment in total government spending tints public investment is still 
found a rigid component, of the latter. It also causes an increase in the coefficient on the fiscal 
consolidation dummy - thus is in line with the finding that public* investment gets cut significantly 
more in large fiscal adjustments. In the end, we decide to include the lagged dependant variables in 
the equation, but point out that the broad conclusion on the rigidity of public investment spending 
and its reaction to fiscal consolidation is sustained regardless of this.
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fact that myopic governments raise investment). Yet as the coefficient on this variable 
interacted with the fiscal cut dummy E lF req .x .C on sD  is of a larger magnitude and negative, 
we find that in fact governments with a shorter policy horizon (higher per annum number 
of elections) did not hesitate to  slash investment more than governments with a longer 
horizon, when pursuing a strong fiscal adjustment. We interpret this as confirmation of the 
hypothesis that a myopic government would be less reluctant to cut government investment, 
what can be seen as an attempt to  win votes in a politically less stable situation by laying 
the weight of cuts on less visible spending - i.e. investment spending.
Fiscal cons, and Election Frequency Interacted
6
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Figure 3: LSDV estimates of the coefficients on the fisca l consolidation  dummy and election  
frequency in teracted  with fiscal consolidation  with 95% confidence intervals. Specification 
(1) from Table 6.
As mentioned, in order to check the robustness of our results for (HI) and (112) we 
use different definitions of a fiscal consolidation, both per se and in the interaction with 
the election frequency. The results are quite consistent and in Figure 3 we show the 95% 
confidence intervals on the coefficients estimated with the specification as in Table 2 but 
with all 10 definitions of a fiscal cut using LSDV.
In case of the third hypothesis (H3), we find strong support for the pro-cyclical stance 
of public investment. Out of three proxies used for capturing the influence of the business 
cycle, the positive coefficient on the output gap and negative on the unemployment rate
Fiscal consolidation dummy
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-  in both  cases highly significant. As for th e  growth rate; o f G D P , th e coefficient is found 
either insignificant or m ildly positive i.e. consistent w ith  our c la im  o f pro-cyclically. T hu s 
overall, we can say that public investm ent spending exh ib ited  a  pro-cyclical p attern .
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F ig u re  4 : D istrib u tio n  o f fiscal co n so lid atio n s accord ing to  different definitions (to p  to  
bottom : based on to ta l d isbu rsem ents, p rim ary  balance, net lend ing). Itight panel: E M U  
m em ber cou n tries, le ft panel - en tire  sam ple.
F inally , th e  E M U  dum m ies are  not sign ifican t in m ost sp ecification s at th e  10fX level, 
and insignificant at ij% for all o f th e  sp ecifica tio n s. T h e  slight d om ination  o f the negative 
values in most sp ecifications may b e  a sign o f  som e negative effect for the E M I ’ m em bers, 
but the tim e span o f the EM U  m ay be to o  short to  draw  any conclusions. T h erefore, in 
the case o f th e  last hyp othesis (IM ) we do not find any p articu lar change o f th e  behavior
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o f  public investm ent spending d u e to  th e  E M U . We find no evid ence o f the effect o f public 
spending cu ts on p u b lic  investm ent, d u e to  m onetary in teg ration  being any different from  
o th e r  fiscal con so lid ation s. I t  is im p o rta n t to  note however, th a t  th e  period o f a  run up 
to  th e  euro, th a t is th e  second h a lf  o f  th e  1990s was flagged by a  large am ount o f fiscal 
consolidations (see F ig u re  4 ) in th e  co u n tries aiming to  jo in  th e  com m on currency, in th e  
E U  m em bers decid ing to  o p t-o u t bu t a lso , a lb e it to  a sm aller e x te n t, in the countries not 
in th e  EU . C onsolid ations in cou n tries a im in g  to  fulfil th e  M aastrich t treaty  en try  criterion  
on  fiscal deficits, as well as in th e  o th e r  E U  m em bers, have cau sed  strong cu ts  in public 
investm ent, t hough ad m itted ly  th e  effect on  public investm ent spending was sim ilar (higher- 
th an -p rop ortion al) as during fiscal co n so lid ation s in o th er periods, o r  fiscal consolidations in 
o th e r  countries in th e  1990s. N otably , a  Iarger-than-average num ber o f fiscal consolidations 
in  1997-1998 (averaging  across our d efin itions) can  be observed in Ita ly , Finland and A u stria , 
b u t also in Sw eden and  th e  U K .
II .5  Conclusions
In  th is  paper we looked a t th e g eneral d ecrease  in public investm ent levels in th e  O E C D
co u n tries  in th e  last 3 0  years. W e found th a t  public investm ent a s  a  share of G D P  halved
in m ost countries, follow ing a  lin ear dow ntrend . T h e m ain qu estion s o f our in terest focused
on movements around this trend. According to our results, despite being on average a fairly
rig id  com ponent o f to ta l governm ent sp en d in g , public investm ent expenditu res a re  strongly
affected  during large fiscal cu ts, th u s con firm in g  the claim s of O x ley  and M artin  (1 9 9 1 ). As
for th e  policy horizon and its influence on investm ent spending, we do not find support for
th e  claim  th a t governm ents with a  h igher e lection  turnover invest less, but we d o  find th a t 
*
su ch  myopic governm ents lay m ore o f  th e  w eight o f a large fiscal cu t o n to  investm ent. W e do
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not find, however, th e  proxim ity o f an u pcom ing election  having a significant influence on 
th is. N ext, we found, sim ilarly  to  L an e (2 0 0 3 ), G ali and P e ro tti (2003 ) and T u rrin i ( 2 0 0 1 ) 
that th e  flu ctu ation s in public investm ent a re  qu ite  p ro -cy clica l, in th e sh ort-term . T h is  
cannot be treated  as evidence against th e  K eynesian  cy cle-sm o o th in g  role o f  investm ent, 
as because o f the delayed outcom e o f public investm ent, we can n o t sim ply exjux-t th a t th e  
effect is also pro-cyclical. T h is  m eans precisely  th a t governm ents tend to  increase invest m ent 
during boom s and reduce it in dow nturns. As for th e  influence o f the M aastricht lY e a ty  
co n stra in ts  or the S G P  we did not find th em  d irectly  afh 'ctin g  short-term  flu ctu ation s in 
public investm ent.
As we control for t Ik; general dow ntrend in investm ent in m ost industrialized cou n tries, 
we can  sav that then? m ay b e  some danger o f p o litica l v o la tility  and incidental fiscal con soli­
d ation  a ttem p ts  inducing serious one-off cu ts  in public investm ent spending. T h is  efftxt m ay 
be im p ortant as th e  p o ten tia l benefits of public investm ent are delayed in tim e, thus w eaker 
governm ents, or large; fiscal cu ts m ay result in the under-provision o f  some in frastru ctu re  
in th e  future. M oreover, as Alesirm and P e ro tti (19!)f>) c la im  th a t fiscal consolidation done 
through public investm ent is not persistent anti is easily  reversed, th is generally casts som e 
doubt on th e  purposefulness of such ad ju stm en ts.
F in ally , though th ere is no evidence of the S G P  itse lf having a  contribu tion  to  this effect, 
th ere  are at least tw o issues worth noting. F irstly , as th e  tim e period after its in trod u ction  
is fairly  short, perhaps it is too  early  to  assess the effect. Secondly, we did not find any 
d istin ct effect o f th e  S G P  or the M aastrich t Treaty , but we did find a strong  effect of 
fiscal consolid ations as such - thus fulfilling th e  E M U -rela ted  deficit requirem ents was q u ite  
probably  no different th an  oth er bu d g etary  consolidations.
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Appendix A: D ata Description and Definitions
G r o s s  F ix e d  C a p it a l  F o r m a t io n  o f  G e n e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t  (G G  G F C F ) th e  figures are  
cyclically  u nadjusted, tak en  as % o f  a c tu a l G D P . (Source: OECD E conom ic Outlook)10 
F is c a l  V a r ia b le s  (Source: OECD E conom ic Outlook)
C urrent D isbursem ents (C u rD is), T o ta l R ece ip ts  (T o tR e c), T o ta l D isbu rsem ents (T o tD is ), 
N et Lending (N etL en ), Prim ary' B a la n c e  (P r iB a l)  all o f th e  G eneral G overnm ent. T h e  fig­
ures are cyclically  u nad ju sted , as % o f G D P .
O t h e r  M a c r o e c o n o m ic  V a r ia b le s  (S ou rce: OECD E conom ic O utlook)11:
P riv ate  Investm ent figures are cy clica lly  u nad ju sted , as %  of G D P .
O u tp u t G ap as % o f  P o ten tia l G D P , In fla tio n , U nem ploym ent R a te  
R ea l Interest R a te  - th e  nom inal in terest ra te  on long-term  governm ent bonds (1 0 -y ea rs*) 
less th ey oy  cpi inflation rate , accord ing  to  th e  form ula: r ea lra te  =  ( - 1 ) * 1 00 
D u m m y  v a r ia b le s :
F isca l stringency dum m ies (Source: O ECD  E conom ic Outlook) idea oringinating from  
A lesina and P ero tti (199G) and D e  H aan e t  a l. (1996):
V arious change ind icators used (red u ctio n  in G G  T otal D isbu rsem ents, increase in G G  N et 
Lending, increase in G G  P rim ary  B a la n c e ) , a ll as %  of G D P , cy clica lly  ad ju sted , according 
to  each  of th e  following defin itions:
D efinition 1 : dum m u  =  1 if  fiscal change in d icator in cou ntry  i in y ear t falls m ore th a n  
1 .5%  of G D P
D efinition 2 : dum m u — 1 if fiscal ch an g e ind icator in cou ntry  i in year t and i +  1 falls 
m ore than 1 %. of G D P
D efinition 3 : dum m u  — 1 in cou ntry  i in y e a r  beginning a  series o f  y ears t to  t +  k  th a t th e  
fiscal change ind icator falls  m ore th a n  0 %  o f  G D P , and a t  least in one year in these series 
it fa lls more than 1%i o f G D P
D efinition 4: dum m u  =  1 in co u n try  i and  an y  year t to  t -\-k in th e  above m entioned series. 
E le c t io n  F r e q u e n c y :  (Source: umrw.electionworld.org , h ttp ://p sep h os.ad am -carr.n et/)  
E L E C .D  =  1 if year t was a  p arliam en tary (p resid en tia l in case o f  U S ) election  in cou n try  
0 otherw ise.
E L .F R E Q  — per annum  num ber o f p arliam en tary  elections co u n try  i in 5 year window 
from  t — 2 to  t +  2, when closing in on y ea r  2004  this window sh ifts to  <  t — 4, t >  
E L .F R E Q .F IS .C O N  — the in teractio n  o f  E L J ' R E Q  w ith th e  fiscal cu t dummy.
E M U  d u m m ie s
D efin ition  1 : E M U  th ird  phase dum m y: 1 since 1999 for E M U  m em bers (2001 G reece), 0 
otherw ise;
D efin ition  2 : M aastrich t Dum m y: 1 in 1 9 9 8  for E M U  m em bers (G reece  2 0 00 ), 0  otherw ise; 
D efin ition  3 : M a a str ich t+ S G P  dum m y: 1 s in ce  1998 for E M U  m em bers;
D efin ition  4 : E M U  second phase dum m y: 1 since 1993 for E M U  m em bers;
F o r  Figure 3 th e  following definitions are  u sed: 1-4 as in D u m m m y  V a r ia b le s  using to ta l 
d isbu rsem ents; 5-7 as 1-3 in D V  using n e t lending, 8 -1 0  as 1-3 in D V  using prim ary b a l­
an ce . Identically  for th e  in teraction  v ariab le .
C o u n t r ie s  u s e d : AU - A u stra lia , B D  - G erm any, B G  -  B elg iu m , CN  - C anad a, DI\ - 
D enm ark , E S  -  Spain, F N  - F in lan d , F R  - F ran ce , G R  - G reece, I R  -  Ireland , I T  - Italy , J P
- Ja p a n , N E -  N etherlands, N\V -  Norway, O E  - A ustria, P T  - P o rtu g a l, S\V - Sw eden, U K
-  U nited  K ingdom , U S  -  U nited S ta te s .
^ P o r t u g a l  - E u ro sta t
 ^^ C re ece  - E urost at
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S B
V ariab le Test
L L C IP S
in tercep t trend in tercep t t rend
G eneral G overnm ent , as % o f G D P
G .F .C .F . - 1 .6 7 * * - 2 .0 9 * * -1 .5 1 * -1 .9 4 * *
T o ta l D isb . - 4 .4 4 * * * 0 .5 0 -1 .5 9 * 1.G9
Net Lending - 2 .2 4 * * -0 .9 5 - 3 .3 2 * * * -1 .7 0 *
P rim . B a la n ce -2 . 1 0 * * -1 .3 7 * -4 4 7 * * * -2 .1 6 * *
T o ta l R ece ip ts - 4 .6 0 * * * 0 .4 3 -1 .1 3 2 .83
Current D isb . -4 4 7 * * * -0 .8 9 -1 .4 8 * 0 .98
a s  %  o f G D P
P riv ate G .F .C .F . - 2 .4 2 * * * -2 4 4 * * * -1.5G * -2 .5 6 * * *
% points
U nem ploym ent - 2 .0 0 * * -0 .4 6 -0 .7 8 - 1 . 1 1
O u tp u t G a p a - 5 .1 2 * * * ■ 2 9 7 * * * - 7 .6 8 * * * -5 1 1 * * *
A  G D P - 1 6 .3 1 * * *  - 1 7 .0 1 * * * - 1 6 .5 1 * * *  - 1 6 .8 1 * * *
In terest R a te - 5 .2 5 * * * .4 .7 4 * * * -6  4 7 * * * -5 2 4 * * *
° - % o f  p otential G D P ,
* , * * , * * *  - re je c ts  null at 10 % , 5% arid 1 %
T a b le  4 : Pan el u n it ro o t tests. L ev in , L in , Chu : II„ : com m on unit root process, and Im , 
P esaran , Shin  I I (>: individual u nit root process. L ag  selection  - Schwarz I1IC . M axim um  
lags 3,
D efin ition s 1- 1 0
O bs M ean Std . Dev.
72 -2 .2 8 2 5 1 .087359
48 -1 .8 3 9 5 8 3 0 .92 3 9 8 3
62 -1 .1 9 2 2 5 8 0 .9 6 8 9 0 5 8
2 1 2 -1 .2 5 9 6 2 3 1 .067637
72 -1 .0 3 3 0 5 6 1.857593
29 -1 .0 5 5 1 7 2 1 .0 1 2 8 2
la -0 .4 5 6 1 3 3 3 1.466876
79 -0 .6 8 7 5 9 4 9 1.791733
43 -0 .5 7 5 8 1 3 9 1.862389
78 -0 .1 5 7 4 3 5 9 1.55683
T a b le  5 : C hanges in  to ta l d isbu rsem ents ind icated  by fiscal cu t dumm ies.
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Appendix C : Simulations
We present a very simple Monte Carlo simulation exercise in order to yield some light 
on the performance of the different estimation techniques in a macro-panel of similar size. 
For this purpose, let us use a Data Generating Process (D G P) as follows:
ilit =  P i *  S/ti-i +  P-2 * Vit-2 +  * Xu +  fa  * t +  in  +  tit (2)
where fa  is the country specific time trend coefficient, independent, identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) ~  n eg ativ e  u n i fo r m {0 ,1 ); /q is the country specific fixed effect, i.i.d. ~  N (0,<r*); 
Sit is the random error term i.i.d. ~  A7(0, <r2); cor(x it,P i) =  <rTn is the correlation between 
the country specific fixed effect and the x  variable.
In the simulation exercise we experimented with various levels of a 2, er2, a Tfl, N  and 
T  in order to look at the behavior of the finite sample bias and the precision of the four 
estimation methods used in the applied part of the paper. Each estimation method was 
repeated 1000 times.
Overall, for all the specificat ions with p i in [0.G, 0.9); p2  in [—0.3, —0.1]; ft — 1 and AT=20, 
A = 35, which as we will see in the following section, resembles our estimates, the following 
patterns can be observed: on average it is the AII-1V estim ator that, seems to be close to 
the DGP, but its standard deviation is of an order of a magnitude higher (especially on 
the lagged dependent variable) making it inefficient in a single estimation. Both the LSDV 
and the AB-GMM estimators are very similar, exhibiting on average a low negative finite 
sample bias for pi, a negative (over estimating) finite sample bias on p2 and estimating the 
coefficients on ¡3 very precisely. They also exhibit relatively low variance. In reasonable 
specifications the cross-sectional dimension of A —20 proves too low to give an edge to the 
AB-GMM estimator, which is in theory more precise than the LSDV for a fixed T  as N 
goes to infinity - due to the elimination of the ’Nickel! bias’. As for the OLS estimator, 
as we expected it has a bias due to the correlation of the fixed effect with the explanatory 
variable, which it does not account for. Obviously if the fixed effects were not correlated 
with t he explanatory variable12 the LSDV estimator would be still consistent but. inefficient 
but the OLS would be consistent. Generally OLS tends to over-estimate the values of the 
coefficient on the LD V, as can be expected due to a positive correlation between the fixed 
effect and the LDV, it exhibits the strongest biases on the explanatory variable A" and 
as could be expected the direction and magnitude of this bias depends positively on the 
direction of the correlation between the fix«! effect and the explanatory variable.
Supposing that our econometric model specification is not degenerate from the assump­
tions imposed in the MC simulations we proceed to using the LSD V , and the very similar 
AB-GMM estimators for the purpose of interpretation. Our simulations confirm that the 
AB-GMM estimators' advantage in micro-panels of long cross sections but. short time series 
does not apply to typical macro-panels.
12In which case they would not be fixed effects but random effects.
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Chapter III
Measuring Long Run Exchange Rate 
Pass-Through
Olivier de Bandt*, Anindya Banerjee^ 
and Tomasz Kozluk
Abstract
Wo discuss th e  issue o f estim atin g  sh o rt- and long-run exchange ra te  pass­
through and review  some problem s w ith  th e  m easures recen tly  proposed in the 
literatu re . T h e o re tica l con sid eration s suggest a  long-run Engle and G ranger 
co in teg ratin g  re latio n sh ip  (betw een im port unit values, th e  exchange ra te  and 
foreign p rice s), w hich is typ ically  ignored in ex istin g  em p irical studies. W e use 
tim e series and  u p -to-d ate panel d a ta  techniques to  test for co in tegration  with 
the p ossib ility  o f  s tru ctu ra l breaks and  show  how th e  long-run m ay b e restonxl 
in th e  e s tim a tio n . W e also d iscuss w h at d ifference is m ade to  th e policy d ebate 
surrounding pass-through.**
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III. 1 Introduction
A large number of recent papers (see for example Campa and Gonzalez-Minguez, 2000; 
Campa, Goldberg and Gonzalez-Minguez, 2005; Frankel, Parsley and Wei, 2005; Marazzi 
et al., 2005) have investigated the issue of exchange rate pass-through (E R P T ) of foreign 
to domestic prices. Studies of E R P T  have been conducted both for the United States and 
for countries of the euro area, and a focus of some importance has been on its evolution 
over the past two dwades, in response to changes in institutional arrangements (such as 
the inauguration of the euro area) and to shocks to the monetary system (such as Clack 
Wednesday and the ERM  crisis in 1992).
Several economic policy issues hang upon the determination of the rate of pass-through 
from exchange rates to prices, and its evolution, both in various time horizons as well as 
in different sectors. These include issues relating to pricing strategies of foreign exporting 
firms, the persistence of inflation, successfulness of inflation forecasting and the impact 
of entering into a monetary union. For the European Union countries, more particularly 
those belonging to the euro area, the issues listed above are of considerable importance. 
A positive or negative answer to the question of whether pass-through has fallen has an 
important bearing on inflation persistence and the success of protocols such as the Lisbon 
Strategy which calls for structural reforms across the European Union.
A notable lacuna in the literature, we argue, is a clear disjunction between the well- 
worked-out theoretical arguments surrounding the key determinants of pass-through, and 
the inappropriate techniques used to  estim ate import or export exchange rate pass-through 
equations. Thus, while almost all the theories contain a long-run or steady-state relation­
ship in tlie levels of a measure of import unit values (in domest ic currency), the exchange 
rate (relating the domestic to the numeraire currency) and a measure of foreign prices (unit
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values in the numeraire currency, typically US dollars), this Ions run is routinely disre­
garded in most o f the empirical implementations. This may seem surprising for at least two 
reasons. First, proper determination of the short run E R P T  relies on appropriate assump­
tions about the long run. Second, as monetary policy tends to  be medium-term oriented, 
issues like inflation forecasting and policy actions should in principle look beyond short term 
developments for a  better understanding of the underlying forces.
Since it is commonly agreed that the time series considered are integrated, one way of 
defining the long run is in the sense of Engle and Granger (1987), henceforth EG, where 
the long run is given by the so-called cointegrating relationship. The reason for ignoring 
this long run, and substituting it by an ad hoc measure, is the failure to find evidence in 
the data for cointegration. The difficulty inherent in such a re-definition of the long run 
is two-fold, first the contradiction between a theoretical prediction of a steady state that 
cannot be found in the data, and, second, the ad hoc measure proposed being no more than 
an extended version of the estim ate of the short-run (and, as we shall see below, strongly 
dominated by the estimated short-run). It is possible that, the sour«» of the difficulty 
is the estimation method used - typically single-equation autoregressive distributed lag 
(AKDL) models - which may not be powerful enough to verify the theory for the span 
of data available. Therefore, instead of looking for a new definition of the long-run, a 
more satisfactory approach is to look for the long run relationship using more appropriate 
and powerful methods, such as those which allow for changes in the long run or use more 
powerful panel data methods. This is the route we follow in this paper.
Focusing on a specification of E K P T  into import prices from Campa, Gok 1 berg and 
Gonzalez-Minguez (2005), we argue in particular that: (a) the long run, in the sense of 
Engle and Granger (1987), is restorable once appropriate testing strategies (including lag
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length selection) are adopted and proper account is taken of the possibility of breaks in 
the long-run relationship; (b) the estim ate of the ‘long run’ used in the empirical literature 
is entirely arbitrary and sensitive to  the results of a number of misspecification issues; (c) 
once the distinction is established between the long run (with a break) in the sense of Engle 
and Granger (1987) and the definition used in the E R P T  literature, it becomes important 
to  investigate the relative magnitudes of these alternative measures and to interpret each 
differently; and (d) it is important to allow for breaks in the long-run theoretical relationship 
to  take due account of pass-through rates in response to changes in financial regime (such 
as those following Black Wednesday in 1992 or the ERM  arrangements which came into 
force post 1996,) Not to take explicit account of such changes, which are easily evident in 
the data, is to make serious mistakes in estimation and inference.
We begin in the next section with a very brief overview of the theoretical framework. 
We next move to the key empirical issues, since these are the main areas of our concern, 
and in Section II1.3 establish the key E R P T  equation in levels and differences. We present 
the definition of short- and long-run E R P T  assumed by the empirical literature and assess 
its adequacy. Section III .4 presents the data.
Section III.r> proceeds by first looking in more detail at some results reported by Campa 
and Gonzalez-Minguez (2006), CM hereafter. Here we look more closely at their estimates 
of pass-through and show that the distinction between the short- and long-run is somewhat 
confused, once the stat istical significance of the coefficients is taken into account. This adds 
to  the uncertainty surrounding the use of the standard measures for short and long run pass­
through in the literature. We compare the CM measures with our estimates of the Engle- 
Granger long run wherever these exist. We continue our analysis of the Engle-Granger long 
run by allowing for structural breaks in the cointegrating vector using methods developed
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by G regory  and H ansen (1 9 9 6 ), and show th at there is st rong  evidence o f  co in tegration  once 
accou nt is taken  o f breaks in th e  d eterm in istic  com p on en ts o f  th e co in tegratin g  regressions 
(such as the co n stan t) and in th e  co in tegratin g  vector. In teresting  c o n tra s ts  are  drawn 
betw een th e  long-run coefficient u nder th e CM  d efin ition  and those o b tain ed  under the 
sp ecification  o f  a  broken long run. G rap h s present th e  e s tim a te s  constru cted  under different 
assu m ptions and  m ake th e co m p ariso n s.
In  Sectio n  I I I .6 th e an aly sis of th e  long run is co n d u cted  using panel m eth od s developed 
by B a n e r je e  and  C arrio n -i-S ilv estre  (2 0 0 6 ) , which a re  ap p rop ria te  for looking a t  cointegra­
tion in  panels. T h is  is p articu larly  useful in the sh o rt-sam p le  analysis w here th e  tim e  series 
d im ension T  is sm all. T h e  te s ts  used allow  not only  for b reak s in the individual u n its o f the 
panel but a lso  for cross-u nit d ep en d en ce. T h e  resu lts seem  to  confirm  strong ly  th e  existence 
of co in tegrat ion, w ith easily in terp re ta b le  break d a te s .
C onclu d ing  rem arks are co n ta in e d  in Section I I I . 7 w here we discuss w hether we should 
reconsider th e  trad itio n al way o f  co m p u tin g  the long run pass-through.
III .2 Exchange R ate  Pass-Through into Im port Prices
B y  d efin itio n 1 im port prices for any ty p e of goods j ,  M P }  a re  a transform ation  o f export 
prices o f  a co u n try ’s trad in g  p a rtn ers  X P ¡  using th e  b ila te ra l exchange ra te  E fit  and 
dropping su p erscrip t j  for c la rity :
M P t =  E R t * X P t ( 1)
In log arith m s (d ep icted  in lower c a s e ):
m pt =  or* +  x p t (2)
1This section is based on Campa, Goldberg and Gonzaiez-Minguez (2005), CGM hereafter.
1 0 6
X P t =  F M C t • F M K U P t  (3)
So that in logarithms we have:
xpt =  fm c t  +  fm k u p t  (4)
Substituting for x p t into equation (2) yields:
m pt =  e n  +  Jm k u p t +  fm c t  (5)
for each sector in each of the countries.
The literature on industrial organization yields insight into why the effect of the change 
in ert on mpt may differ from one, through mark-up determinants like competitive conditions 
that exporters have to face in the destination markets. Hence, the estimated pass-through 
elasticities are a sum of three effects:
• effects of the unity translation effects of the exchange rate movement,
• the response of the markup in order to offset this translation effect,
• the effect on the marginal cost th a t are attributable to the exchange rate movements, 
such as the sensitivity of input prices to  exchange rates.
Markup responsiveness depends on the market share of domestic producers relative to 
foreign producers, the form of competition that takes place in the market for the industry, 
and the extent of price discrimination. O ther factors affecting pass-through are the currency 
denomination of exports and structure and importance of intermediate goods markets.
The empirical setup of CGM is based on (5) which assumes unity translation of exchange 
rate movements. However, as mentioned above, exporters of a given product can decide to
Where the export price consists of the exporters marginal cost and a markup:
absorb  som e of th e  exchange ra te  variations instead  o f  passing them  throu gh  to  the price 
in th e  im p orting  country  currency. I f  th e  pass-throu gh is com plete (p rod u cer currency 
p ricing), th e ir  m ark-ups will not respond to  flu ctu ation s o f th e  exchange ra tes, thus leading 
to  a  pure cu rren cy  tran slation . A t th e  other ex trem e, th ey  can  decide n o t to  vary  the prices 
in th e  d estin atio n  country cu rrency  (local cu rrency pricing  o r pricing to  m ark et) and absorb 
t!ie  flu ctu atio n s w ithin th e  m ark-up. Thu s, m ark-ups in an  industry are assum ed to  consist 
o f a  com p on en t specific to  th e  type o f good, independent o f  th e  exchange ra te  and a  reaction 
to  exch an ge ra te  m ovem ents:
fm ku p t  =  ot +  $ e r t ( 6 )
A lso im p o rtan t to  consider are th e  effects w orking through th e  m arginal cost,. These are 
a fu n ction  o f  dem and conditions in th e  im porting  cou n try ; m arginal co sts  o f  production 
(la b o r wages) in th e  exp ortin g  co u n try  and the com m od ity  prices d enom inated  in foreign 
cu rrency :
/m et = T)o ■ yt +  m  • ƒ wt +  m  • ert +  t?3 * f m  (7)
S u b stitu tin g  (7 )  and  (6 ) in to  (5 ) ,  we have:
m p t =  ol 4- (1 +  4» +  % )  c r t +  %  • Vt +  Vi • f m  +  m  - f c p t +  e t (8 )
'-------- V---------'
0
w here th e  coeffic ien t /? on th e  ex ch an g e  ra te  ert is th e  pass-through elasticity . Obviously,
th is is a  sim ple approach , w ith  a  h ig h ly  reduced form  representation , w here one can  have
no hop e in id en tify in g  $  from  7/2 . In  th e  C G M  ‘ in teg rated  world m ark et1 specification ,
Vo * Vt +  ?7i • fw t  +  773 • fc p t , ind epend ent o f  th e  exchange ra te , is dubbed as th e  opportunity
cost o f  a llo ca tin g  those sam e goods to  o th e r  cu stom ers, is reflected in th e  world price of
the p rod uct f p t  in th e  world cu rren cy  (h ere taken  to  be th e  U S  dollar)2 . T h u s th e  final
2The integrated market hypothesis in CM is based on the assumption that there exists a single
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equation can be re-written as follows:
mpt = OL +  (3 ■ ert + 7 • fp t  + c* (9)
which gives the long run relation between the import price, exchange rate and a measure 
of foreign price.* 3
At this point it is perhaps important to stress two issues. First the exchange rate pass­
through literature can be divided in two main streams - with papers which focus on ‘first 
step’ pass-through, he. E R P T  into import prices and those which consider ‘second step’ 
pass-through, i.e. into consumer prices. As has been made clear above, for the purpose of 
this paper we will look at E R P T  into import prices.
The second issue is the relevance of E R P T  for the design of monetary policy. Since 
E R P T  is a channel linking exchange rates with prices, it is often named as one of the key 
determinants of monetary policy design. There is a vast literature on optimal monetary 
policy, starting with models developed for a closed economy, and extended to the open 
economy (see for example Obstfeld, 2002).
The general consensus is that the optimal design of monetary policy should diiTer de­
pending on the degree of E R P T . For example, Devereux and Engel (2002) derive a model
in which local currency pricing causes relatively high volatility of the exchange rate and low
world market for each good. Therefore, regardless of the origin of the product, on the world market, 
it has one world price. This price constitutes the opportunity cost of selling to a local market. Thus, 
in the CM setup for the integrated market and, consequently, in ours, it proxies for the foreign 
price. The currency denomination does not in fact matter, as long as the exchange rate for the local 
currency is taken vis-a-vis this ’world’ currency. In the CM case the extra-euro area imports into 
the euro area as a whole(denominated in US dollars) are taken as a proxy for the world price.
3It is not uncommon in the literature to insert additional control variables on the right hand side 
of this equation. For example, Marezzi et al. (2005) use commodity prices, in order to control for 
changes in marginal costs that producers may face. This seems undesirable in our specificai ions for at 
least two reasons. First, we are concerned with ERPT in individual sectors, and thus the appropriate 
equation for commodity sectors will already contain the commodity price - thus the control variable 
would be redundant. Second, and more genera lh' any marginal cost effect is assumed to work through 
the ’world price’.
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volatility o f prices. In their model exchange rates can fluctuate to a large extent, since due 
to  incomplete pass-through they have little effect on other macro variables.
Adolfson (2001) stresses the understanding of E R P T  for monetary policy’s response to 
shocks, and emphasizes that incomplete E R P T  yields the exchange rate channel of shock 
transmission to  have less impact, and thus require a lower interest rate response. Moreover, 
lower pass-through implies less conflict between inflation and output variability and leads 
to an increase in exchange rate volatility. The result that nominal exchange rate volatility 
increases as pass-through declines is generated by the fact that low pass-through is induced 
by large import price stickiness and it is because of price stickiness that the endogenously 
determined exchange rate must, through larger movements than if prices were less sticky, 
absorb a part of the relative price adjustment due to a country specific shock. However, 
this ignores the direct cost of exchange rate fluctuations which affect the variability in the 
import sector prices and thus offsets the incentive to use the exchange rate channel. On the 
other hand, Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) propose a model in which the degree of E R P T , that 
is the degree of exposure of firms mark-ups to exchange rate fluctuations is an important 
determinant of optimal monetary policy. In their paper, the focus of policymakers on 
stabilizing both domestic prices and the output gap, combined with the inability of firms to 
fully pass-through exchange rate fluctuations to  prices, may cause an inefficiently high level 
of prices. As internal stabilization policies may raise the volatility of the exchange rate, this 
may lead exporters, whose revenues are exposed to such volatility to try to  stabilize their 
profits by charging higher prices.
Consequently, Smets and Wouters (2002) find limited room for an exchange rate sta­
bilization channel in the conduct of monetary policy in the presence of incomplete pass­
through and therefore conclude that central banks should refrain from engineering large
1 1 0
exchange rate volatility in order to stabilize prices. Thus, in principle, monetary policy 
aiming at internal stabilization may make better use of the exchange rate channel if E R P T  
is complete, while being unable to do so in case of (at least partial) local currency pricing.
Important ly, much of the focus of the literature concentrates on short run pass-through, 
and assumes that pass-through in the long-run is full (see, among others Smets and Wouters, 
2002; Adolfson, 2001). This is usually the result of the imposition of staggered price setting, 
which allows the response to an exchange rate shock with imperfect adjustment in the short 
run, because of menu costs, and a gradual full incorporation of the change in the long run. 
On the other hand the literature focusing on price discrimination allows imperfect pass­
through in the long run, as part of the adjustment is borne by firms mark-up (this issue is 
reviewed in more detail in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc, 2006).
As wc will show, there is some evidence that E R P T  into import prices, is not always full 
even in the long run. These results points to the invalidity of the full-ERPT assumption and 
may have important implications for the proper estimation of the short-run pass-through 
and consequently the design of monetary policy. Importantly, this finding seems more in 
line with the price discrimination models as in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (200G).
Admittedly, there is a large degree of endogeneity in the observed E R P T  and monetary 
policy. That is, pricing strategies of firms depend not solely on competition conditions on 
the market, but also on monetary policy, or rather the expected future monetary policy and 
the policy makers' credibility. The formation of a monetary union, as occurs in the middle 
of the samples used for the empirical exercise, is thus likely to have an important, impact on 
E R P T  (and vice versa) and any estimat ion method should take account o f these changes. 
This is our guiding motivation for looking at. long run relationships with structural change 
in our study of E R P T . Il
I l l
III.3 ERPT - estimation
Both economic theory and relevant tests lead us to think each of the series (import price, 
exchange rate and world price) as being characterized by a  unit root. However, despite the 
underlying levels equation (1), CGM claim not to be able to  reject the null hypothesis of the 
non-existence of a cointegrating relationship among the three series. Hence, they proceed 
by estimating equation (9) in first differences:
4 4
A mpt =  a. +  X ! bk ‘ &ert-k  +  X  Ck ' A  fP t - k +  €t ( 10)
fc=0 k=0
for a certain type of good i in a certain country j .  The superscripts have been omitted 
for clarity. Next, they define the coefficient &o and the sum of coefficients 85 the
short-run and long-run E R P T  respectively.
At this point it is useful to focus on the CM definition of the long run pass-through. 
Since CM do not find evidence of the long-run in the Engle and Granger (1987) sense, they 
are forced to propose their own working definition of the long run. We claim that the CM 
definition of the long run pass-through, which is constructed by summing the estimated 
coefficients for the first five lags (i.e. lag 0 to lag 4), is somewhat arbitrary, and thus rather 
inadequate for the purpose of enquiring about the actual long run effect. It is not clear why 
the five lags are chosen and this rather ad hoc measure does not seem to take into account 
the significance of the coefficients on the individual lags. Taking for example the estimates 
for France (see Table 1) we can see that in the majority of cases only the coefficient on 
lag 0 is significant, while the following four lags are not significantly different from 0. As 
these coefficients are of relatively large magnitude, the number of lags is rather important 
- if one summed the first three, four, or six lags, the point estimate of the long run could 
differ vastly, though potentially would be as justified. T he importance of our argument
1 1 2
France
L ag O L ag 1 L ag 2 Lag3 L ag4 CM  L R
SIT C O 0.96 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 1 -0 .15 -0 .0 4 0.74
(0 .09) ( 0 . 1 1 ) (0 . 1 1 ) (0 . 1 1 ) (0 .0 8 ) ( 0 . 1 0 )
S IT C 1 0 .0 1 0 .59 -0 .4 9 0.71 -0 .41 0 .40
(0 .2 ) (0 .2 5 ) (0 .2 6 ) (0 .2 5 ) ( 0 .2 1 ) (0 .2 5 )
S I T C 2 0 .7 7 0 .1 6 0 .05 0 .0 6 -0 .0 6 0 .98
(0 . 1 1 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .1 3 ) (0 .1 3 ) ( 0 . 1 ) (0 .1 3 )
S IT C 3 LOG -0.0 2 0.1 -0 .0 5 0 .0 7 1.16
(0 .06 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 .0 8 ) (0 .0 8 ) (0 .0 6 ) (0 .08)
S IT C 4 1.13 -0 .14 -0 .31 0 .3 6 -0 .0 8 0 .97
(0 .2 5 ) (0-3) (0 .3 1 ) (0 .3 1 ) (0 .2 4 ) (0 .33)
S IT C 5 0 .8 7 0 .08 - 0 .1 1 - 0 .1 2 0.1 0.81
(0 .1 7 ) (0 .1 9 ) (0 .1 9 ) (0 .1 9 ) (0 .1 5 ) (0 .2 G)
S I T C 6 1 . 1 1 -0 .2 6 0 .2 2 0 .0 9 -0 .1 7 1.0 0
(0 .09 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) (0 . 1 1 ) (0 .0 8 ) (0 .0 9 )
S IT C 7 1 . 1 2 -0 .3 0 .25 - 0 .0 2 - 0 .0 1 1.03
(0 .1 4 ) (0 .1 5 ) (0 .1 5 ) (0 .1 5 ) ( 0 . 1 2 ) (0 .2 2 )
S 1 T C 8 0 .95 -0 .1 7 0 .1 1 - 0 .1 1 - 0 .0 1 0.76
(0 .0 8 ) ( 0 . 1 ) ( 0 . 1 1 ) (0 . 1 ) (0 .0 7 ) (0 . 1 2 )
F or  each sector first lin e reports the estim ated coefficient,
and the second the standard error .
T a b le  1: E s tim a te s  o f  equation (10) - coefficien ts and standard  errors on th e  lags of exchange 
ra te  - original C M  sam ple 1989-2001 . T h e  last colum n reports th e  C M  long run estim ate .
for inference can  b e  illu strated  fu rth er by tak in g  th e  coefficients for SITC O  from T a b le  1 
-  th e  C M  long ru n is significantly  d ifferent from  1, w hile if we redefine th e  ’’ long ru n” a s  
th e  sum  o f  th e  first th ree lags, we cou ld  not b e  ab le  to  re je c t it being equal to  1 . W ith  
S IT C 1  th e  exam p le  becom es even m ore v isib le - th e  five-lag C M  long run is insignificantly  
different from  0 , w hile significantly  d iffere n t from 1 , w hereas th e  four-lag ’’ long run” would 
b e  significantly  d ifferent from  0 , while n o t differing significantly  from  1 .
T h e  fa ct th a t  C M  are unable to  find a  co in tegrated  ‘eq u ilibriu m ’ relationsh ip  betw een th e  
variables in levels m ay seem surprising in  light o f th e  fact th a t th e  th eoretica l underpinning 
o f  th e  E R P T ,  is in  fact a  levels re la tio n sh ip , as in equation  (X ). W e proceed by n otin g  
th a t  if th e  co in teg rated  equilibrium  re la tio n sh ip  were to  ex is t, th e  equation  to  be estim ated
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should contain an error correction term (ECM ), as in Engle and Granger (1987), and thus 
take the following form:
K\ Ki ^
A m p *  =  a +  ^ 2  bk • A ert- k + ^  ck - A  fp t. k+ A(mpt-x -  a  -  • e r t - i  -  7 • f p t - 1)  +ut ( 1 1 )
k=0 k=0 '  E C M  '
while equation (10) would be misspecified.
There are a number of reasons which could lead to a failure to find a  cointegrating rela­
tionship in series which are suspected to be cointegrated. In particular, as we show below, 
appropriate lag length selection and proper accounting for a structural break, whether in 
single equations or more powerful panel methods, can change the inference on the existence 
of a ‘long-run’ relationship. This helps to provide a less arbitrary estimate of the long run 
E R P T  and to  assess changes to this elasticity following the introduction of the euro. We 
discuss these issues in Section III .5, following a brief description of the data in Section III.4 
below'.
III.4 Data
In order to perform our estimations, wre use two data sets. The original sample, approx­
imately equivalent to the one used by CM contains data for import unit values (in local 
currency), exchange rates (relative to US dollar) and world prices (denominated in US 
dollars) for 1-digit SITC sectors for 11 countries. As noted in the previous section, we 
concentrate on looking at the integrated market specification, although analogous results 
may be derived under ‘segmented’ markets, w'here the index of world price (or unit values) 
is constructed as a weighted (by trade shares) geometric average of prices of each country's 
five largest trading partners.
The CM d ata set covers the years 1989-2001 and servos mainly to illustrate that the 
change of met hodology would also result in changes in the inference of the original CM paper.
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Results of the estimations for this sample are presented in Appendix B . More important for 
our specific goals we use the sample of 1995-2003, from Eurostat, which has the advantage 
of extending further beyond the suspected break date related to  the introduction of the euro 
than the previous data set. The construction of the variables follows CM, and is described 
in the Appendix A.
The indicator we use for import prices, the index of import unit values (IUV) has a 
series of caveats concerning its use that must be kept in mind. First of all, unit values, 
as provided by Eurostat are values of kilograms of a certain good. This means we are 
looking for instance not only at kilograms of food, oil or raw materials, but also kilograms 
of computers, cars etc. Moreover, following CGM, we consider the 1-digit SIT C  indust ries as 
a reasonable compromise between the informative power of the series and their availability. 
Using IUVs, means the ‘goods’ we speak of are not well defined goods as such - they are 
in fact bundles of goods (of all goods that are traded on the certain month and fall into 
the specific SITC category) and thus the composition of such bundles may change from 
month to month (apart from being different from country to country). Additionally, this 
composition may change precisely because of changes in the exchange rate, as the demand 
(and supply) and thus the pricing strategy of some specific sub-category goods may be very 
different especially within categories as wide as SITC  8 Mi sc. Manufactured goods. Thus 
the part of the adjustment to the exchange rate change that will go through quantity and 
not price, will affect the implicit weight of the good in our 1-digit SITC  basket.
Further following from our discussion in Section III.2 , it is important to emphasize that 
there are a number of reasons why we expect there may be a  change in the long run E R P T  
within our sample.
Firstly, on the 1st of January 1999 11 European countries fixed their exchange rates by
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adopting the euro.4 This constituted a change in monetary policy, especially for countries 
were it was previously less credible. The perceived stabilization of monetary policy, espe­
cially in countries with previously rather less successful monetary policy, may have induced 
the producers to change their pricing strategies, and thus have an influence on the E R P T. 
We expect the formation of the euro area to  have caused a change in long run E R P T , though 
this change may have commenced both before the exact adoption date, for instance upon 
joining the ERM , as well as after, when the euro became a well established currency.
Anticipating to some extent our future results, on left hand side of Figure 1 we show 
the errors from the estimation of the levels equation (9), for which as we will see in Section
III.5.1 it is not easy to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. On the right hand, we 
have the residuals from the same equation once we allow for a  break - these seem to appear 
more stationary. The substantial changes in the behavior of the residuals commence, as 
may be noted in the figure, in the run-up to the euro. Similar figures may be constructed 
e.g. for France which again shows significant change around the end of 1998. This goes 
somewhat ahead of our argument, to which we will return to  it in more detail in Section
III.5.2, but serves for the purpose of illustrating that not accounting for a structural break 
in the relationship may lead us to the failure of finding a  long run, although we must be 
constantly vigilant that what we classify as a ‘break’ is not a data artifact. We have good 
reasons for believing this not to  be the case.
Moreover the adoption of a  common currency has changed the competitive conditions, 
by increasing the share of goods denominated in the (new) domestic currency. Turning 
to Table 2 we can roughly assess the importance of imports originating from outside the
euro area in overall imports for each single country and indust ry. Overall, the share of the
4Greece failed to fulfil the Maastricht Treaty criteria, and therefore joined 2 years later, effective 
l si of January 2001.
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Figure 1: Residuals from the estimation of equation (9) without a break (left) and with a 
single estimated break (right) on the series for Spain, SITCO.
value of imports from outside the euro area is below 50% in most cases. Moreover it has 
slightly decreased in the past decade. There are however noticeable exceptions: the share of 
extra euro area imports is high and often above 90% in case of SITC 3 (Mineral fuels) and 
relatively high though substantially lower (closer to 60-70%) in the case of SITC  2 (Crude 
materials). As for countries we immediately notice the high share of extra-euro imports in 
Ireland, which still does the majority of its trade with the UK and to a smaller extent Finland 
which trades intensively with other Scandinavian countries and with Russia. Therefore in 
most cases, joining the euro shifted the composition of on average 50% of imports from 
foreign currency denominated to home currency denominated, and thus immune to exchange 
rate fluctuations.
These cautions having been stated, it remains the case th at we are constrained in our 
investigations by the quality of the publicly available data. While there may be numerous 
doubts about using IUVs as a proxy for import prices, the lack of alternative measures 
(especially at a sectoral level) forces us to  use what is available. This has the advantage 
that we can make comparisons with the CM or CGM estimates which are based on similarly 
constructed data.
Finally, looking at the exchange rates of current euro area currencies in Figure 2 we see
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Figure 2: Monthly index of exchange rates of euro area currencies versus the USD. 1995- 
2005.
that in virtually all the countries the currencies were depreciating against the US dollar in 
the period 1995-2000, and especially since 1996. Moreover, after a  short period of a stable 
euro dollar exchange rate, the euro currency(ies) started appreciating, till the end of our 
sample. This asymmetry of exchange rate developments may have different implications 
for the E R P T , as obviously for an imported good of a fixed dollar price, depreciation of 
the euro vis a vis the dollar would mean the increase of the price of the good on the euro 
area market, while the appreciation of the euro, a decrease of the price, leading to possibly 
different behavior of the producers margin.
III.5 Results
I I I .5.1 Single equations - without breaks (importance of lag length selec­
tion)
Simple augmented Dickey-Ftiller tests for cointegration in single time series for individual 
country/industry combinations (see Tables 3 and 4) do not support the CM view about the 
lack of cointegration between the series. The results concern the more recent sample (1995- 
2005) yet by switching to automatic lag selection criteria we manage to obtain rejections of
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the null of no cointegration for the majority of the series (at 5% level). Moreover, as we see 
in Table 11 in Appendix B , adopting an information criteria chosen lag length when testing 
the null on the 1989-2001 CM sample, leads to the rejection of the null of no cointegration 
for most of the series. Therefore we can say there is some evidence that, a long run, levels 
relationship, in the Engle and Granger (1987) sense, exists between our variables.
III.5.2 Single equations, with structural breaks
In order to pursue the issue of looking for cointegrating relationships further, we propose the 
use of the Gregory and Hansen (199G, GII hereafter) algorithm which allows for testing the 
null of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration with a (estimated) structural 
break. We test two alternative versions of the model proposed in equation (9). F irst, a break 
in the constant, thus a levels shift:
mpt -  a  +  ci] * d3 +  /? ■ cr t +  q * fp t  +  e t (12)
Second, a break in all the cointegrating equation coefficients, thus a slope shift:
mpt ~  a  -F (i\ * (is -t- d  • c r t +  ■ crt * d$ +  q ■ fp t  + 1 \ • fpt. * ds +  i't (13)
In both cases dM is a dummy variable equal to 0 if t <  s and equal to 1 otherwise. The G il 
allows for the estimation of the break point s  positioning it where the ADF test on errors 
from the estimated levels equation yield the strongest evidence for the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration.5
It is an issue of considerable interest to decide which formulation of the model to  adopt.
We provide evidence below to show that, it is the second of the two formulations that we
would tend to choose. Generally, as mentioned earlier, upon the introduction of the euro,
5Brii*f details of the procedure are contained in Appendix C’.
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w<* would expect the fixed component of the mark-up (denoted by tin* coefficient o) to 
m ther fall than increase - due to potentially improved competition in the market arising 
from increased price transparency. Table 5 (for the GH single expiation tests) shows clearly 
that in the specification of break only in constant, the fixed component in the mark-up 
tends to  rise roughly in as many cases as it tends to fall. However as the specification from 
equation (12) is much more restrictive than the one based on equation (13), not allowing 
for a possible break in the other variables would tend to cause the estimate of oq to be 
biasexl. Table G shows that the morii flexible specification of a break in slopes and constant 
lead to  the majority of the estimates pointing to a decrease or insignificant change in the 
fixed mark-up component.f> In more detail, when we allow for the more general break as 
in equation (13), for the GH single equations for 22 out of 60 series nq's are negative and 
significant, leaving only !> significantly positive.
Comparing the results for the two alternative specifications (with breaks in constant 
ami with breaks in constant and slope) we see that in a handful of cases the rejection of the 
null of no cointegration was possible when the alternative did not allow for a break, while 
not possible when the alternative accounted for a break. This tenuis to suggest, that in
these cases the evidence for the existence of a break is weak.' Overall the? most important *7
r’Significance is judged with respect to conventional critical values. A more general consideration 
would require bootstrapped critical values and is the subject of on-going investigations.
7If for a certain series we are able te> reject the null of no eointegration against an alternative 
of cointegration without a break (ADF), but unable to do so against an alternative with a break 
(GII), this may be evidence that there is no break in the cointegrating relationship. The reasoning 
is as follows. We treat rejection of the null of no cointegration (ADF) as evidence of existence of a 
cointegrating relationship between the variables, as in equation (0). In this case, imposing a break, 
i.e. a dummy variable as in equation (12), or a dummy variable with interaction variables as in 
equation (13), would mean adding variables of no explanatory power (insignificant) and should not 
in principle affect our statistic. However, the critical values of the GH tests are higher in absolute 
value than those of the standard ADF test, in order to guarantee appropriate test sizes for the null 
of no cointegration against of an alternative of cointegration with a break. Thus a more or less 
unaffected test statistic and a higher critical value may result in the failure to reject the null in the 
case when imposing a break is not justified.
outcome is that in a  relatively short sample, there are only about 12 out of 90 series for 
which we are unable to  reject the null of no cointegration in any of the three specifications 
(no break, break in constant, breaks in slopes). We treat this as strong evidence of the 
presence of the theory backed levels relationship in our data, which changes in response to 
key economic events.8
A selection of the single equation results for the ’’long run’* E R P T  are presented in 
Figures 3 to 0. As indicated in the notes to the figures, they present the point estim ate 
and the 95% confidence interval for both the CM-defined long run (estimator (1) in all the 
figures) i.e. the sum of five lags, as well as the EG long run in 5 different specifications. 
Noticeably, apart from yielding different values of the pass-through, the EG estimates are 
more precise which allows for more definite conclusions regarding the rejection or acceptance 
of the hypotheses of E R P T  being equal to 0 or 1. The narrower confidence intervals are 
an immediate consequence of the superconsistency of the OLS estimator in a cointegrating 
relationship. The coefficients obtained from the levels estimation of equation (9) when 
allowing for a structural break in the entire cointegration vector (observations (4) and (5) 
for the G li estimated break and (7), (8) for the imposed 1998/1999 break) are however 
more imprecise, especially if the estimated break happens to lie towards the beginning or 
end of the sample.
There is some country- and industry-specific variety in long run pass-through, where 
commodity sectors (SITC  2 and SITC  3) tend to have a higher (closer to 1) pass-through 
than manufacturing sectors, and with very few exceptions we can strongly reject zero rates
of pass-through. A glance at the tables and figures also suggests, if anything, an increase in
8The changes are modelled here as discrete breaks in constant or slope and is a limitation of our 
framework. A richer alternative to consider would be allow for non-linearities, which may in fact 
pick up evidence for more change which is gradual. This is unfortunately precluded in our study by 
the shortage of data.
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the pass-through rates in most countries and most industries, with some exceptions. Not 
all of these changes are significant, but the tendency is nevertheless rather clear cut.
Overall, tests for cointegration, be it without a break, with a break in the constant, 
or in the entire ’’equilibrium” relationship allow us to reject the null of no cointegration 
therefore providing support for the existence of a long run relationship as in equation (9) in 
our data. This stands somewhat in contrast with the CM conclusion that no cointegrating 
relationship exists, and allows us to switch from an arbitrary definition of long run EK PT 
as a sum of five (mostly insignificant) coefficients on the lags of the exchange rate to the 
long run in the EG sense.
The evidence gathered above, by looking at individual sectors within each country, 
can be strengthened even further by using several recently developed panel-based tests for 
cointegration. Dealing with single time series, albeit with about 110-120 observations, we 
still have a tim e span of only about 10 years of data. However, by looking at the evidence 
from all the sectors and countries together (if the number of sectors in each country, is 9 
and there are 10 countries in our data set, a panel-based test could use up to 9 x  10 x 110 
observations) and allowing for heterogeneity, we should in principle obtain a far clearer idea 
of the common trends underlying the series and hence tlxe existence of the long run. In 
the spirit of the discussion above, any such estimation procedure in panels would of course 
need to  allow for structural change. In addition it would also need to allow for dependence 
among the units of the panel. We turn now to a consideration of these issues.
III.6 Panel cointegration tests
There are essentially three ways of proceeding in order to construct panels from the data sets 
- (1) creating country panels of industry cross-sections, (2) industry panels with country 
cross-sections and (3) a pooled panel in which every country and industry combination
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Figure 3: France - ’’ long run” exchange rate pass-through estimates with confidence inter­
vals (95%). Individual industries, sample: 1995-2005, entire sample analysis. The estima­
tors are presented in the following order: (1) CM long run, no cointegration, no break, (2) 
cointegrating long-run, no break, (3) cointegrating long run, break in constant (G II), (4) 
cointegrating long run before break in slope(GH), (5) cointegrating long run, after break 
(GH), (6) cointegrating long run, break in constant (1998/99), (7) cointegrating long run, 
before break in slope (1998/99), (8) cointegrating long run, after break (1998/99). In (3)-(5) 
values extracted from Gregory and Hansen (199G), ADF*. Values not reported if no cointe­
gration (ADF). For break dates estimated with the GH refer to Table 5. Dotted horizontal 
line at value of 1.
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Figure 4: Germany - ’’long run” exchange rate pass-through estimates with confidence 
intervals. Individual industries, sample: 1995-2005. Notes - see Figure 3 for explanations.
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Figure 5: Italy - ’’ long run” exchange rate pass-through estimates with confidence intervals. 
Individual industries, sample: 1995-2005. Notes - see Figure 3 for explanations.
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Figure 6: Portugal - "long run" exchange rate pass-through estimates with confidence 
intervals. Individual industries, sample: 1995-2005. Notes - see Figure 3 for explanations.
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constitutes a separate unit. In search of the existence of a cointegrating relationship in the 
series we try to maximize the dimensions of our panel, and thus will focus on (3). Hence 
we will apply two types of tests. The so called first generation panel cointegration tests as 
in Pedroni (1999) test for existence of a cointegrating relationship, assuming no cross-unit 
interdependence. The modification of the test, based on Gregory and Hansen (1996) is 
proposed in Banerjee and Carr ion-i-Sil vest re (2006) and allows for an estimated breakpoint 
in each individual series. As mentioned however, the tests have the shortcoming of not 
accounting for possible cross unit dependence. This, as shown by Banerjee, Marcellino and 
Osbat (2004) in a series of Monte Carlo simulations, can lead to substantial oversize of the 
tests, and thus increase the possibility of wrongful rejection of the null of no cointegration.
The second generation of tests, as the one proposed in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(200G) allows a factor structure for cross-section dependence, but has the limitation of 
imposing a common (across units) break date.9 The latter, as we will see, does not seem 
as mucli of the problem, as in our main sample of interest, the Pedroni (1999) break date 
estimates are, as we suspected, relatively close to the date of the introduction of the common 
currency. Morravcr, recomputing the tests for different (imposed) break dates does not lead 
to any substantial change in our conclusions.
The statistics for the Pedroni (1999) panel cointegration tests with no cross-sectional
dependence and no breaks are displayed in the first row of Table 7. They allow for strong
rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegration even when the alternative does not allow for a
break. This test is restrictive in the sense that we do not allow the cointegration relationship
to change within our sample. However as mentioned, we suspect the formation of the euro
area constituted a shift in both competition conditions and monetary policy which may
yBrief details of these tests are contained in Appendix C.
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Model pseudo-t pseudo-p
No break -7.73 -35.45
Break in constant -22.15 -49.38
Break vector -23.26 -49.50
Under the null hypothesis both statistics have 
______  a N(OJ) distribution
Table 7: Pseudo-t and Pseudo-p parametric statistics from Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2006). The null hypothesis is no cointegration. Sample: 1996-2004, full panel (N =90), unit 
specific breaks.
have affected the long run pass-through. We propose running the Pedroni (1999) test 
which allows for the change in the cointegrating vector. The results allow strong rejection 
of the null of no cointegration in both the case of a shift in constant and break in the 
cointegrating relationship between the variables for all the country panels. By construction 
the test chooses the break date which is consistent with strongest evidence against the null. 
The test algorithm allows us to extract the break dates for each individual series, as well as 
the cointegrating coefficients. These are presented in Tables 8 and 9. Within the context 
of these results derived from the panel tests, it is useful to  return briefly to the issue of 
model choice and to ask whether the more flexible formulation (i.e. equation (13) instead 
of (12)) is also the more appropriate here. We note from the panel estimates reported in 
Table 9 that out of 90 series, 34 a p s  are significantly negative, while only for 6 they are 
significantly positive. We therefore point to the break in slopes and constant specification as 
being more coherent with the idea that the fixed component of the markup falls (a negative 
value of cq ), while changes in the pass-through are also observed for a number of sectors 
and countries.
The estimated break dates for all the individual series are presented in Figure 7. There 
is some dispersion among the obtained dates, and though there seem to be two modes of 
the distribution - one relatively close to  the introduction of the euro and the other close to
136
the turn around in the euro/dollar exchange rate developments (2000-2001).
14
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0
Figure 7; Distribution of estimated break dates by semester (1997sl-2003s2). breaks in 
slope taken from Tables 9. Dark color - all breaks, light color - only breaks when long run 
E R P T changed significantly (10%).
Although the evidence, as presented in Tables 8 and 9, in favor of both cointegration 
and structural change is unequivocally strong, a few qualifications are worth noting. First, 
the GII based algorithm here allows for only one, ’’strongest” 10 break, which is a serious 
limitation as far as timing the (single) break allowed is concerned. Second, as noted earlier 
when referring to non-linear methods, the efiect. of the change in macroeconomic conditions 
on the E U F T  may not have been either instanteous or linear. Finally, there are other 
features of this period which are relevant, such as the evolution of the euro/pound rate for 
Ireland, late euro area membership for Greece etc.
Nevertheless, the sheer fact that despite these limitations (which would in all cases 
have acted against us) the algorithm identifies a relatively large amount of series where 
there is cointegration and the change, be it upon the introduction of the euro, or upon
the appreciation of the euro, is an interesting finding. Moreover, as we will turn to  the
10I jj fact it docs not touch upon the notion of the strength of evidence of the break. Generaliv 
the break found by this algorithm is a break for which the evidence for a cointegrating relationship 
is the strongest (i.e. largest - in absolute value - test statistic leading to the rejection of the null of 
no cointegration).
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interpretation of developments in individual countries and sectors in the following section 
we will observe some interesting patterns in estimated break points.
We consider the test results from the panel as sufficient evidence in favor of the existence 
of a  ’’long run” levels relationship between the variables, as implied by the theoretical 
underpinning - equation (9). Moreover, despite some variability in the estimated breaks in 
the individual series we can say that at least for some country/industry combinations there 
is evidence that the formation of the EMU led to a significant change in the equilibrium 
pass-through rate, be it directly upon its formation or indirectly by tying the currency to 
the euro, and thus seeing it appreciate against the dollar since about 2001.
However, as given above, the failure of first generation panel cointegration tests to 
account for cross section dependence tends to oversize the tests and may lead to flawed 
inference on the existence of the long run relationship. Our final generalization of the 
testing framework, having already developed tests for cointegration with structural breaks, 
is to  allow for a factor structure to model this type of dependence (as in B ai and Ng, 2004) 
and apply the test proposed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) which allows for 
a  single (common) estimated break in the series. In this second generation test, we test 
the null of no cointegration against an alternative hypothesis of cointegration (with up to 
r  common factors modelling cross section dependence) with one common break date for 
all the series. The results for 1-, 3- and 6-factor dependence structures are reported in 
Table 10 and we consider them as reconfirmation of the existence of a long run equilibrium 
relationship.
The results in Table 10 are computed with the common break date imposed at 1999ml. 
More general results are plotted in Figure 8 where we report the Banerjee arid Carrion- 
i-Silvestre (200G) test statistic for all possible choices of common break dates (subject to
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Ho: unit root (no co-integration)
No. of factors Pseudo-1
No break Break (a) Break (b)
(1) -4.51 -3.72 -3.11
(3) -3.71 -3.47 -2.60
(r.) -3.76 -2.95 -3.47
Under the null the statistics have the norm al Ar( 0 ,1) distribution , 
No break, (a) - break in constant within co-integrating equation, 
(b)break in the en tire  co-integrating relationship.
Date o f  break im posed 1999m l.
Table 10: Test statistics for Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) panel co-integration 
tests with cross-section dependence (common factors). Sample: 1996-2005.
BrM k In conitm t BfMk kn v*etcf
1-11 * 13 * m| I ■ n  « ta  » m»|
Figure 8: Distribution of the test statistics from Banerjee anti Carrion-i-Silvestro (2006) 
test. The null hypothesis is no cointegration, the alternative cointegration with a common 
break in constant (left hand side) as in equation (12), and cointogration with common break 
in cointigrating vw tor (right hand side) as in equation (13). In both cases cross sectional 
dependence is modelled with a 1-, 3- and 6-fact or structure. Under the null hypothesis, the 
statistics have a jV (0, 1) distribution. Each observation is obtain«] by estimating the model 
with a given break date.
trimming). Clearly, regardless of the break date imposed, in almost all the cases the null of 
no cointegration is rejected. The assumption of a common break point may be a limitation, 
since as reported earlier, the estimated break points may be quite dispersed, and may limit 
our ability to choose the strongest break point - yet even for the dates for which there would 
seem to less intuitive reason to impose a break, we are often able to reject the null of no 
cointogration comfortably.
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III. 7 Discussion and concluding remarks
The results of our paper show ample evidence for an EG cointegrating relationship between 
the variables in levels - as in the underlying theoretical equation (9). We have suggested 
several methods for working with the data that enable the cointegrating relationship to be 
depicted, including better lag-length selection in the tests for cointegration and a consid­
eration of the impact of structural change and conducting inference using a panel (where 
the N  dimension augments the T). By taking care of the adverse effects of cross-section 
dependence, we have shown that the evidence from the panel tests - with or without al­
lowing for structural breaks - is entirely unambiguous. Thus, even if one were not willing 
to accept the not ion of ‘detectable’ structural change, as modelled in this paper, or were 
only willing to attribute the finding of a break to data issues, it should be noted that our 
main contentions would still hold. We can therefore redefine the long run effect of exchange 
rate fluctuations on prices to be consistent with the theoretical literature. Instead of a 
rather arbitrary sum of (mainly insignificant, of opposite signs) coefficients on lags of the 
exchange rate,11 which we discussed in Section III.3, we propose using the EG cointegrating 
equation coefficient. The use of the standard measure of pass-through should be viewed 
with caution, or re-interpreted substantially.
Our main preoccupation is the fact that despite using data of monthly frequency and 
aiding ourselves with panel methods, we still deal with a relatively short sample of at most 
10 years. This may prove too short for the ‘true’ long run to reveal itself. This problem 
is aggravated by the specific developments in our sample - namely the introduction of the
euro, the Maastricht criterion de facto restricting the bilateral movements of the exchange
11 This would, as we have argued, make the estimates problematic to interpret in any case - 
regardless of whether the notion of a long run, defined as the sum of four or five short run effects, 
is coherent.
14G
rates of the countries since 1997, and the depreciation and subsequent appreciation of the 
euro-dollar rate.
However, we think that the sheer fact that we find overwhelming evidence in favor of a 
cointegrating relationship in the EG sense provides backing to the presence of a theoretically 
implied relationship as in equation (9). Augmenting this finding with our techniques for 
(a) dealing with change in the sample; and (b) extracting information from a panel, w'here 
pooling or averaging over the 90 units counteracts the noise arising from the T  dimension, 
makes our case more compelling.
When discussing the long run ERPT, anticipating our discussion of the results below, 
a number of other issues arise concerning the magnitude of the pass-through coefficient as 
measured by us. First of all, can we reasonably expect ERPT to be lower than one in the 
long run? Most of the literature, see for example Smets and Wouters (2002), is based on the 
notion that nominal rigidities cause imperfect ERPT. But as rigidities such as sticky prices 
tend to be rather a short to medium run phenomena, one may be led to think that producers 
would be unwilling to accommodate a change in the exchange rate into his mark-up forever, 
thus leading to expect full ERPT in the long run.
This story is not entirely convincing - the foreign exporter maximizes profit, not mark­
up over a set of markets and over time, and thus may be willing to accept to adjust his 
mark-up in order to maintain market share, adapting to competitive conditions both in 
the short and long run. The fact that empirically, exchange rates are found to be much 
more volatile than prices, would also suggest that even in the long run, not all exchange 
rate fluctuations are passed on to the price level and some of the adjustment may be done 
through quantity. Consequently, Corsetti, Dedolaand Leduc (2006) propose a model where 
ERPT is lower then one even in the long run, as a result of price discrimination and thus
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different pricing strategies between markets. Thus overall, a finding of the exchange rate 
pass-through to be lower than one in the long run is also not unreasonable.
Finally, in this context, can we expect the long run ERPT to be greater than 1? Essen­
tially, in the long run, the answer is 'no’. We do find a handful of the series exhibiting an 
ERPT estimate significantly greater than one. However, most commonly this occurs when 
we allow for a break in the slope and the break is estimated as being located rather close 
to the end of the sample, making inference unreliable.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the estimated break dates, their location, and the 
direction and nature of the change in the cointegrating relationships, we should emphasize 
that both our single-equation and panel methods allow for only a single break. This is a 
limitation imposed by the relatively short span of our sample. If there arc, say, two breaks in 
the data, the algorithm may pick up only one of them, or estimate a break lying somewhere 
in between the two actual breaks. This may account for some of the heterogeneity reported 
in the tables.
Generally speaking, both in our single equation framework, as well as in the panel 
estimates with increased power, we find evidence of a change in the vicinity of the introduc­
tion of the common currency (1998-9) or in the vicinity of the exchange rate developments 
turnaround (2001-2).
First, in the case of the breaks estimated to lie near 1998-9, thus coinciding with the 
introduction of the euro - there are reasons to expect both ‘monetary’ and ‘real’ effects of 
the common currency. As for the former, a vast literature tends to suggest that we should 
expect ERPT to fall upon the introduction of the euro (see for instance Devereux, Engel 
and Tille, 2003, who argue that as the new currency becomes the currency of invoicing, 
European prices will become more insulated from exchange rate volatility). However, in 148
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our estimates wo tend to find, especially for Italy and also Portugal and Spain, where the 
breaks coincide with the euro introduction, there tends to be a significant rise in ERPT - 
which suggests the story is not as simple. First of all, the above argument concerns primarily 
short run pass-through, while in this paper we focus on ERPT in the long run. In principle, 
there is no reason why it would not be possible to observe even opposing movements in the 
short- and long-run ERPT. Moreover, the acceptance of the euro as an invoice currency 
may take far longer than we are able to pick up in our short sample. Second, the euro 
can be expected to have reduced the ‘noise1 in the exchange rate movements, especially 
for countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. In a noisy, volatile environment producer 
currency pricing may prove difficult - frequent and often temporary exchange rate changes, 
confronted with menu costs or costly pricing strategy reviews may lead import goods to be 
actually more local currency priced. Arguably, especially in the mentioned countries, as the 
euro was introduced, the amount of noise in exchange rate developments may have fallen, 
thus actual changes in the exchange rate may have become no longer perceived as noisy, 
temporary shocks but more of a somewhat permanent and macro-founded nature, which 
the foreign exporter may become more willing to pass them on to the price. This is in line 
with the models of Adolfson (2001) and Corsetti, Dedolaand Leduc (200G) which generate 
high volatility of exchange rate associated with low ERPT.
As for the ‘real* effects of the common currency following the introduction of the euro, 
roughly 50% of the imports became by default home currency priced, and thus no longer 
subject to fluctuations in the exchange rate. This potentially meant a change in competitive 
conditions for extra-euro imports, for various reasons related to increased price transparency. 
The latter effect would tend to work in the direction of decreasing ERPT with the formation 
of the euro, however its strength relies largely on the extent to which extra- and intra-euro
1 4 9
imports within a singe 1-digit SITC category actually compete with each other.
We do however show there is some evidence of this effect, namely the estimated re­
duction of the constant markup (negative estimates a i in the most general specification 
of equation (13)) towards the second part of the sample suggests increased competition 
between importers.
Second, as for the breaks in the vicinity of 2001, that is coinciding with the period when 
the euro (and thus the ‘local currencies’ in our sample), after several years of depreciation 
against the dollar, started off on a  relatively stable appreciation. The reasoning for a 
possible asymmetrical effect of these exchange rate developments on import prices was 
briefly provided in the previous sections and is generally based on the notion that as the 
euro was depreciating, imported goods (which according to  our assumptions, and following 
CM, have a world price in dollars) if priced in dollars in the intra euro market, would be 
becoming more expensive if the exchange rate change were passed through into the price. 
Thus in order to stay competitive and maintain market share, the foreign producers could 
have been expected to accommodate some part of the rise - thus ERPT could be expected 
to be lower than if a producer currency pricing strategy were adopted. The turn-around 
in the exchange rate developments meant goods with dollar prices becoming cheaper on 
the intra euro market, which may have inclined producers to  be more willing to shift away 
from local currency pricing. By passing through more of their dollar price, they would be 
maintaining their revenue in terms of the dollar, but finding it easier to gain an edge in the 
market and compete with local products. Not ice that as we look at import prices this does 
not necessarily imply a change (fall) in the price level, nor a gain in market share, as there 
are many other factors at work (such as changing retailer margins). We treat the fact that 
in the cases when our estimated break point lies near 2001 the estimated ERPT rises, as
1 5 0
strong support for the above story of an asymmetrical ERPT.
Next, there are other developments, arguably harder to date, that may have had an effect 
on the long run ERPT - among them are: the increase in trade integration, ongoing trade 
liberalization, specific import compositions of individual countries, such as the Irish large 
share of pound rather than dollar priced goods and the different evolution of euro/pound 
and euro/dollar rates especially since 1999.12
Last, it is important to mention the fact that the effects of incidents like euro adoption 
cannot be expected to happen on an exact date - on one hand, they do not come fully 
unexpected, and thus may be anticipated to some degree, and on the other, the effect may 
be gradual and thus picked up with a lag.
Having discussed the breaks, we can now turn to analyzing the actual long run pass­
through estimates in more detail.
We will focus on the coefficients in Table 9 as the most general setting, which allows for 
breaks in both the constant and the cointegrating vector. The increase in ERPT in most 
sectors in countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal usually coincides with the introduction of 
the euro. This may be a sign of the increase in the credibility of the monetary regime, that 
occurred when these countries joined the euro area, which led foreign producers to expect 
more stable conditions, and as argued previously made them more willing to pass on the 
actual fluctuations. This change is not evident in the case of Greece, which generally has 
rather low pass-through rates, but joined the euro 2 years later.
As for the sectors, notably sector SITC 5 (Chemical products) faced an increase (signif-
^Another suggested issue is the integration of China into the global economy. Although, we 
expect the effect to work primarily through the ’world price’ rather then the degree of pass-through, 
there may be some room for the latter because of the change in the competition conditions induced 
by the inflow of Chinese goods. Sector trade shares of imports from China relative to all imports and 
relative to extra-EU imports grew steadily in the manufacturing sectors throughout our sample and 
notably in sectors SITCJ7 and SITC .8  seemed to accelerate around 2001. This pattern prevailed for 
most EU countries.
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leant in 7 of the 10 countries) in pass-through across almost all the countries in question, 
rendering it closer to 1. Next, in SITC 0 (Food and live animals) there has been an in­
crease in the pass-through in the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
from values around 0.5 to values much closer to 1. The estimated dates of this change are 
close to euro introduction for Italy, Greece and Spain. For the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Portugal the estimated breaks lie in mid 2002 and even in 2003. In the case of Ireland, an 
explanation for this may be provided by her intensive trade ties with the United Kingdom, 
which is by far the most important origin of imports into that country. As opposed to 
the euro/dollar exchange rate, the euro/sterling rate was relatively stable throughout our 
sample (see Figure 9). Specifically the British pound did not depreciate against the euro 
as the dollar did since about 2001. Thus euro movements versus the dollar may have had 
much lesser influence on the pass-through in this country, and suggests the weakness of 
the integrated world market assumption for Ireland. Finally in all the specifications it is 
evident the pass-through in sector SITC 3, i.e. mineral fuels, is practically equal to or very 
close to 1, and has not changed substantially upon the introduction of the euro. This may 
be explained by strong foreign market power of producers in this sector, who for instance 
face practically close to zero domestic competition in products like oil, and thus a common 
world price is fully passed on when the exchange rate fluctuates.
Generally we are able to reject zero pass-through rates much more often than using the 
arbitrary long run definition of a sum of 5 lags. Our estimated pass-through coefficients 
tend to be closer to 1 in magnitude, although they are often significantly different (from 1) 
due to much narrower confidence intervals. Moreover, we are able to provide an explanat ion 
for the increase in the pass-through rate that seemed to occur after 2000 in many countries. 
As mentioned previously, in the first part of the sample, the euro, and thus most currencies
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Figure 9: Evolution of EUR(ECU)/USD and EUR(ECU)/GBP exchange rates(199G—100).
related to it (e.g. through the ERM), was depreciating. Foreign producers may have been 
forced to absorb some of this increase in the relative price of their good in order to maintain 
the market share. Since 2001 the euro started to appreciate. As foreign producers where 
able to receive their relatively unchanged income in the foreign currency, they may have 
been able to pass on a larger part of the change in the exchange rate.
To summarize, in this paper, we propose a new estimate of the long run ERPT. The 
incorporation of the levels equilibrium relationship that we propose renders the empirical 
estimation of ERPT more consistent with the theoretical underpinnings which are in fact 
a levels relationship.
The empirical literature has been somewhat forced to look for alternative, more arbi­
trary definitions of long run ERPT, because of a failure to find a cointegrating relationship 
between the variables. We show that proper choice of lag lengths in unit root tests, al­
lowing for breaks in the series and using panel methods facilitates the discovery of such an 
equilibrium relationship in the data, and thus improved estimation of both long and short 
run ERPT.
Overall, ERPT in the long run is found to be equal to one or close to one in the
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commodity sectors, throughout the entire sample, while it tends to be rather lower than 
one in the manufacturing, food, beverages and tobacco and chemical sectors. As there are 
a number of reasons, such as the euro introduction and exchange rate developments that 
lead us to suspect a potential change in the long run relationship, we use up-to-date panel 
methods, to estimate possible break dates and changes in ERPT and account for possible 
cross-section dependence.
We tend to favor the most flexible specification, i.e. the one allowing for a break in 
the entire cointegrating relationship, as in this case the estimated shift in the constant is 
in line with the expected increase in competition expected with trade integration and the 
introduction of the euro.
Allowing for a structural break in the relationship we find that ERPT has generally 
increased in the vicinity of the euro introduction and the change is especially evident in 
Southern European countries. This may be the effect of perceived stabilization in the 
monetary regime, which led to less noise in exchange rate developments. Moreover the 
increase in ERPT in the second part of our sample may be due to specific exchange rate 
developments (euro/dollar depreciation till 2000, and subsequent appreciation) which may 
suggest asymmetrical response of the import prices. When we allow' for the change in the 
long run relat ionship, we find that, towards the second part of our sample, that is after the 
estimated break date, apart from Greece and perhaps a number of manufacturing sectors 
in Austria, long run ERPT was not generally substantially (in most cases not significantly) 
lower than 1.
Obviously in order to be able to  speak more confidently of the EG long run ERPT, we 
would require a longer series, ranging both further back and beyond the date of the intro­
duction of the euro. While this is the subject of on-going research, we hope we have been
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able in this paper to question the basis of the empirical literature surrounding estimation 
of ERPT and to propose a set of alternative ideas for discussion.
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Appendix A - Data
Sources: Eurostat, COMEXT.
import prices - monthly indexes of import unit values (calculated to be based on local cur­
rency) for imports originating outside the euro area.
foreign prices - monthly indexes of import unit values (calculated to be based on US dollars) 
from imports originating outside the euro area into the euro zone.
exchange rates - index of monthly average exchange rate of local currency against the US 
dollar.
All variables are in logs.
SITC code - Industry
0 - Food and live animals chiefly for food
1 - Beverages and Tobacco
2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.
6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials
7 - Machines, transport equipment
8 - Manufactured goods n.e.c.
• CM data set 1989-2001 - series for 1989m1-2001m3: Belgium+Luxembourg, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Series for 1996ml- 
2001m3: Austria and Finland.
• ’’new1’ data set 1995-2005 - 1995ml-2005m3 for 10 out of 11 countries of the CM data 
set (Belgium-H Luxembourg excluded, Austria and Finland start 1996ml, Portugal 
and Austria stop 2004ml)
• full panel - reduced version of 1995-2005 data set, trimmed in order to obtain a 
balanced panel. Covers 1996ml-2004ml2 for all 10 countries. •
•  full panel for CM 1989-2001 sample - 9 countries: Austria and Finland excluded, due 
to short series. Series Ireland SITC 4 and Portugal SITC 4 also excluded due to 
missing values.
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Model pseudo-t pseud o-p
No break -8.27 -35.53
Break in constant -15.61 -40.18
Break vector -19.51 -42.22
Under the null hypothesis both statistics have 
__________ a N(0,1) distribution__________
Table 14: Pseudo-t and Pseud o p  parametric statistics from Banerjee and Carrion-i- 
Silvestre (2006) version of Pedroni(1999). The null hypothesis is no cointegration. Sample: 
1989-2001, full panel (N=79) excl. Austria and Finland, unit specific breaks. Equivalent of 
Table 7.
Figure 10: Semi-annual distribution of estimated break dates (1990sl-2000s2). Breaks in 
cointegrating vector. Dark color - all breaks, light color - only breaks when long run ERPT 
changed significantly (10%). Sample: 1989-2001, excl. Finland and Austria. Equivalent of 
Figure 7.
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Ho: unit root (no co-integration)
No. of 
factors
Pseudo-t
No break
ave.
Break (a) 
min. max ave.
Break (b) 
min. max
(1) -2.64 -2.51 -3.59 -1.55 -2.32 -3.77 -0.29
(2) -2.89 -2.49 -3.95 -1.54 -2.07 -3.62 -0.75
(3) -1.88 -1.76 -2.79 -0.66 -1.86 -3.67 -0.52
Under ike null the statistics have the normal N(0,1) distribution. 
No breakf (a) - break in constant within co-integrating equation, 
______ (b)break in the entire co-integrating relationship.
Table 15: Test statistics for Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (200G) panel co-integration 
tests with cross-section dependence (common factors). Sample: 1989-2001, Finland and 
Austria excluded. Columns (ave), (min) and (max) report average, minimum and maximum 
values of the statistic when estimation is repeated for each common break between 1990m4 
and 1998ml0. Extended version of Table 10.
r.
I O F_1 ■ F_3 F j l  f 0 F_1 » F__3 ■ F_ë|
Figure 11: Distribution of the test statistics from Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) 
test. The null hypothesis is no cointegration, the alternative cointegration with a common 
break in constant (left hand side) as in equation (12), and cointegration with common break 
in cointegrating vector (right hand side) as in equation (13). In both cases cross sectional 
dependence is modelled with a 1-, 3- and 6-factor structure. Under the null hypothesis, the 
statistics have a iV(0,1) distribution. Each observation is obtained by estimating the model 
with a given break date. Sample: 1989-2001, Finland and Austria excluded.
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Appendix C - Descriptions of tests
Single equations with breaks - Gregory and Hansen (1996), panel cointegration 
without cross-sectional dependence: Pedroni (1999) - without breaks and with 
breaks as in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006)13
For the purpose of describing the formal setup of the tests, let {V*,*} be a (m x l)-vector of 
non-stat ionary stochastic process with the following representation
A%i,t — v%,t
Vi,t — f t  ( t )  -F + ei,t; e*(t = Pte^t 4- £*,*,
(14)
(15)
where V* * =  is conveniently partitioned into a scalar yu and the ((m — 1) x 1)-
vector Xi,t, i =  1, *.., N, t =  1 , . . . ,  T. Let t’u )  be a random sequence assumed
to be strictly stationary and ergodic, with mean zero and finite variance. In addition, 
the partial sum process constructed from {&,(} satisfy the multivariate invariance principle 
defined in Phillips and Durlauf (1986). At this stage and in order to set the analysis in a 
simplified framework, let us assume that } and {£»,t} are independent.
The general functional form for the deterministic term ƒ (t) is given by:
f i  (t ) = P i + f a t  + OiDUi't +
where
DUitt / 0 t<Tbi * _  ƒ 0 t < Th \ l t > Tbi (t-T b i) t>Tbi
with Tbi = AjT, A* € A, denoting the time of the break for the i-th unit, i = 1, 
also that the cointegrating vector is specified as a function of time so that
f ¿¿.lX 2 t  >  T b i
(16)
(17)
,N . Note
(18)
Using these elements, Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) propose up to six different 
model specifications, of which for the purpose of this paper we will review two:
•  Model 1. Constant term with a change in level but stable cointegrating vector:
Vi,t =  Pi + OiDUu +  x'i t 6i + eu  (19)
•  Model 4. Constant term with change in both level and cointegrating vector:
Vi,t ~  Pi +  OiDUij +  xfi t6itt +  e iit (20)
Using any one of these specifications the authors propose testing the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration (with break) using 
the ADF test statistic applied to the residuals of the cointegration regression as in Engle 
and Granger (1987) and Gregory and Hansen (1996) but in the panel data framework
13This Appendix is a extract from Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006). For more details, 
including setup, derivations, asymptotic properties and finite sample simulations we refer the reader 
to the original papers.
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developed in Pedroni (1999, 2004). In fact, Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose both of the 
specifications given by models 1 and 4 above.
The Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) proposal starts by following Gregory and 
Hansen (1996), to the OLS estimation of one of the models given above (in our case (19) 
and (20)) and run the following ADF type-regression equation on the estimated residuals
(MAO):
k
Ae-i % (A*) = pi^ t—i (A*) + ^ ^ j  (A*) + £*,(■ (21)
3=1
The notation used refers to the break fraction (A*) parameter, which (if it exists) is in 
most cases unknown. In order to get rid of the dependence of the statistics on the break 
fraction parameter, Gregory and Hansen (1996) suggest estimating the models given above 
for all possible break dates, subject to trimming, obtaining the estimated OLS residuals 
and computing the corresponding ADF statistic.
With the sequence of ADF statistics in hand, one can also estimate the break point for each
unit as the date that minimizes the sequence of individual ADF test statistics -  either the £-
/ - \-i
ratio, tfa (A*), or the normalized bias, computed as Tpi (A*) = Tpi f 1 -  --------
-  see Hamilton (1994), pp. 523. Note that the estimation of the break point Tk is conducted 
as
7 k -
arg min
(A*); 7 k -
arg min 
A i €  A
TpiiXi), (22)
Vi = l , .. . ,iV . At this point Gregory and Hansen (1996) test the null hypothesis for 
each unit. Gregory and Hansen (1996) derive the limiting distribution of £^ ^Ai) —
infA,-eA tpi (A*) and Tpt (Aij =  infa*€A Tpi (A*), which are shown not to depend on the
break fraction parameter. Specifically, Gregory and Hansen (1996) show that Tpi ^A*) =►
infAi€A ¡ ¿ Q ( \ ,s ) d Q ( \ i ,s ) /  f 0' Q (\i, s)2 ds, and th  (A() => infj^A ƒ„ Q (Ai, s) <1Q (A,, s) j
[/o Q(Ai, s ) 2 dr (l + Q(Xi)f D ( \ i )  p(A*))]  ^ , where => denotes weak convergence, Q(A*,s) 
and ^ (A*) are functions of Brownian motions and the deterministic component, and (A*) 
depends on the model -  see the Theorem in Gregory and Hansen (1996) for further details.
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) propose combining the unit-specific information 
in a panel data statistic.
The panel statistics on which they focus in order to test the null hypothesis are given 
by the ZpST and ZiNT tests in Pedroni (1999, 2004), which can be thought as analogous 
to the residual-based tests in Engle and Granger (1987). These test statistics are defined 
by pooling the individual ADF tests, so that they belong to the class of between-dimension 
test statistics. Specifically, they are computed as:
N - ' / % x t [  a)  =  TP i ( ^ )  (23)
t=l
i f % r (A) = (24)
i= I
where pi ^Ai) and tp{ ( a*^  are the estimated coefficient and associated f-ratio from (21)
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a n d
Â = (25)
is the vector of estimated break fractions.
Note that this framework allows for a high degree of heterogeneity since the cointegrating 
vector, the short run dynamics and the break point estimate might differ among units. The 
use of the panel data cointegration test aims to increase the power of the statistical inference 
when testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration, but some heterogeneity is preserved 
when conducting the estimation of the parameters individually.
Following Pedroni (1999), the panel test statistics are shown to converge to standard 
Normal distributions once they have been properly standardized.
Panel cointegration with cross-sectional dependence(Bai and Ng 200413): 
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006)13
The setup above extended static-regression based tests for cointegration to allow for 
structural breaks in the components of the regression. The underlying assumption was that 
panel units are cross-sectionally independent, which is quite rarely the case in economic 
applications. The extended approach in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) models 
cross-sectional dependence using common factors such as in Bai and Ng(2004). The tests 
can accommodate a (common) structural break.
Break point known
The underlying model is given in the following structural form: A
Vi,t =  f i  (t) +  x'itSi ,t +  «1,1 (26)
Ui,t =  fjVi +  Ci,i (27)
( /  -  L) Ft = C (L ) u ; (28)
(1 - p iL ) e i , t = H i(L )eu  , (29)
( I - L ) X i .t  = G i(L )v iit, (30)
t =  1 ,... ,T , i — 1.......TV, where C  (L) =  ^ and f i  (I) denotes the deterministic
component (which may be broken as in 16 above), Ft denotes a (r x l)-vector containing 
the common factors, with 7r* the vector of loadings. Despite the operator (1 — L) in equation 
(28), Ft does not have to be 1(1). In fact, Ft can be 1(0), 1(1), or a combination of both, 
depending on the rank of C (l). If C (l)  =  0, then Ft is 1(0). If C(l) is of full rank, then 
each component of Ft is 1(1). If (7(1) ^  0, but not full rank, then some components of Ft 
are 1(1) and some are 1(0). Our analysis is based on the same set of assumptions in Bai and 
Ng (2004), and Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005). With a  number of assumptions on the 
loadings and error terms from the above equations we one can continue the estimation of 
common factors as is done in Bai and Ng (2004). We need to compute the first differences:
A  yi,t ~  A  fi  ( t ) +  A  x'ijdi't +  A F t 7Ti +  A e * ./, ( 3 1 )
and take the orthogonal projections:
MiAj/i = MiAFiti + AliAet 
— f * i  +  zu
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(32)
(33)
with Mi = /  — A x f (A xf Ax?)-1 A x f  being the idempotent matrix, and ƒ =  A/iAF and 
Zi = A/iAe*. The superscript d in Ax^ indicates that there are deterministic elements. 
The estimation of the common factors and factor loadings can be done as in Bai and 
Ng (2004) using principal components. Specifically, the estimated principal component of 
ƒ = ( f a  h-> ■ - ■» / t )j denoted as ƒ, is y/T— 1 times the r  eigenvectors corresponding to the 
first r  largest eigenvalues of the (T — 1) x (T -  1) matrix y*y*f, where y? =  A/jAy*. Under 
the normalization / / ' / ( T  — 1) = /r, the estimated loading matrix is II = f fy * l (T — 1). 
Therefore, the estimated residuals are defined as
— Vi,t M*. (34)
One can recover the idiosyncratic disturbance terms through cumulation, i.e. ~ 
and test the unit root hypothesis (aj.o =  0) using the ADF regression equation
k
= i 4” Aèi.(_j 4* £*,t.
j =i
(35)
We denote by A D F -(i)y A D FJ (i) and ADF? (i) the pseudo ¿-ratio ADF statistics for 
testing Qi,o = 0 in (35), for the model that includes a constant, a linear time trend, and 
a time trend with a change in trend, respectively. When r  =  1 we can use an ADF-type 
equation to analyze the order of integration of Ft as well. However, in this case we need 
to proceed in two steps. In the first step wre regress Ft on the deterministic specification 
and the stochastic regressors. In the second step we estimate the ADF regression equation 
using the detrended common factor he. the residuals of the first step:
A F? = Sotti + £  lA  ttj + Ut,
J=1
(3G)
and test if ¿o = 0 -  ADFp, (A) denotes the pseudo ¿-ratio ADF statistic for testing So = 0 
in (36).
Finally, if r > 1 one should use one of the two statistics proposed in Bai and Ng (2004) 
to fix the number of common stochastic trends {q). As before, let F f  denote the det rended 
common factors. Start with q = r and proceed in three stages -  which are reproduced for 
completeness:
1. Let P± be the q eigenvectors associated with the q largest eigenvalues of T~2 FfFt*-
2. Let Ytd =  j3±Fd, from which we can define two statistics:
(a) Let K  (j)  = 1 -  j f  (J  + 1), j  =  0 ,1 ,2 ,. . . ,  J :
i. Let i f  be the residuals from estimating a first-order VAR in y f, and let
= £  A'«  ( T~' £ # 0 " )  • (37)
j=1 \ *—2 /
H. Let e*  (q) =  ± [ z [ =2 ( > ? %  + V y V f )  — T  ( ¿ f  +  £ ? ) ]  ( t -> Y .L 2 V ',1 ,% )
-1
Ì.
1 6 9
in. Define M Q d ( ? )  =  T  [f^ (q)  — l] for the case of no change in the trend and 
MQd (q, A) = T  [f[/ (q, A) — l] for the case of a change in the trend.
(b) For p fixed that does not depend on N  and T :
i. Estimate a VAR of order p  in A Ytd to obtain II(L) = / 9 — fti£ —... -  IIPU*. 
Filter Y f  by ft (L) to get yf = II (L) Ytd.
ii. Let vd (q) be the smallest eigenvalue of
* d _  1 
'  “ 2 Y  iy ? * *  i +,t—2 V
(38)
iii. Define the statistic M Q j (q) = T  |r^  (g) — lj for the case of no change in
the trend and M Q j  (q, A) =  T  ^vd (</, A) — lj for the case of a change in the 
trend.
3. If Ho : ri = q is rejected, set q =  q — 1 and return to the first step. Otherwise, f\ =  q 
and stop.
Nowr, note that the definition of the common factors framework implies that the matrix 
of projections Mi that is used above cannot depend on i, which means that all elements tha t 
are defined in Axd should be the same across i. There are two different kind of elements 
in Aaf: (i) the deterministic regressors and (ii) the stochastic regressors. Regarding the 
latter, BS have shown in their Appendix that the limiting distribution of the statistics do 
not depend on the presence of stochastic regressors, so that we can ignore the effect of these 
elements when defining A/*. Unfortunately, this is not true for the deterministic regressors. 
Thus, to warrant that Mi does not (asymptotically) depend on i one has to assume common 
break dates, i.e. one has to assume that the break points are the same for all units. This 
restriction can be seen as a limitation of the analysis, but in fact it is due to the definition 
of the common factors framework. Thus, (33) specifies a common factor structure for all 
units, so that- ft cannot depend on i. Looking at the definition of ft = MiAFt one can 
see that the specification of heterogeneous structural breaks implies that the idempotent 
matrix Mi depends on i. The only way to overcome this situation is to impose Mi = M  Vt 
so that the structural breaks are the same for all units.
Next, the limiting distribution of the ADF statistic for the idiosyncratic disturbance 
term does not depend on the presence of stochastic regressors. Moreover, the presence 
of changes in level does not affect the limiting distribution of the ADF statistic that is 
computed using the idiosyncratic disturbance term.
The individual ADF statistics for the idiosyncratic disturbance terms can be pooled to 
define a panel data cointegration test. Thus, one can define
A’- l/2ZfKT (A) -  e| (A) Vn  =c N (0, *1 (A)), (39)
where the superscript e denotes the idiosyncratic disturbance. The moments ©$ (A) and 
^2  (A) depend on the deterministic specification used and, except for the case of changes in 
trend, are the same as the ones for the statistics in Bai and Ng (2004) (where these do not 
depend on the break fraction A).
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Break point unknown When the break point is unknown we can proceed to estimate 
it using the infimum functional as described above. However in contrast with case where 
factors were not present, we have to constrain the (unknown) break point to be common 
to all units in the panel data set and to estimate both the subspace spanned by the com­
mon factors and the idiosyncratic disturbance terms for all possible break points. We then 
compute the Zf (A) = JV“1 tp* (A) statistic for each break point using the idiosyn­
cratic disturbance terms and estimate the break point as the argument that minimizes the 
sequence of standardized Z\ (A) statistics.
t
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Chapter IV
Exchange Rates and Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
- a Glance at the EU New Member States
Abstract
We analyze the exchange rate pass-through from the nominal effective ex­
change rates to import prices in 8 Central Eastern European countries, taking 
a separate look at pass-through in commodity and manufacturing sectors. We 
find that the degree of pass-through was not primarily driven by the choice of 
the exchange rate regime, and that it tended to be full and instantaneous in a 
number of countries and sectors while incomplete in the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia. As there is some evidence exchange rate changes are further passed 
on to CPI, we speculate on how high and instantaneous ERPT may contribute 
to the vulnerabilities arising from the ERM II requirements once the countries 
decide to adopt the euro.
JEL Classification Numbers: F14, F31, F3G, F42 
Keywords: CEECs, exchange rates, pass-through, import prices.
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IV. 1 Introduction
Exchange rate pass-through into prices (ERPT) has been recognized as an important input 
for the design of monetary policy. It reflects the interaction of a number of microeco­
nomic factors, such as the market power of producers and importers, market segmentation 
and competition conditions. Moreover it also reflects a number of macroeconomic issues, 
such as the credibility of monetary policy and the expectations of future macroeconomic 
developments.
In this paper, we use data for sectoral import unit values (IUVs) for 8 New Member 
States from Central and Eastern Europe to determine what part of nominal effective ex­
change rate developments is passed on to import prices. We adopt different assumptions 
about the long-run ERPT in order to be able to draw conclusions on the instantaneous 
pass-through. We find evidence of full or close to full short run ERPT in Hungary, both 
in commodity and manufacturing sectors; in Poland and Lithuania especially in the com­
modity sectors and in Estonia in the manufacturing sectors. Pass-through for all sectors 
together tends to be full in all three of these countries, and with lesser confidence in Esto­
nia. On the other hand we find evidence of incomplete pass-through in the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Latvia, especially in the manufacturing sectors. Most of the ERPT estimates 
appear stable within the examined period. The consequences of high pass-through in the 
short term may include potential vulnerabilities in future attempts in joining the common 
European currency.
Our findings, though seriously limited by the quality of the data, iiave a number of 
important implications for the countries - once in the euro waiting room - the ERM II. 
As Central Eastern European economies (CEECs) catch up in terms of development, pro­
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ductivity growth, through the Balassa-Samuelson effect,1 can be expected to cause the real 
exchange rates in developing, strongly growing economies to appreciate in the longer term. 
This can take place through two channels - the nominal exchange rates and (relative) price 
inflation. A country with a fixed exchange rate policy, in principle leaves one of the channels 
closed. Thus recent higher (than in inflation targeting CEECs) inflation in the Baltic States 
should not come as a surprise. However, as for these countries inflation has been the main 
obstacle to joining the European common currency in 2007, any additional rise in prices 
caused by temporary nominal exchange rate shocks (e.g. fluctuations in the euro/dollar 
rate), could bring with them the risk of failing to enter the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) on a certain date. On the other hand, although this risk seems mitigated in inflation 
targeting regimes, the fact of a floating currency brings about potentially large fluctuations 
in exchange rates, which can in turn feed in to prices, thus must be taken into account 
by the monetary authorities. The importance is emphasized by the fact that the Maas­
tricht inflation criterion has been shown to be applied with great scrutiny when Lithuania 
attempted to join the EMU starting 2007.
As we will show, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania tend to have high short-term values 
of ERPT into import prices. This means a change in the nominal (effective) exchange rate 
tends to be passed on fully to the local import price within one month, though admittedly 
in some cases this tendency is stronger in the commodity sectors than in manufactured 
goods. Thus an adverse (effective) exchange rate development, both in case of a currency 
board such as Lithuania and in case of flexible regimes such as in Poland and Hungary may
potentially lead to a failed attempt to join the euro. This reasoning involves the assumption
^ h e  effect of productivity growth differentials between tradeables and non-tradeables in different 
countries resulting in bilateral changes in the real exchange rate, was first noticed in the works 
of David Ricardo, and among others Roy Harrod and later independently by Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964). The most common nomenclature refers to it as the ’’Balassa-Samuelson effect”.
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that at least part this change is further passed on into the consumer price index (CPI), which 
as will show, there are grounds to believe is the case. We find indications that in these three 
countries, ERPT into the overall price level is non-zero in the short run and full or close to 
full in the long run. One of the purposes of the exercise is to highlight some problems of 
the vulnerabilities of both regimes under ERM II. On the other hand, the finding of rather 
low values of ERPT in Czech Republic and Slovenia, makes them less sensitive to the issue, 
though admittedly for the latter, on which the decision to enter to the Eurozone has already 
been made, the issue is of lesser relevance.2
The paper is structured as follows. In Section IV.2 we describe the basic setup of our 
ERPT estimation. Next, in Section IV.3 we discuss other empirical work in this area. 
Turning to Section IV.4 we describe the data including the construction of the variables, 
trade patterns of the CEECs and devoting special attention to exchange rate developments. 
Section IV.5 presents the estimation method, and the following sections summarize and 
discuss the results.
IV.2 Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices
By definition3, import prices for any type of good AfP? are a transformation of export 
prices of a country’s trading partners XP} using the bilateral exchange rate ERt:
MPtj = ERt • XP} (1)
2The decision to approve Slovenia’s accession to the EMU on the l 3i of January 2007 was made 
by the Council of the EU on July 1 1 fA, 2006.
3This section is based on Campa, Goldberg and Gonzalez-Minguez (2005), CGM hereafter. It is 
similar to the relevant section in De Bandt, Banerjee and Kozluk (2006) and thus in Chapter III of 
this thesis.
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In logarithms (depicted in lower case):
mpi =  ert 4- xpj (2)
Where the export price consists of the exporters marginal cost and a markup:
XP} = FMCÎ * FMKUPÎ (3)
So that in logarithms we have:
xpl = fm 4  + fmkupi (4)
Substituting for xpj into equation (2) yields:
mjPt =  ert +  fm hupt  +  /mcj (5)
i
for each sector in each of the countries.
The literature on industrial organization yields insight into why exporters of a given 
product may decide to absorb some of the exchange rate variations instead of passing them 
through to the price in the importing country currency. This responsiveness of the mark-up 
is determined primarily by the competition conditions, such as market share, competition 
structure, the ability to discriminate between markets etc. that the producer or exporter 
faces in a given market. If the pass-through is complete (producer currency pricing), their 
mark-ups will not respond to fluctuations of the exchange rates, thus leading to a pure 
currency translation. At the other extreme, they can decide not to vary the prices in the 
destination country currency (local currency pricing or pricing to market) and absorb the
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fluctuations within the mark-up.
Thus, mark-ups of the exporting industry are assumed to consist of a component specific 
to the type of good, independent of the exchange rate and a reaction to exchange rate
movements:
fm kupt = a  +  ( 6 )
Also important to consider are the effects working through the marginal cost. These are 
a function of demand conditions in the importing country; marginal costs of production 
(labor wages) in the exporting country and the commodity prices denominated in foreign 
currency:
fm c t —co-yt + c i-  fw t +  c2 * ert + C3 • fcjn  (7)
Substituting (G) and (7) into (4), we have:
m p t = a + (1 + + C2) e r t + co • yt + c\ ■ /«V + <*3 • J c jh  + * t (8)
'------ V------ '
0
where the coefficient /? on the exchange rate ert is the pass-through elasticity.4 Therefore 
estimated pass-through elasticities are a sum of three effects:
•  effects of the unity translation effects of the exchange rate movement,
• the response of the markup in order to offset this translation effect,
• the effect on the marginal cost that are attributable to the exchange rate movements, 
such as the sensitivity of input prices to exchange rates.
And thus does not necessarily equal 1. In the ‘integrated world market’ approach adopted
4Obviously, this is a simple approach, with a highly reduced form representation, where one can 
have no hope of identifying $  from co.
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by the CGM specification, Co ■ yt +  ci • fw t  +  C3  * f c p ti is independent of the exchange rate 
and can be thought of as the opportunity cost of allocating those same goods to other 
customers, as reflected in the world price of the product f p t in the world currency.5
IV.2.1 Long run E R P T
FYom the previous section we can re-write the final equation (8) as follows:
mpt — a  +  (3 ■ ert +  7  • fP t +  et (9)
which gives the long run relation between the import price, exchange rate and a measure 
of foreign price.
Exchange rate pass-through is usually specified as the effect of exchange rate fluctuations 
on import prices (the so-called ’first stage’ pass-through, which we will mostly focus on in 
this paper) or on domestic consumer prices ( ’second stage’ pass-through). Since E R P T  
(both into import prices and into domestic prices) is a  channel linking exchange rates 
to prices, it is often named as one of the key determinants of monetary policy design. 
T h e level of E R P T  is an important input for inflation forecasting and monetary policy.
There is a vast literature on optimal monetary policy, which takes into account E R P T  into
5The integrated market hypothesis in CGM is based on the assumption that there exists a single 
world market for each good. Therefore, regardless of the origin of the product, on the world market, 
it has one world price. This price constitutes the opportunity cost of selling to a local market. 
Thus, in the CGM setup for the integrated market it proxies for the foreign price. The currency 
denomination does not in fact matter, as long as the exchange rate for the local currency is taken 
vis-a-vis this ’world’ currency. In the CGM case the extra-euro area imports into the euro area 
denominated in US dollars are taken as a proxy for the world price. CGM propose an alternative 
specification - the ’segmented world market’ where both the exchange rate and foreign price are, 
respectively, the trade-weighted average of exchange rates with the 5 biggest trading partners and 
the trade-weighted price index of imports from the same trading partners. CGM test and reject 
the hypothesis that the segmented market specification for most of their EMU sample combinations 
adds any information relative to the integrated market hypothesis. As will become clear later, in 
this paper we take an intermediate approach.
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import prices and final consumer prices.6 Most generally, earlier literature (see Devereux 
and Engel, 2002; Adolfson, 2001) tends to suggest that as incomplete E R P T  lowers the 
relative importance of the exchange rate as the shock transmission channel, and allows the 
attainment of low price volatility together with large exchange rate fluctuations. However, 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2002) show that internal stabilization 
policies are not successful in the presence of imperfect pass-through if they do not take into 
account the cost of excessive exchange rate volatility. High fluctuations in the exchange 
rate, in part engineered by central banks exploiting the above finding, together with the 
firms’ inability to fully adapt prices in response to these fluctuations (due to sticky prices - 
the main underlying source of low E R P T  in most models), may cause producers to charge 
inefficiently high prices in order to assure a certain revenue level.
Moreover a large part of the literature focuses on short run E R P T  assuming full pass­
through in the long run. Notably Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2006) distinguish two sources 
of imperfect pass-through: price st ickiness which is a short run phenomenon and thus does 
not affect the long run, and market segmentation which allows for an imperfect pass-through 
even in the long run.
Finally, there is a large degree of endogeneity in the observed E R P T  and monetary
policy. That is, pricing strategies of firms depend not solely on competition conditions in
the market, but also on monetary policy, or rather the expected monetary policy and the
policy makers’ credibility. On the other hand monetary policy can be expected to depend
on a consideration of E R P T  and the efleet of exchange rate variability on prices. Therefore
it will be interesting to compare results for countries with very different exchange rate
regimes. On the downside, there are a number of problems with the data for CEECs, which
^Section 2 of Chapter III reviews the literature in more detail.
1 7 9
IV.2.2 E R P T  in the short run
Both economic theory and relevant tests lead us to think of each of the series (import 
price, exchange rate and world price) as being characterized by a unit root. Moreover, the 
underlying specification of the model being an equilibrium relationship in ’levels’ suggests 
th at these series can be expected to be cointegrated. I f  we can find evidence of the latter, 
we will proceed by estimating an error correction model (ECM ), as in Engle and Granger
(1987), of the the following form:
Ki k2
A m pt -  o + y ^  bk-Aert-k+y^,ck • Afpt-k +A (mpf- i  -  a - f t -  ert~ 1 -  7  • f P t - i )  +u< (10) 
*=° *= 0  S "ecm *
where the estimated coefficient 6 0  will yield the instant reaction of the price level to the 
exchange rate movement, and thus the short run or the instantaneous E R P T . The total 
number of lags is selected automatically, starting from the maximum of 4 and dropping lags 
until the last is significant, or the simultaneous model is obtained, which in our estimates 
leaves only simultaneous effects in the vast majority of cases.
IV. 3 Empirical literature
Empirical investigations of E R P T  have been given much attention in the recent literature 
(see for example Campa and Gonzalez-Mingues, 2006; Campa, Goldberg and Gonzalez- 
Minguez, 2005; De Bandt, Banerjee and Kozluk, 2006; Marazzi et al., 2005). But while 
E R P T  has been subject to a relatively large amount of empirical analysis for the industrial­
ized economies, and even some developing countries (see for example Frankel, Parsley and
we describe in detail in Section IV .4.
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Wei, 2005), rather little work has been done on the Central Eastern European transition 
economies. To our knowledge, there are two papers concerning the issue of E R P T  into the 
aggregate price indices, of which both focus on the ’secondary1 E R P T , that is pass-through 
into domestic prices. Davras (2001) attem pts to examine E R P T  into domestic fundamental 
prices (i.e. domestic price aggregates which exclude food, energy and administered prices) 
for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia in the second half of the 1990s. The au­
thor attempts to  estimate impulse-response functions from vector auto-regressions (VARs) 
and a version of the error-correction (ECM ) specification. The results obtained tend to 
suggest short run E R P T  in the Czech Republic was close to zero, while in the other coun­
tries above zero, significantly lower than one (point estimates of 0.1 to  0.3, though not 
significantly different from each other). The robustness o f the analysis is weakened by a 
scarcity of observations (the short time series consist of twelve quarterly observations for the 
Czech Republic and 29 for the other countries), and by problems with estimated parameter 
instability, possibly due to the fact that the sample period includes the turbulent period of 
relatively early transition.
Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten (2006) take a different approach. They use a cointegrated 
VAR framework to estimate E R P T  into consumer price inflation in the same four CEECs 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) in the period 1993ml:2002m5. They 
supplement the set of explanatory variables by industrial production and the interest rate 
differential (with respect to Euribor) in order to account for cyclical fluctuations.7 They
find estimates of long run pass-through into the CPI in Slovenia, Hungary and Poland
7In a working paper version of the paper, Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten (2004), the authors 
attempt to support their conclusions with 1(2) analysis. However, ADF tests performed on the 
variables over our sample (1999ml :2005m 12) do not confirm the hypothesis of the variables being 
1(2). This may be because the data starts rather late compared to the Coricelli, Jazbec and Masten 
(2004) paper and thus does not cover the turbulent early period of transition.
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insignificantly different from one, while significantly lower than one in the Czech Republic. 
Short-term, or instantaneous pass-through rates from exchange rate changes to inflation 
differentials tend to be highest in Slovenia, lower, though admittedly not significantly lower 
for Poland and Hungary» and the lowest in the Czech Republic. Generally, the authors 
tentatively conclude that accommodative monetary policy causes much o f the inflation 
pressures in the CEECs.
Both investigations in the field of E R P T  in Central and Eastern Europe are rather rough 
and only very indicative results are obtained. The m ajor determinant is certainly the lack 
of long tim e series over a stable period. Consequently, in this paper, we want to introduce 
a number of new issues. F irst, we attempt to distinguish between E R P T  in different types 
of goods, mainly between primary goods and processed or manufactured goods, which 
empirical estimation for the industrialized countries has shown to have different importer 
pricing behavior.8 We use a data set which, starting in 1999, is characterized by much more 
stable exchange rate, price and monetary policy developments. Admittedly many of the 
problems encountered in previous work still linger and we have preferred in consequence to 
adopt a simple estimation approach.
IV.4 Data
For the purpose of this paper we use data for Import Unit Values (IUVs) and exchange
rates of local currencies against the euro and US dollar. The data is taken from Eurostat
8One of the reasons why one can expect ERPT into import prices to be higher (at least in the 
short run) in primary and commodity sectors is the fact that trade in these sectors is to a large 
extent done through future contracts, upon a ’world’ price, set in one of the main currencies (usually 
USD). Hence there is little room for adjustment, and the IUV, which is reported in local currency 
is affected directly by the change in exchange rate, consisting to a large extent of a product of 
the incidental (upon the declaration of import) exchange rate and the pre^agreed contract price. 
Anecdotal evidence and empirical estimates in papers quoted later in this work seem, somewhat 
unsurprisingly, to point to more flexibility in the manufactured sectors.
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(COM EXT) and described in more detail in Appendix A. T h e observations concern total 
trade and trade in nine individual 1-digit SITC  sectors for 8 of the Central and Eastern 
European EU members (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia).9 They range from 1999ml to 2005m l2.
The issues related to using IUVs in E R P T  estimation are mostly related to the under­
lying properties of the indexes. These have been well overviewed in Cam pa and Gonzalez- 
Minguez (2006) and also in De Bandt, Banerjee and Kozluk (2006) and concern the issue of 
aggregation. Generally IUVs have the downside of measuring the value of a basket which is 
varying at each moment of observation. That is the IUV may change from month to month 
not solely because the price o f a good has changed, but because the composition of goods 
imported in one month may change in another, partly perhaps, because of the exchange 
rate movements. Moreover, using import unit values entails essentially looking at the values 
of kilograms of each type of goods, be it commodities, automobiles or computers.
The problems described above are standard and well identified in the analysis of E R P T . 
However, in the case of the CEECs there are a number of additional issues that make the 
analysis more complicated and troublesome. First of all, for this group of countries the IUVs 
are not directly provided by the Eurostat, and thus we have had to compute them by dividing 
the value of trade by the quantity. This renders the series to appear less smooth than the 
series for ’’old'’ EU  members, as they are not aggregated up from lower classification levels. 
Moreover, the C EEC s have been undergoing a period of transition to market economies since 
the early 1990s. Prices were gradually liberalized, economies opened up to international
trade and integrated both with the global and European economies. All of the countries
9The series SITC 1 (Beverages and Tobacco) IUVs appear to be corrupt (large break in mean 
and variance) for six of the countries, and have been excluded from the sample, especially as the 
series are relatively short.
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had to set up new monetary regimes, and many have switched between various arrangements 
for their exchange rates. Moreover, on the l si of May 2004 they joined the EU. Each of 
these changes may be suspected to  constitute a break in the sample. The issues of exchange 
rates in C EEC s and trade integration with the E U  are given more attention in the following 
sections, but generally, the transition, exchange rate regime changes and EU  integration 
justify using the sample provided in C O M EXT, that is starting 1999m l. Going back earlier, 
would force us to deal with the problem of the introduction of the common currency in the 
biggest C E E C s’ trading partner - the EMU, leading us to  a suspicion of a possible break.
In our exercise we distinguish imports from two sources - the (current) EU and from 
outside of it. This means the im port price (in local currency) is a weighted average of the 
import price of imports from inside the EU p m EU and from other sources p m nanEU (both 
in local price):
p t f
pm u =  ptn-a *
imp-valgu ^«cnEU „ 1 ~ imp-valf,1' 
im p-valft0 7  lt im pjuai[tOT (11)
where im p ju a lx  is the value of im ports from X  - in our case the EU-25 (EU ) and the total 
outside world (T O T). Consequently, the exchange rate is an effective exchange rate, i.e. the 
weighted average between the rates against the euro and the dollar:
e r a  =  e r ftUR *
im p jv a lEU
im p .v a lJtOT
+  er,USD
1 — im p .v a lEV 
im p-vaiftOT
(12)
The foreign price is proxied by the ’world price’ which consists of the weighted average of 
the the EU price of imports originating from within and from outside the EU:
1 — im p -v a lEU 
im p .vai[tOT
(13)
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This setup is equivalent to assuming that trade done with the EU partners is denominated 
in euros, and with outside partners in dollars. T h e assumption may seem questionable, 
but is actually broader than the "integrated market” specification of Campa and Gonzalez- 
Minguez (2006)10 and in a sense a  natural extension. Moreover due to specific exchange 
rate regimes in some of the CEECs, including fixing to the euro or dollar and switching 
between regimes, the use of a type of effective exchange rate is necessary. Finally, one may 
wonder how reasonable it is to include for instance the UK together with the euro area, but 
having tried varying this approach by using the EM U or the EU-15 instead of the EU-25 
did not affect the results.11 One of the reasons could be the small amount of trade done 
with the non EM U members of the ’’old” EU relative to the dominating trade partners - 
Germany, Italy and France.
IV.4.1 Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy
The choice of exchange rate regime is determined by the choice of monetary policy. In 
the simple Mundell-Flemming framework, with capital flows, in a small (relative to  global 
capital) economy, in order to pursue a fully independent monetary policy, focusing on 
domestic shocks and pursuing a domestic target, like for instance pure inflation targeting, 
the authority must cease attempts to cont rol the exchange rate and allow it to  float. At the 
other extreme fixing its currency to another will require the adopt ion of the monetary policy 
of the target country (in order for the peg to be sustainable), and the adjustments to go 
through the price channel. In a sense in the real exchange rate link of the nominal exchange
rate and the nominal price level, there is only one degree of freedom, thus for instance an
10Our approach is actually a variation of the Campa and Gonzalez-Minguez (2006) ’segmented 
market’ specification, as we use the effective exchange rate and effective import prices.
n Some of the results in the two specifications are compared in Appendix B,
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CZECH R.
------CZKEUR —  - CZKUSD
Figure 1: Weekly CZI\ exchange rates against EC U /EU R (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ) : 1 Ja n  1991 - fixed peg against basket 
65% DEM, 35% USD. C .B. intervention band ± 0 .5% ; 28 Feb 1996(*) band widened to  
±7.5% ; 2G Mar 1997(*) (managed) float; Vertical solid line indicates 1999m ld l. Note that 
the CSK (Czecho-Slovak koruna) was replaced by the CZK on the 8th of February 1993 at 
par. Source: Thomson DataStream , transitioneconomies.blogspot.com
inflation target serving as a nominal anchor for expectations, determines the absorption of 
shocks through a flexible exchange rate and vice versa, a fixed nominal exchange rate, will 
require adjustments through the level of prices.
In practice, many intermediate arrangements exist, but any type of policy that should 
claim to overcome the above explained trade-off is unsustainable without strict capital 
controls. As we will see in the next section, CEECs exhibit a wide range of regimes, 
spanning from full float inflation targeting through various types of intermediate regimes 
to a fully fixed exchange rate.
186
ESTONIA
------EUR -------USD
Figure 2: Weekly EEK  exchange rates against ECU/EUR (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ): 20 Ju n  1992 currency board with 
DEM (subsequently EUR); 27 Jun 2004(*) ERM  II; Vertical solid line indicates 1999m ldl. 
Source: see above
IV.4.2 Exchange rate regimes in CEECs
The time-lines of exchange rate regimes and the historical exchange rates against the USD 
and the euro in the CEECs are described in Figures 1 to 8. In the 1990s’ early years of 
transition the Central and Eastern European economies have experienced high inflation, and 
partly as a result of this, frequent monetary regime changes. The quest for credibility in 
monetary policy caused the policy makers to take very different, and in some cases varying 
routes. There were notable attempts to  ’borrow’ credibility by fixing domestic currencies to 
well-recognized external ones, such as the USD or DEM, or a basket of currencies, however 
the way to proceed was uncertain, and the exchange rate developments often turbulent. 
The strongest commitments to  fixing the currency were visible in the adoption of currency 
boards in Estonia in 1992 and in Lithuania two years later. Latvia tightly pegged its lat 
to the SD R  basket, and maintained the arrangement till 2005. Poland, having started off
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HUNGARY
----- EUR - - - -  USD
Figure 3: Weekly HUF exchange rates against ECU /EU R (solid line) and USD (dot­
ted). Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ) : 9 Dec 1991(*) - peg to bas­
ket 50%ECU, 50% USD, C .B . intervention band ± 0 .3% ; 2 Aug 1993(*) basket changed 
to 50%DEM , 50%USD; 16 May 1994(*) - basket changed to 70%ECU, 30%USD; 22 Dec 
1994(*) - intervention band widened to  ±2.25% ; 13 Mar 1995(*) - crawling peg/band to bas­
ket. Bands at ±2.25% . Crawl rate decreasing; 1 Jan  1997(*) basket changed to  70%DEM, 
30% USD; 1 Ja n  1999(*) basket changed to 70% EU R, 30% USD; 1 Ja n  2000(*) bas­
ket changed to 100% EU R; 3 May 2001 (*) band widened to ±15% ; 1 Oct 2001 (*) fixed 
horizontal band ±15% . Notes: Devaluations in early 1990s. Vertical solid line indicates 
1999m Id 1. Source: see above
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LATVIA
Figure 4: Weekly LAT exchange rates against ECU/EUR (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ) : 20 Ju l 1992 managed float; 12 Feb 
1994 fixed peg to SDR basket. C .B. margin ±1% ; 1 Jan  2005(*) fixed peg to EUR. C .B. 
margin ±19£; 2 May 2005 ERM  II; Vertical solid line indicates 1999m ldl. Source: see 
above
LITHUANIA
------EUR - - - -  USD
Figure 5: Weekly LTL exchange rates against ECU/EUR (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ) : 1 Ju l 1992 managed float; 1 Apr 
1994(*) currency board with USD; 2 Feb 2002(*) currency board with EUR; 27 Jun  
2004(*) ERM  II; Vertical solid line indicates 1999m ldl. Source: see above
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POLAND
------EUR - — USD
Figure 6: Weekly PLN exchange rates against ECU /EU R (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (*): 1 Jan  1990 fixed to USD; 16 May 
1991 fixed to  basket (45% USD, 55% D E M + G B P + F F + C H F ); 14 Oct 1991 crawling peg 
to (same) basket. Crawl rate decreasing, C .B. intervention margin ±0.5% ; 6 Mar 1995(*) 
C .B . intervention margin widened to  ±2.0% ; 16 May 1995(*) crawling band (to basket) 
±7% . Crawl rate decreasing; 26 Feb 1998(*) band widened to ±10% ; 28 Oct 1998 band 
widened to ±12.5% ; 1 Ja n  1999(*) basket changed to  55% EU R , 45% USD; 25 Mar 1999(*) 
band widened to ±15% ; 12 Apr 2000(*) free float (but C .B . reserves extraordinary right 
to intervene) Notes: Devaluations in early 1990s. Vertical solid line indicates 1999m ldl. 
Source: see above
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SLOVAKIA
------EUR — - USD
Figure 7: Weekly SKK exchange rates against ECU /EU R (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ) :  1 Jan  1991 fixed peg against basket 
60% DEM, 40% USD, C.B. intervention band ±1.5% ; 1 Jan  1996(*) band widened to ±3% ; 
16 Ju l 1996(*) band widened to ±5% ; 1 Jan  1997(*) band widened to ± 7% ; 1 Oct 1998(*) 
managed float; 25 Nov 2005(*) - ERM  II; Vertical solid line indicates 1999m ldl. Note that 
the CSK (Czecho-Slovak koruna) was replaced by the SKK on the 8th of February 1993 at 
par. Source: see above
SLOVENIA
------.EUR ------USD
Figure 8: Weekly SIT  exchange rates against ECU/EUR (solid line) and USD (dotted). 
Vertical lines indicate dates described below with (* ) : 8 Oct 1991 managed float; 27 Jun 
2004(*) ERM  II; Vertical solid line indicates 1999mId 1. Source: see above
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1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
CZ - 9.9 9.5 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8 0.1 2.8 1.9
ES 89.8 47.7 28.8 23.1 10.6 8.2 3.3 4 5.7 3.6 1.3 3.1 4.1
IIU 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.6 18.3 14.2 10 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.6 6.8 3.6
LV 108.8 35.9 25 17.6 8.4 4.7 2.4 2.7 2.5 1.9 2.9 6.2 6.8
LI 410.2 72.2 39.7 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1 1.3 0.3 -1.2 1.2 2.7
PL 36.9 33.3 28.1 19.8 15.1 11.7 7.3 10.1 5.5 1.9 0.8 3.6 2.1
SK - 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12 7.3 3.3 8.6 7.6 2.7
SN 31.7 21 13.4 9,9 8.4 7.9 6.2 8.9 8.4 7.5 5.6 3.6 2.5
Table 1: Annual CPI inflation. Source: IM F (International Financial Statistics)
by attempting to fix to the USD, and forced to frequently devalue its currency in the early 
1990s followed the path of gradual increase in its exchange rate flexibility in order to reach 
a practically full float by the end of the decade. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia 
closed the decade with managed float regimes of very different degrees of tightness, and 
while Slovenia introduced this arrangement since the establishment of its currency, allowing 
for a gradual depreciation of the tolar, the other two went through years of pegging to 
currency baskets. Finally Hungary also went through crawling pegs, in order to finish with 
a wide horizontal band.
Despite the different regimes adopted, by the late 1990s all of the 8 EU  New Member 
States managed to stabilize inflation quite successfully (see Table 1). However, we still can 
observe very different monetary policy regimes from inflation targeting with a fully floating 
exchange rate to currency boards with a full fix.
Going into more detail about the period relevant for our data set, i.e. starting 1999ml, 
the exchange rate regimes were still subject to some changes, albeit to  a lesser extent than 
in the previous periods. This makes the analysis and comparison of E R P T  estimates in the 
CEECs more complicated and questionable but also, in a sense, more interesting.
The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia essentially maintained a managed floating 
exchange rate in the analyzed period, the second and third joining the ER M  II in 2005
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and 2004 respectively. Poland entered 1999 with a crawling (at a decreasing rate) peg 
against a basket of currencies (55% EU R, 45% USD). The intervention band was ±12.5%  
and was subsequently widened in March 1999 to ±15% . One year later the central bank 
switched to a fully floating exchange rate, albeit reserving itself the right of intervention in 
extraordinary situations.
In Hungary the regime was a crawling (at a decreasing rate) band to a euro-dollar basket 
with ±2.25%  margins. One year after (2000m l) the basket was replaced with the euro as 
the reference currency, a year later the band was widened to ±15% , and in October 2001 
the crawl of the peg ceased, thus turning to a fixed horizontal band.
As for the Baltic States, all three maintained relatively fixed exchange rate arrange­
ments. Estonia, being the first to introduce a currency board with the DEM , and subse­
quently the euro, entered the ERM  II  in 2004. Lithuania, which previously chose to fix its 
currency to the USD, switched the fix to the euro in early 2002 with the objective of future 
EMU membership. It also joined the ERM  II in 2004. Finally Latvia maintained a  tightly 
fixed peg (with ± 1 %  bands) to the virtual SDR, or in other words a basket o f international 
currencies until the end of 2004, switching then to the euro as the reference currency and 
joining the ERM  II four months later. The last, to date, to join the waiting room for the 
euro, was Slovakia, which entered the ERM  II in November 2005.
The issue of changes in exchange rate regime may pose a  problem for our estimation. 
The sample is too short be divided into sub-samples, but we will use recursive estimation 
as a  guide to the trustworthiness of the results.
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IV.4.3 CEECs - trade patterns
In practically all the SITC  sectors, aside perhaps from sector 3 (Mineral fuels), the 8 EU 
New Member States import the majority of goods from other EU states. Their integration 
with the EU , already high in 1999, increased further during the run up to EU membership. 
As visible in Figures 9 and 10 the share of imports originating from outside the EU, in 
individual sectors, resembles that of the entire EU. Nevertheless, the CEECs trade more 
intensively with EU members than the ’old1 EU , except for commodity sectors SITC 2 
(Crude materials) and again SIT C  3 (Mineral fuels).
IV.4.4 CEECs and the Euro
Part, of the accession agreement which the CEECs had to sign in order to join the EU, entails 
the adoption of the common currency ’as soon as they are ready1. No opt-out clause has been 
put in place for these countries, and in the mid to late 1990s all countries seemed rather 
determined to join. In fact many analysts predicted that due to large potential benefits 
there may be a rush to the euro. The situation however, changed rather drastically. At 
the date of entry to the EU , all but Poland, o f the 8 countries were pursuing an official 
target date for the adoption of the common currency. However it seems now, that in 
2007 only Slovenia will jo in , while most other countries have either withdrawn from or 
postponed their target dates. W hile Lithuania made an attem pt to join on the same date, 
its participation was ruled out by the European Commission on the grounds of missing 
the Maastricht inflation criterion by a marginal amount.12 Estonia, experiencing higher
inflation, decided beforehand not to  pursue the earlier target date i.e. 2007, partly in fear
l2The criterion of inflation lower than the average in the three EU countries with lowest inflation 
+1.5 percentage point. Notably, when Lithuania failed to fulfil the criterion by a narrow margin, 
i.e. in mid 2000, Poland was among the three countries upon which the cut-off value was calculated.
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of the adverse signal a rejected attem pt would make. Together with Latvia, all three remain 
in the ERM  II and now officially declare target dates in the area of 2008-2009, though the 
persistent higher inflation makes these dates questionable. Slovakia, the last to  jo in  the 
ERM II, officially aims at 2009, while the Czech Republic and Hungary withdrew from 
their previous declarations, and now follow Poland’s policy o f not setting an official target 
date. Contrary to  Slovenia, the B altic States, and Slovakia these countries do not seem 
determined to rush into the euro, partly because of lack of political support, but more 
probably due to  the reluctance to reduce fiscal deficits. Nevertheless declarations of officials 
from these countries rather exclude any attempt to adopt the euro before 2011. Finally, 
there does not seem to be pressure from the EU itself for the CEECs to adopt the euro, 
which together with the previously described developments means that for most C E E C s the 
issue of exchange rate management and monetary policy will remain vital for the coming 
years. E R P T  may prove important both in the years they follow an independent monetary 
policy, as well as once they are in the euro waiting-room - the ERM II.
IV.5 Estimation Methods
As described in the previous section, there are several problems concerning the d ata on 
lUVs for the New Member States. The shortness of the available sample puts in question 
whether one can claim to be able to capture the ’’ long run”, that is the levels cointegration 
relationship as in equation (9). The G years we are dealing with may just be too  short 
a sample for the actual long run to  reveal itself. In order to  somewhat circumvent this 
we propose using two alternative strategies. Firstly, we nevertheless attem pt estim ating 
the long run relationship with the available series (we will refer to this as the ’estimated 
long-run’ specification), and second we in a sense impose a  full pass-through in the long
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run ('imposed long-run’). In both cases, we test for cointegration between the variables by 
looking at the obtained error correction terms, and subsequently use them for estimating 
the instantaneous, short run E R P T  as represented by bo in equation (10).
The assumption of a full pass-through in the long run, though not necessarily correct,13 
can be backed with several arguments. First o f all, as mentioned in Section IV .2 a  large 
amount of macroeconomic literature assumes a  full (unit) E R P T  in the long run. Second, 
it does not seem totally unreasonable that in small economies the effects o f exchange rate 
movements are, in the long term, passed on to the price level. Third, as we will see, having 
estimated long run coefficients on the exchange rate in the levels equation (9) in most cases 
we are unable to reject the hypothesis that they are equal to 1 (see Table 2), although 
admittedly the confidence intervals are relatively wide, and thus in quite some cases we can 
neither reject them being equal to  zero.
Despite the possible suspicion of breaks within our sample, we decide not to use break 
detection methods, as the sample length is relatively short. Therefore we proceed with: 1) 
estimating the ’’long run” E R P T  coefficients, 2) testing for cointegration in the estimated 
and imposed long run relationships, both using single equation ADF tests and Pedroni 
(1999) panel test, 3) estimating the short run, first difference relationship.
Finally, in Appendix B  we provide some insight on E R P T  in aggregate C P I, aggregate 
IUVs and experiment with using the longer 1995-2005 sample.
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l
Model pseudo-t
Estimated long run -15.82
Imposed long run -5.79
Under the null hypothesis the statistics have
a N(Ofl) distribution
Table 5: Pseu d ot statistics from Pedroni (1999). The null hypothesis is no cointegration. 
Sample: 1999m l-2005m l, full panel (N =66), no cross-unit dependence.
IV.6 Results
Generally, we find rather strong evidence of the existence of a cointegrating relationship be­
tween our variables (see Tables 3, 4 and 5). W ith the data span that we deal with, it is hard 
to claim to have a good overview o f the actual long-run developments, moreover the sheer 
long-run estimates do not tend to  be very precise. Both  of these issues however, support 
our proposal to use both the 'estimated long-run’ and ’imposed long-run’ specifications, in 
to account for the possibility of both  a full and an imperfect pass-through in the long run.
In general the sectoraly disaggregated short run estimates are not very precise. In 
many cases of the single equation short-run estimates, though point-estimates fall within 
the expected values, more than 50%  cannot reject the short run being equal to 0 nor it 
being equal to 1, which may be due to  the exacerbation of the (dis)aggregation problems 
of dealing with IUVs, especially in short series. In  order to  increase the explanatory power, 
we decided to  propose grouping sectors within a country in order to perform a panel es­
timation. Obviously, this is a rough way to go about the problem, but it seems the only 
one available. Therefore we proceed by estimating three types of common coefficient, fixed 
effect panels for each country: (i) TO TA L - one which groups all industries in a country in
the cross-section dimension; (ii) SITCL0-4, also referred to  as primary sector, which groups 13
13Several empirical papers (see De Bandt, Banerjee and Kozluk, 2006; Campa and Minguez, 2006), 
using different definitions of long-run ERPT into import prices find incomplete pass-through even 
in the long run, in a number of sectors/countries.
202
Sh
or
t 
ru
n 
es
ti
m
at
es
 w
ith
 ’’
es
ti
m
at
ed
 l
on
g 
ru
n”
C
ze
ch
 I
t.
 
E
st
on
ia
 
H
un
ga
ry
 
L
at
vi
a 
L
it
hu
an
ia
 
Po
la
nd
 
Sl
ov
ak
ia
 
Sl
ov
en
ia
„ w
to
CJ
00
do C
203
sectors of commodity, agricultural goods and foodstuffs; (iii) SITC.5-8 also referred to as 
the processed or manufactured goods sector, which encompasses sectors of manufactured 
and chemical goods. In order to justify our grouping approach we must notice that re­
taining separate estimates for each country is in line the country specific characteristics 
such as monetary policy regimes and their changes, which have been found to matter for 
ERPT. More importantly, much of the work in the area of ERPT tended to show specific 
patterns that distinguish the behavior of prices of commodity/primary sectors from manu­
factured sectors (see for example Campa and Gonzalez-Minguez, 2006; De Bandt, Banerjee 
and Kozluk, 2006). Finally, the shares of CEECs trade done with the EU tend to be higher 
in the manufactured goods than in commodity sectors, tvhile they remain similar between 
countries. This is yet another reason to justify not only the grouping strategy adopted, but 
also the fact that we allow different ERPT estimates in primary and manufactured sectors. 
Thus we obtain common coefficient estimates which will be some sort of averages between 
sectors and between sector groups in a country. The results are advertised in Table 6.
First, tiie results do not differ significantly regardless whether the estimated or imposed 
long run are used.14 Next, the only country where the results are problematic is Slovakia, 
where all the estimated rates are both not significantly different from 0 nor from 1. In case 
of 4 countries (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland) the point estimates of the total 
ERPT into imports price is close to 1 and in fact insignificantly different from it. Of course, 
can we not be certain this is evidence of full pass-through, but the estimates are reasonably 
close. Next, in case of Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Latvia the full pass-through is
rejected, and only in the first case, we cannot reject the one-period pass-through being *204
14 Admittedly, the fact that we cannot reject the hypothesis of long-run ERPT smaller than one in 
Czech Republic and Slovenia (see Table 2 could lead us to favor the ’estimated long-run' specification 
in the case of the two countries. However, overall conclusions do not differ vastly, regardless of which 
of the two specifications we adopt.
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zero. Switching to  the SITC subgroups (ii) and (iii), we find that in case of the ”commodity 
and primary sectors” in Poland, Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic, we cannot 
reject full E R P T  in the short term, while easily rejecting the zero pass-through. In all of 
these countries, aside the Czech Republic, the point estimates o f E R P T  in the commodity 
sectors are rather close to one, indicating full or close to full E R P T . On the other hand, 
in Slovenia the commodity E R P T  is somewhat smaller, while still much higher than 0. 
The estimates for Estonia and Latvia, do not provide much insight. As for the production 
sectors, only in Hungary and Estonia the pass-through can be interpreted as full or close 
to full, while in Poland and Slovenia it is clearly non-zero, but rather not full. Finally, the 
short-run E R P T  in production sectors is rather low and close to zero in the Czech Republic 
and Latvia, while not much can be said about Lithuania.
Turning to the insight on the robustness of the results, Figures 11 to  13 show that 
reducing the sample by dropping up to  21 either last or first observations, does not, in 
principle, change the estimates or their significance. This confirms that during the analyzed 
period (1999-2005) E R P T  developments in the C EECs where rather stable, and thus our 
results seem to be robust.
Finally Appendix B presents the results for E R P T  into C PI and aggregate import prices. 
Though these results must be treated with even more caution than the above, we can see 
that pass-through into aggregate IUVs in Hungary, Lithuania and Poland seems generally 
significant and rather high in the short run, and close to full or full in the long run. As for 
the second degree pass-through - i.e. into the aggregate price indices, there is some evidence 
of non-zero short-term E R P T  and still rather high, albeit not full aside Lithuania, E R P T  
in the long run.
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IV. 7 Discussion
Overall, we can say that exchange rate regimes are not the primary' driving force behind the 
pass-through of the nominal effective exchange rate to import prices, as evidence pointing 
towards full or close to full immediate pass-through into IUVs in the total and commodity 
sectors can be found both for Poland and Hungary, with rather flexible regimes as well as for 
Lithuania which has had a currency board regime. Similarly, there is some weak indication 
of full ERPT in Estonia.15 On the other hand, Slovenia with a managed float has rather 
intermediate values of ERPT in the aggregate estimates and in both sector groups, while the 
Czech Republic has low aggregate, basically zero ERPT in production sectors, and rather 
high commodity sector short run pass-through rates. Generally, only in the case of Slovenia 
and Latvia can we reject full ERPT in the commodity sectors, and only in Poland, Czech 
Republic, and Latvia can we reject full ERPT in the production sectors.
Altogether, although our results are rough, they point to the issue of potential vul­
nerabilities in future strategies to adopt the euro. By the EU aquis, all the CEECs are 
required to join the common currency, and the ERM II waiting room imposes bounds on 
both exchange rate movements (for two years) and price changes (practically for 1 year). In 
countries like Poland and Hungary, where the full and immediate pass-through is coupled 
with a rather flexible exchange rate regime, the central bank will have to combine both the 
focus on price stability and on the effect of instantaneous movements in the exchange rate 
versus the euro and the euro/dollar rate on domestic prices. This may prove both tricky 
and hard to justify by the statutes of the central banks. At this point, in time, this seems
more of a problem for Hungary, which both historically and currently has higher inflation,
15The lack of precision of the results for Estonia may be driven by the fact of the kroon being 
tied to the currency of its largest trading partner (the EU) throughout the entire sample and thus 
experiencing very little nominal effective exchange rate variability.
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and if this were to continue, would need a smaller price swing (and thus, as a consequence of 
larger ERPT into the CPI, a smaller change in the exchange rate) to breach the benchmark. 
Admittedly by the time the two countries decide to join the euro, the situation may turn 
around, but the fact that not only there seems to be a strong immediate effect on import 
prices, but also an immediate effect on CPI backed by a strong or even full pass-through 
effect in the long run indicates this issue should not be overlooked. With lower and slower 
pass-through the Czech Republic seems much less prone to the same problems.
On the other hand, Lithuania’s currency board arrangement insulates it from fluctua­
tions of the lita against the euro, and makes the fulfillment of the exchange rate criterion 
seem rather simpler. However, with a full and immediate pass-through from the effective 
nominal exchange rate its prices are exposed to euro/dollar exchange rate changes, which 
are beyond any control of the central bank. Its attempt to enter the Eurozone in 2007 was 
set back because of inflation marginally exceeding the entry requirement, which proved the 
strict approach of the EU to applying the criteria. The fact that Lithuania exceeded the 
benchmark by less than 0,1 percentage points means that the difference between qualifying 
and not managing to is subtle and therefore an unfavorable euro/dollar development with 
full and instantaneous pass-through into import prices could, if it were to feed in to the 
CPI, jeopardize its euro prospects. Backing this argument we find a tendency for exchange 
rate fluctuations to be passed on to the CPI, to some extent in the short run and close to 
fully in the long run. Therefore, the currency board, will not provide full insulation against 
exchange rate changes. As for Estonia, this may be the case, but the evidence is rather 
weak, while in Latvia, more room for exchange rate fluctuations is accompanied by a rather 
low pass-through. Finally Slovenia with its imperfect pass-through is already on a steady 
road to the common currency.
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Figure 11: Recursive estimations of short-run ERPT into IUVs. Point estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals. In each panel, the observations are obtained as follows: (left part of 
the panel) we start by dropping the 21 last observations and estimate equation (10) and 
plot the short-run ERPT, next we add one observation and reestimate. So on until reaching 
the full sample. Then (right part of each panel) we take the full sample and drop the first 
observation, and plot the resulting ERPT, and so on until having dropped the first 21 
observations. The specification is ’estimated long-run’. Solid horizontal lines are at values 
0 and 1.
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Figure 12: Recursive estimations of short-run ERPT into IUVs. Point estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals. See Fig. 11 for details.
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IV. 8 Conclusions
Exchange rate pass-through has been been given significant attention, due to its insight on 
foreign and domestic firm market power, market competition structure and the design of 
monetary policy. In this paper we attem pt to estimate the E R P T  into sectoral import prices 
in 8  Central European countries. T h e main problems regard the data - the short transition 
history is further troubled with structural change issues o f major shifts in exchange rate 
regimes, ongoing integration with the EU, economic transition itself and a change in regime 
in the regions largest trading partners - the introduction of the euro. Despite this, we 
manage to obtain several interesting results.
Admittedly, the relatively short time span and consequently imprecise estimates do not 
allow us to say too much about the long run E R P T  in the new Member States. However, 
we can say a number of things about the estimates of the short run pass-through. First of 
all they are rather robust to  the different long run specifications proposed - i.e. they are 
unaffected by whether we use the estimated values of the long run or impose an assumption 
about full pass-through in the long run. Moreover, despite rather disappointing power 
of the sectoral estimates, estim ating the values for the groups of commodity sectors and 
production sectors yields relatively strong results. Short run pass-through of the effective 
exchange rate fluctuations in the two most advanced (in terms of GDP per capita) Central 
European countries, Czech Republic and Slovenia, which suggests foreign exporters are less 
willing to pass-through short term fluctuations of the exchange rate thus more pricing to 
market. Notably the two countries differ to a large extent on the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility - Slovenia has a rather tightly managed float, while the Czech koruna is rather 
flexible. On the other hand in Poland, Hungary and Lithuania E R P T  is full or close to 
full in the short term, meaning that any effective exchange rate fluctuations are passed on
2 1 0
immediately to the import prices. Again the exchange rate regime does not seem a crucial 
determinant here - Poland with practically a free float is behaving similarly as Hungary 
with a very wide fluctuation band and Lithuania with a  currency board. Finally, except for 
Slovenia, and less confidently Estonia E R P T  in commodities is full or close to  full and is 
generally higher than in the production sectors, where it tends to take intermediate values. 
As most of trade in commodities is done with extra-euro partners, this indicates that even 
a currency board with the euro may fail to provide insulation of commodity prices against 
the fluctuations of exchange rates.
Although tentative, the finding that ’first-degree’ E R P T  tends to be full or close to full, 
tends to be an important indicator for the future strategies regarding the waiting room for 
the euro. Full and immediate pass-through into import prices, if largely fed through further 
to CPI, which as we show seems to be the case, could potentially jeopardize euro entry 
prospects by causing problems with fulfilling the inflation criterion. Up-to-date experience 
has shown, that the assessment tends to be strict, and together with the fact that even a 
currency board does not insulate against global exchange rate fluctuations, a tendency to 
pass on these changes into the price may prove sufficient for the benchmark to  be exceeded. 
Of course this will surely not be the only obstacle, and quite possibly not a  m ajor one, 
however it is a vulnerability that should be kept in mind.
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Appendix A - D ata Sources: Eurostat, C O M E X T. 
import prices - monthly indexes of effective import unit values (calculated to be based on 
local currency, combines imports from inside and from outside EC-23). Logs taken. Re- 
based for 2 000-100 .
foreign prices - monthly indexes of import unit values into the EV-25 (calculated to be 
based on the effective euro/dollar aggregate currency, combines imports from inside and 
from outside EU-25). Logs taken. Rebastxl for 2000—100.
exchange rates  - index of monthly average? exchange rate of local currency against the ef­
fective euro/dollar aggregate. Logs taken. Iichased for 2000 = 100.
SITC code - Industry
0 - Food and live animals chiefly for food
1 - Beverages and Tobacco
2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
•1 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
5 -  Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.
0 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials
7 - Machines, transport equipment
8 - Manufaet urexl goods n.e.c.
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